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ABSTRACT
The process of population decline that is now under way in the old
residential areas of most large American cities raises many questions
about the future of such areas. Current interpretations emphasize the
difficulties of rebuilding these "gray areas" even though they are ap-
parently diminishing in usefulness in their present form. This study
examines recent trends in the utilization of old residential neighbor-
hoods in the central cities of large urban regions, and prospects for
rebuilding them with new private housing,
Declining residential areas still play an important role on the metro-
politan scene: they provide a supply of cheap housing for low-income
groups. Migrations of low -income minority groups into the cities are
currently at record levels. These migrations, plus high birth rates
among low-income families already in the cities, promise a large con-
tinuing demand for low-cost housing during the next decade or two.
The movement of earlier central-city residents to the suburbs during
the 1950's, which accounts for population losses, enabled remaining
occupants to improve their living conditions and helped provide housing
for the newcomers. Old residential areas are generally still w6ll-
utilized; large-scale programs to rebuild them at the present time would
remove needed low-cost housing from the market.
The main alternatives for public policy are either to attempt a gradual
rebuilding by replacing surplus housing in small parcels as abandonment
proceeds, or to wait until the declining areas have been thoroughly
vacated and then to clear large areas for rebuilding. On social as well
as economic grounds, a gradual replacement of deteriorated housing
would be preferable. To determine the feasibility of attracting new pri-
vate housing into the declining areas, this study analyzes rebuilding
prospects in the central cities of three contrasting regions: New York,
Los Angeles, and Hartford.
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The test of this feasibility consists of two pre-conditions: (1) land
costs for sites to be rebuilt must be commensurate with their re-
use value for new housing,, and (2) the total demand for cleared land
must be great-enough to permit a replacement of all deteriorated
housing within a reasonable number of years.
Several regional characteristics have special significance in estab-
lishing these pre-conditions for rebuilding. In regions where the
downtown core is particularly strong as a place of employment and
service, the central location of declining areas may constitute a
distinct asset in the market for new housing. The supply of vacant
land competitive with new housing sites in the declining areas, and
the density of existing development in these areas also influence
the feasibility of rebuilding. Further, the total demand for new
multifamily housing within the region sets an upper ceiling on the
potential rate of rebuilding the older areas, since site costs are
normally too high for new single-family homes.
Despite the importance of these characteristics, rebuilding is
feasible under many different sets of regional circumstances; no
unique combination of factors is required. The highly divergent
cities of New York and Los Angelesboth meet the pre-conditions
for rebuilding, while Hartford is borderline in meeting the first
requirement and fails to meet the second.
Where the pre-conditions are weak, public action can have some
effect in strengthening them, but rebuilding will probably require
some direct public subsidy if it is to proceed at a reasonable pace.
In cities that meet the pre-conditions for rebuilding, the task of
public action is to create a suitable environment for new housing in
the declining areas. Failure to establish this final condition accounts
in large part for the lack of construction activity in declining areas
where the economic basis for new development is sound. Although
public programs for gradual rebuilding have rarely been attempted,
recent experience in New York and Los Angeles suggests several
useful approaches for integrating new housing into old areas as part
of a steady rebuilding process.
Thesis Supervisor: Lloyd Rodwin
Title: Professor of Land Economics
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PREFACE
Research into problems of urban policy first requires a diagnosis
of current and emerging urban conditions. This study is directed
largely toward understanding the significance of recent changes in
population patterns and the utilization of old housing in American
cities, and evaluating the prospects for rebuilding declining neigh-
borhoods. Recommendations for public policy follow from these
empirical analyses.
Information for the study has come principally from an examination
of three contrasting cities: New York, Los Angeles, and Hartford.
Assembling necessary facts on the relevant characteristics of these
cities and their surrounding regions has required extensive contact
with government agencies, realtors, and individuals well acquainted
with housing market conditions. My indebtedness to these local
sources is acknowledged specifically in the course of this work, but
several individuals and organizations are due for special thanks for
their very generous assistance.
In New York, Milton Abelson of the Regional Plan Association was
particularly helpful in many ways. Staff members of the Federal
Housing Administration, the New York Department of City Planning
(especially Sylvid Wolosof and Samuel Joroff), the New York Housing
and Redevelopment Board (Louis Winnick and Frank Kristof), and
Abram Barkan of James Felt and Company also helped generously.
For assistance in Los Angeles, I am most indebted to Henry A.
Babcock; Professor Leo Grebler and Frank Mittelbach of the
University of California Real Estate Research Program; Carleton
VBlock and Ben-Ami Friedman of the Los Angeles City Planning
Commission; George Marr of the Los Angeles County Regional
Planning Commission; Charles Shattuck and Kurt Shelger;
Belden Morgan and other staff members of the Federal Housing
Administration; and Arnold A. Wilken, Area Representative of
the Housing and Home Finance Agency.
In Hartford, special assistance was provided by Robert J. Bartels,
Director of the Hartford Commission on the City Plan; John Rowlson;
Robert Chave of the Capitol Region Planning Agency; staff members
of the Federal Housing Administration and of the Hartford Area
Transportation Study.
Faculty members of the M. I. T. Department of City and Regional
Planning offered good counsel in the formulation of research pro-
posals and made many useful comments on an earlier draft of this
study. I am particularly indebted to Professor Lloyd Rodwiri, who
served as thesis advisor, and to Professors John T. Howard, Kevin
Lynch, Frederick J. Adams, and Charles Abrams.
I am grateful to the Joint Center for Urban Studies of M. I. T. and
Harvard University for a research fellowship that provided financial
assistance and a stimulating atmosphere in which to work.
Finally, I am most indebted to my wife for her support and encourage-
ment and for her own intellectual contributions to this study.
Bernard J. Frieden
Cambridge
February, 1962
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CHAPTER I
DECLINNG AREAS: A PROBLEM FOR OUR CITIES
Vast and complex changes mark the current development of American
cities. People choose to live in new locations: large numbers migrate
into urban regions, while others within these regions move into new
suburban patterns of settlement. Powerful forces are producing major
urban transformations, and intricate cross-currents of population move-
ment. In this dynamic situation, analysis and prediction are difficult.
The winds of change are obvious to all, but their speed and direction
are not yet gauged.
It is clear that growth and decline go hand-in-hand in the modern metro-
polis. Of our ten largest cities in 1950, nine lost population between
1950 and 1960, while their metropolitan regions continued to grow.
Even the large central cities that continued to expand, such as Los
Angeles, lost population near the core while expanding at the outer
fringe. The same combination of central decline and over-all increase
also characterized many smaller urban regions in the 1950's. Suburban
growth has thus had -a side effect of depleting population in central resi-
dential areas.
Current interpretations of the American city emphasize the problems
of obsolescence and decline in a period of generally buoyant expansion.
The rebuilding of older areas has become a matter of national concern,
with the federal government spending millions of dollars every year for
urban renewal subsidies. And the picture of urban problems that has
emerged with this new interest is a grim one.
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The "Gray Areas" Hypothesis
Many square miles of our cities consist of old residential areas
where population decline has already begun or appears imminent.
To recent analysts, 1 these are the "gray areas" of obsolescent
housing, destined to become increasingly vacated in the near future.
In their view, the old residential structures are rapidly outliving
their usefulness, and will shortly be ready for clearance and replace-
ment. Further, according to the gray areas hypothesis, economic
and social forces are operating inexorably both to destroy the present
usefulness of these parts of the city, and to block their rebuilding as
new residential communities.
What is the nature of this hypothetical process that seems to ensure
indefinite stagnation in the old residential areas, long after they are
fully ripe for rebuilding? Changing public taste is expected to bring
about a rapid obsolescence of buildings constructed to the standards of
past generations, while the buildings themselves deteriorate with age.
Residents will withdraw, leaving behind a set of partially occupied
buildings. These semi-abandoned structures are at the base of the-
gray areas hypothesis: their continued presence is expected to con-
stitute a severe liability encumbering the land they occupy. It is argued
on the basis of current experience that such land can be cleared only at
a high cost, for old structures are expensive to acquire despite their
waning utilization.
Recent experience also suggests that desirable building sites will be
available at a lower cost on vacant outlying land. Suburban sites have
already become the overwhelmingly popular choice for new housing,
and little evidence is at hand to suggest a sharp reversal of this trend.
The attractions of the suburbs hardly need elaboration, and a steadily
growing highway network within our metropolitan areas promises to
open up an increasing supply of suburban land with good accessibility
to jobs and consumer services.
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The gray areas, in comparison, offer few present or potential
advantages. The central location of most of these areas was
formerly a considerable asset for their development, but with the
outward spread of jobs and services, and with improved highway
access to the suburbs, central locations no longer play a dominant
role in the housing market. While a limited number of people want
to live near the center, and are willing to pay enough for their
housing to compensate for high land costs, the vast majority of those
in the market for new housing choose suburban dwellings.
Thus the gray areas argument constitutes both an explanation of cur-
rent population decline with its concomitant lack of new construction,
and a prediction of more widespread abandonment and stagnation in
the coming decades. The argument rests on assumptions -- drawn
largely from current experience -- about cost differentials between
built-up and vacant land, and assumptions about the extent of housing
demand for inner locations. A further elaboration concerns the type
of housing that people will choose. While multifamily housing can
overcome high land costs by economizing on the amount of land re-
quired for each unit, the mass market is for single-family dwellings,
which require a lavish amount of land per unit. Although a certain
portion of the population favors apartment living, an increasing share
of the demand for apartments is also expected to favor suburban loca-
tions.
On all these grounds, analysts of the gray areas foresee a bleak future.
For the mass new housing market, the value of gray area land is ex-
pected to fall far short of its acquisition cost. The housing demand
that remains for gray area locations is assumed to be too small to per-
mit extensive clearance of the large residential sections that are
becoming obsolete. In short, this hypothesis holds that the market for
new housing will decisively reject locations in the declining residen-
tial areas, in favor of suburban locations on vacant land. "Gray area"
has become a pejorative term, synonymous with decay and stagnation.
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According to this argument, the only prospects for new development
would require using tremendous public subsidies to wipe out current
cost differentials between gray area sites and competitive vacant land,
or waiting many years until acquisition costs fall to low levels,
The Declining Areas in a Different Perspective
This study will take issue with the basic perspective of the gray areas
hypothesis, and with many of its supporting assumptions. As a diagno-
sis of current trends, the gray areas view accurately identifies the
direction of changes now under way. But it exaggerates the rate of
change, and thus leads to an ill-founded notion of the under-utilization
of older residential neighborhoods, with undesirable implications for
public policy. For these areas serve vital social purposes, and will
probably continue to do so for at least the next two decades. They
provide housing for the flow of low-income migrants now streaming
into urban regions. The gray areas hypothesis poses a premature
issue: how to accomplish the large-scale rebuilding of these declining
areas.
The task of the next twenty years in most of our large cities is more
properly one of conserving the old housing and improving it, so that it
can continue to serve low-income groups in the population. Deteriorated
areas that are truly ripe for clearance will be measured by the acre
rather than by the square mile. Limited clearance of deteriorated
housing would permit a gradual rebuilding of the old areas, with small
increments of new development replacing the old structures as they
wear out, and with a steady influx of new population during the long
period of transition. For this scale of clearance, the economic pre-
conditions of rebuilding -- a price relationship in which site costs do
not exceed re-use values, and a sufficiently large potential demand for
housing sites in the older areas -- can be met in many metropolitan
regions.
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Further, this type of selective clearance can permit a desirable
alternative to the long process of abandonment and decay, followed
by eventual total clearance, as foreseen in the gray areas view.
Where the pre-conditions for rebuilding are present, new develop-
ment can gradually replace deteriorated housing, bringing a steady
influx of new population while occupancy of the old housing declines.
The components of this argument are developed and tested in the
following chapters, but they can be summarized briefly here.
Use of Declining Areas
Utilization of old residential neighborhoods is closely linked to the
migration of low-income people into urban areas. Historically, such
migrant groups entering the cities have generally occupied housing
that has been abandoned by earlier residents. In the 1950:'s, record
numbers of central city residents moved out to the suburbs, leaving
a partial vacuum in the older areas. At the same time, however,
record numbers of low-income migrants from the South and from
Puerto Rico poured into the urban regions on a scale equal to that of
the great European migrations of the past. The new migrants, like
their counterparts from Europe fifty years ago, settled largely in old
sections of the central cities.
Migration alone did not fill the housing vacuum: minority populations
already in the cities expanded significantly, and there was a general
reduction of household size among other residents of the central cities.
The change in household size reflects in part a rising proportion of
small families in the center, and in part an increase in dwelling space
for the average family. On balance, most large central cities declined
slightly in population in the 1950's, but their housing stock was still
well utilized, and vacancy rates were only moderate. Population loss
thus had little to do with falling utilization of the housing stock. In-
stead, it facilitated an upgrading of space standards for many families,
and enlarged the supply of housing for expanding low-income groups.
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In time, present low-income minority groups will surely vacate the
old neighborhoods in their search for better housing. This process is
already under way in many areas, but at a rate so slow that it is barely
perceptible. Discrimination in the housing market is one factor that
seems likely to hold down the pace of decentralization for Negroes and
other minorities now concentrated in the central cities, even when
their incomes rise. When minorities and other low-income groups
eventually vacate the old housing, provided that they are not replaced
by future in-migrants, a large part of the old housing stock will be
truly abandoned and ready for large-scale clearance. But the present
peak rate of low-income migration to the cities, the slow pace of
minority group movement from central cities to suburbs, and the high
birth rates among minority groups, suggest that few cities will be
ready for wholesale clearance within the next decade or two.
Housing in the declining areas is by no means uniformly substandard.
Many of the structures no longer conform to predominant middle-class
taste, but only a small proportion are seriously deteriorated or lacking
in basic facilities. Since the old housing is still very much in demand,
any general clearance program would create considerable hardship,
unless alternate housing were provided for low-income groups to re-
place whatever is cleared. Under the circumstances, clearance efforts
should logically be limited to a scale consistent with the supply of vacant
low-cost housing, and should concentrate on removing only dilapidated
or clearly substandard structures. Since the need for low - and moderate -
cost housing is likely to persist for some time, public policy should also
aim at rehabilitating and conserving the old housing, in order to prolong
its usefulness during a period when it will be needed.
Public Policy Alternatives
If clearance is feasible on a limited scale, is there any reason to pro-
mote the rebuilding of cleared sites in the near future? One alternative
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for public policy is to await the gradual abandonment of declining
areas, and to defer rebuilding until depopulation is well advanced
and site acquisition costs have fallen to a generally low level. A
contrasting policy would be to promote the gradual rebuilding of such
areas, clearing old buildings as they deteriorate or become vacant,
and replacing them with small parcels of new construction,
The first alternative -- gradual abandonment, followed by ultimate
large-scale clearance -~ is implicit in the gray area view of the
future. This pattern of decline has some highly objectionable features,
however, During the long period of abandonment, service costs would
be high in relation to the number of people using local facilities.
Streets, utilities, and public services would have to be maintained for
a dwindling population. New capital investments in schools and en-
vironmental improvements would be difficult to justify against other
pressing claims on public funds, since the life of many of these facil-
ities would be a short one, geared to the life expectancy of the old
housing. In all likelihood, public services would be cut back to mini-
mum levels, despite the needs of remaining low-income people.
In time, high vacancy rates will reduce acquisition costs sufficiently
so that large -scale clearance and rebuilding can begin. Yet most
areas will be far from completely vacant even at this point; perhaps
half the dwelling units will still be occupied. Remaining residents
are likely to be those with the greatest attachment to the community.
They will have to be relocated, with all the well-known hardships
that have already beset large redevelopment projects.
The alternative course of action is to rebuild declining areas gradually,
so that new housing develops at the same time that occupancy of the old
units declines. This pattern of change avoids the problems of under-
utilization by supplying an influx of new occupants throughout the transi-
tion period. A high level of services can be provided for the total
population, while capital investments can be related to new housing as
well as old. Further, low-income residents would leave the area at
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times of their own choosing. The limited clearance of deteriorated
and predominantly vacant structures would displace some people from
time to time, but if they wished to remain in the area, they could move
into other buildings with a longer useful life. Some old residents might
wish to move into the new buildings. Continual rebuilding would also
broaden the range of residential choice for new occupants, offering
them an opportunity to find new housing and good local services at inner
locations formerly occupied entirely by the old residential areas. Fi-
nally, gradual rebuilding will promote greater internal variety in an
area than complete clearance and rebuilding at one stroke.
In some cases, the physical constraints of gradual rebuilding will run
counter to the desired direction of change. When the new function of
an area requires a radically different land use pattern, with a complete
reorganization of streets and utilities, rebuilding by small sections
may prove impractical. Or if the new development is incompatible with
housing -- heavy industry, for example -- partial redevelopment would
deteriorate the environment still further for remaining residents. In
general, the constraints of slow rebuilding will create more complex
physical planning problems than a clean sweep, but only rarely are
these problems likely to make a gradual approach unworkable. Where
no compelling reasons dictate a choice of large-scale clearance, grad-
ual rebuilding offers clear advantages in avoiding the problems of slow
decline and subsequent dislocation.
Feasibility of Gradual Rebuilding
A gradual replacement of worn-out housing with new construction may
be socially desirable, but is it economically feasible? New construction
could take many forms: shopping areas, factories, housing, community
facilities. Our analyses are limited to the feasibility of attracting new
housing, with the assumption that supporting activities -- shopping,
schools, public facilities -- will follow the housing pattern. We thus
omit any consideration of industrial development or other forms of
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non-residential construction, which may nevertheless replace old
housing in some areas.
The feasibility of attracting new housing to old residential areas,
as we define it, depends upon two sets of requirements. First,
economic pre-conditions must be such that large public subsidies
will be unnecessary to market cleared land for new housing .
Second, the surrounding environment must be upgraded sufficiently
so that it neither obstructs new development nor exercises a blighting
influence upon it.
The pre-conditions,then, are twofold: (1) the value of cleared land
for new housing must be commensurate with its acquisition cost,
and (2) the demand for housing sites must be great enough to utilize
all cleared land that is not needed for environmental improvements
(schools, public works), within a reasonable number of years.
If these pre-conditions are fulfilled, other problems remain before
rebuilding can be accomplished. First, the environment must be
brought up to a level high enough to attract residents willing to pay
the cost of new housing. Second, cleared areas must be properly
integrated with surrounding residential development so that older
existing structures do not deter new building or lower its quality.
This second set of requirements will call for experimentation with
various types of neighborhood plans, involving different proportions
of clearance and rehabilitation, and different treatments of the en-
vironment.
Current lack of new development in older areas does not necessarily
indicate the absence of pre-conditions for rebuilding. Even when an
area meets the pre-conditions for attracting new housing, further
public action is necessary to create the final conditions for rebuilding.
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In many cases, the present stagnation of older areas results from a
failure to capitalize upon basically favorable circumstances.
Meeting the final conditions for rebuilding -- upgrading the environ-
ment,, replanning the neighborhood -- will surely involve sizable
outlays of public funds for new community facilities, for assistance
in rehabilitation, and for general overhead. These expenditures will
bring obvious benefits in terms of improved living conditions and pro-
longed usefulness for old residential areas. In each locality, these
social benefits will have to be weighed against the costs involved, and
against alternative welfare policies. Except for a brief glance at
cost levels,we shall not analyze the issues involved here in any detail.
Our concern is: if environmental improvements are undertaken, can
new housing be attracted into declining areas without large additional
subsidies ?
Influence of Regional Structure
The first pre-condition for attracting new housing -- a balance between
site cost and re-use value -- depends in part upon the characteristics
of individual metropolitan regions. The structure of a region influences
this balance in several ways:
a, The older areas, which are generally near the center of
the region, may or may not derive special advantages
from their location. Depending upon the strength and
functional significance of the downtown core, the value
of inlying housing sites may be considerable.
b. Alternate vacant sites may or may not be competitive with
clearance areas, depending upon their respective locations
and the regional transportation system.
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c. The density of existing development, which influences
the cost of site acquisition, varies considerably in the
old residential areas of different regions, as well as
within regions.
Aside from structural influences, regional differences in consumer
housing taste, in public acceptance of high densities, and in the cost
of new construction also create significant differences in the feasi-
bility of rebuilding declining areas.
New housing can be feasible in the declining areas under many different
regional circumstances; no unique combination of factors is required.
Our detailed analyses cover three contrasting regions: New York,
Los Angeles, and Hartford. Site costs and potential re-use values
for new multifamily housing are roughly in balance in the declining
sections of all three central cities. Housing demand need not favor
central locations in order to bring land values in line with site costs
in central areas. Centrality has little significance in the Los Angeles
housing market; yet land costs and potential returns from new housing
are commensurate in the aging inner areas of Los Angeles.
A factor of special significance in establishing current relationships
between site costs and re-use values is the density of development
before and after rebuilding. The density of existing housing in clear-
ance areas has a major effect on land cost, with cost rising in direct
relation to density. The density of new housing has a parallel effect
in establishing the maximum land price that is feasible for new develop-
ment: the higher the density, the higher the price that can be paid.
When new buildings are developed at higher densities than existing
structures on the site, as is generally the case in Los Angeles, the
economics of new development permit an easy conversion of old housing
to new. When preferences in the housing market dictate a moderate
reductionih density, as in parts of New York, such a change may also
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be feasible. Only a radical downward break with the densities of
the past is likely to create a wide gap between high site costs and
low re-use values.
Demand for Multifamily Housing
The second pre-condition for rebuilding calls for a balance between
the amount of land to be cleared of deteriorated housing and the
amount of land that can be utilized by new housing in the clearance
areas. Present land prices for sites that must be cleared of old
structures are generally too high to permit the use of the land for
single-family homes. Thus the size of the market for new multi-
family housing is a basic factor in establishing the rate at which
cleared sites can be rebuilt.
Where the total demand for new apartments is small and cannot be
increased, the rate of rebuilding must be slow. Alternatives then
are either to provide subsidies to counter the high cost of cleared
sites and make them available for single-family homes, or to await
the eventual abandonment of the declining areas and a fall in their
acquisition cost.
Few large cities have so limited a demand for new multifamily
housing that a rebuilding of their declining areas is obviously un-
feasible on these grounds alone. Only a portion of the new multi-
family demand can be attracted to the old areas, however, depending
in part upon consumer locational preferences, as well as upon the
price of competitive sites and the total cost of developing and operating
new housing in the old areas and alternate locations.
To judge how much of this new housing could occupy cleared sites in
the declining neighborhoods requires a careful analysis of locational
characteristics of the housing market in each metropolitan region.
In two of the three regions that we analyze in detail, a sufficient
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amount of new multifamily construction could potentially be drawn
into the old locationsto permit a reasonably rapid replacement of
deteriorated housing. At current land consumption rates for such
new housing, New York could rebuild its deteriorated areas in nine
years, In Los Angeles, fourteen years would be required.
Of the three regions studied in detail, only Hartford would be unable
to rebuild its cleared land in a reasonable time. Hartford may be
representative of a common situation among small cities where the
total current demand for new multifamily housing is quite limited.
Even if a significant part of this demand could be satisfied -within the
declining areas, the pace of land utilization would be slow, and
several decades would be required before sites cleared of deteriorated
housing could be rebuilt with new construction.
A glance at recent homebuilding in large urban regions indicates that
many have the raw material for a rebuilding program in the form of
a sizable volume of multifamily housing. In addition to New York
and Los Angeles, the metropolitan regions of Chicago, Philadelphia,
Washington, San Francisco, San Diego, Atlanta, Miami, Minneapolis,
and Seattle all have been building a large number of multifamily units
in recent years. 2 These regions warrant a close examination of
locational aspects of their housing markets, to determine the extent
to which the new multifamily construction can serve as a basis for
rebuilding their deteriorated areas in the near future.
Variations in Public Policy
Public policies for rebuilding can differ considerably in various cities,
depending upon the presence or absence of the pre-conditions for
attracting new housing to the old residential areas. Where these pre-
conditions are weak, as in Hartford, limited action may be possible
to strengthen them through the general physical planning of the region.
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Changes in regional structure -- the transportation system, the
functional importance of the center ~~ and changes in the regulation
of building on competitive sites, may create additional demand for
housing locations in the old neighborhoods. Federal action in the
fields of housing and tax policy may increase the demand for multi-
family housing by altering price relationships between single-family
and multifamily housing. Barring such changes, the rebuilding of
declining sections in these regions will have to proceed very slowly
until such time as land costs fall, or rebuilding will have to be
accomplished with the aid of sizable- public subsidies.
In the large cities that already meet the pre-conditions for rebuilding,
policies can be shaped to accomplish a gradual replacement of de-
teriorated housing. Public action will have to be taken to create the
final conditions for integrating new and old housing. Individual neigh-
borhoods will require many different types of treatment to render
their environments satisfactory for new housing, and experimentation
will be necessary to develop appropriate planning techniques. 'The
gradual transformation of old areas will not be simple to manage, but
with an economic basis assured, public policy can focus increasingly
on detailed techniques for initiating and maintaining a steady rebuilding
process.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The "gray areas" hypothesis is most fully developed in the
work of Raymond Vernon cited in Appendix C, but see
also the work of Hoyt and Rapkin in Appendix C, and
the general interpretations of Paul N. Ylvisaker, "The
Deserted City, " Journal of the American Institute of
Planners, XXV, No. 1 (February 1959), 1-6, and
"Opening Minds and Expanding Cities, " in Ends and
Means of Urban Renewal, Philadelphia, Philadelphia
Housing Association, 1961, pp. 7-21.
2. See Gardner F. Derrickson, "Recent Homebuilding Trends
in Major Metropolitan Areas," Construction Review, VI,
No. 9 (September 1960)' 5-10. Of the eleven areas cited,
five had more than 15, 000 new multifamily units (in 5-or-
more family structures)'in 1958 and 1959, and the re-
mainder had more than 5, 000 new multifamily units in
this two-year period.
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CHAPTER II
THE USES OF AGING AREAS:
POPULATION LOSSES AND HOUSING GAINS
The use of old housing is intimately bound up with migrations of
low -income groups into the city, and migrations of earlier residents
out of it. Relationships between migration patterns and the old neigh-
borhoods have become clear enough to take on the status of an urban
American tradition. Thus the narrator of a 1960 novel by Philip Roth
visits the old Jewish section of a city and finds it now the heart of the
Negro area:
The neighborhood had changed: the old Jews like my
grandparents had struggled and died, and their offspring
had struggled and prospered, and moved further and
further west, towards the edge of Newark, then out of
it, and up the slope of the Orange Mountains, until they
had reached the crest and started down the other side,
pouring into Gentile territory as the Scotch-Irish had
poured through the Cumberland Gap. Now, in fact, the
Negroes were making the same migration, following the
steps of the Jews, and those who remained in the Third
Ward lived the most squalid of lives and dreamed in their
fetid mattresses of the piny smell of Georgia nights. 1
This dual movement of old groups and new provides a source of housing
for the newcomer, and a market for the old structures. Currently,
both movements are operating at record levels, pumping low-income
migrants into the old neighborhoods almost as rapidly as the old resi-
dents desert them. Many central cities regard the loss of their former
residents to the suburbs as a civic tragedy. Remaining occupants of
the old areas, however, as well as the newcomers, have been well
served by the great move to the suburbs in the 1950's. For the thinning
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out of population in central areas brought with it a gradual improve-
ment of living conditions, with more interior space per person and
an easing of the housing shortage of ten years ago.
Still, the improvement has been modest, representing an inching up
of housing standards rather than a dramatic rise. In most large
cities, the gains of the past decade are tenuous as yet, and could
be set back considerably by unvise public policies. Large-scale
programs to clear the old residential areas pose a particular threat
to the presently improving situation. As the housing market has
been operating, the production of new units has barely taken care of
new household formation, with just enough of a surplus to create a
slight expansion in the general housing supply. If future production
maintains the same relationship to growing demand, the destruction
of a large number of old units would undo much of this expansion
and plunge cities once again into a period of shortage and overcrowding.
To gauge the results of population shifts of the 1950's and their impli-
cations for the aging neighborhoods of American cities, we shall look
briefly at the recent experience of the ten cities that were largest in
the nation in 1950. Following this general survey, we shall investi-
gate in more detail three contrasting urban regions -- New York,
Los Angeles, and Hartford -- to examine the nature of their changes
in population and the utilization of their housing, and to determine the
character of their declining sections. We want to know (1) whether
the old housing supply is still useful, (2) whether the new migrants
are following close on the heels of their predecessors in leaving the
older parts of the cities, and (3) whether new private construction
shows any signs of replacing the old structures in these locations.
Migration to the City
The future of declining urban neighborhoods will be determined largely
by the flow of low-income migrants to the city. This type of migration
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is thus basic to our study of both the national scene and our three
selected cities.
The United States is now involved in a migration of historic pro-
portions: the movement of Negroes from the South to the urban
areas of the North. In the 1950's, this flow reached a record level,
with net migration of nonwhites from the South at 1, 457, 000. 2
Some figures. on earlier migrations from Europe lend historical
perspective here. The great Irish and German migrations of the
1850's each brought less than one million people to the United States
in a decade. Peak Jewish migrations from 1900 to the first World
War were at the rate of approximately one million per decade, while
the Italian migration of 1901-1910 reached two million, but with a
considerable backflow occurring simultaneously. 3 Thus the scale of
the contemporary Negro migration exceeds that of most of the great
European migrations of the past.
Nor is this the only low-income migration to the cities at the present
time. Net migration from Puerto Rico to the mainland was 430, 000
in the 1950's, 4 and other internal migrations of rural whites to the
big cities are as yet uncounted. Taken together, these vast population
shifts confront most of our big cities with problems they have not had
to face since the early 1900's. Not the least of these problems is the
need for providing adequate housing and a suitable living environment
for the incoming groups.
Are these migrations temporary phenomena, destined to grind to a halt
in the near future? The evidence does not support such an assumption,
although the question is certainly a debatable one. Negro and Puerto
Rican migrations have been building up steadily for some time. During
the 1940's, net nonwhite migration from the South was 1, 245, 000 --
only slightly less than the 1950's figure. Yet several decades of out-
migration from the South and from Puerto Rico have not even begun
to exhaust the pool of remaining potential migrants. After years of
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exodus, more Negroes remain in the South, and more Puerto Ricans
remain on the island, than ever before ~ thanks to impressive rates
of population increase. Industrial development in the South and in
Puerto Rico may well slow the pace of future out-migration, but no
sudden downturn is in sight.unless economic conditions in the big
cities deteriorate.
Further, the new migrants are young, and once settled in the big
cities they tend to have large families. Whether or not migration
rates drop, recent arrivals and their offspring will swell population
pressures on the urban housing stock. If these groups succeed in
raising their incomes quickly, they may be able to take care of their
increasing housing needs by finding accommodations outside the old
residential areas. If the experience of earlier Negro arrivals is re-
peated, however, the newcomers will be slow to disperse from central
cities to suburbs. One study of the twelve largest metropolitan regions
has pointed out that nonwhites constituted 3 percent of their combined
suburban populations in 1930, and no more than 5 percent in 1960.
More strikingly, the proportion of nonwhites has declined in the sub-
urban areas of five of these regions, varied only slightly in six, and
increased notably in only one, while the proportion of nonwhites in
the central cities mounted steadily.5
Large City Experience in the 1950's
Of the country's ten largest cities in 1950, all but Los Angeles lost
population from 1950 to 1960, while their metropolitan regions con-
tinued to grow. As we have already indicated, 1960 levels in the
central cities reflected a notable growth of nonwhite population since
1950, and an equally notable departure of whites to the suburbs. Al-
though this conjunction of nonwhite expansion and white withdrawal
may suggest a causal connection, there is probably less in this
situation than meets the eye. Middle-class dispersal to the suburbs
is a long-standing trend that has proceeded rapidly in the 1950's even
in such cities as Minneapolis, where the nonwhite population is small.
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Similarly, the abandonment of housing formerly occupied by whites
seems to have no major attractive force in drawing Negroes to
particular cities: cities with tight housing supplies, such as New
York, nevertheless draw large numbers of migrants who live in
overcrowded single rooms.
For the nine cities that lost population, white out-migration was
slightly greater than nonwhite population growth. Population
losses were relatively small, however, ranging from below 5 per-
cent in six of the cities up to 13 percent in Boston (see Table II-1).
Nonwhite population, on the other hand, showed sizable rates of
increase, from 40 to 70 percent in most cases, but as much as 97
percent in Los Angeles. Rates of this magnitude reflect heavy
in-migration, as well as rapid natural increase among nonwhite
families already in the cities by 1950.
What have these population shifts meant for the utilization of housing?
Despite the large influx of nonwhites, housing conditions improved
generally, but the improvement was only a limited one. In 1950,
residential space was in short supply in all these cities. Gross
vacancy rates (including substandard units) were all below 3 percent,
except in Los Angeles (Table 11-2). Net rates of sound vacant units
were all far below 2 percent, except again for the Los Angeles rate
of 2. 7 percent.
By 1960, vacancy rates were beginning to reach the 5 percent level
that housing economists have long considered the desirable minimum
to facilitate normal turnover and reasonable residential mobility.
The significant measure of vacancies is the proportion of sound
housing units available for rent or sale. In terms of this measure,
only two cities -- Los Angeles and Detroit -- achieved a satisfactory
level by 1960, but the rest came up significantly since 1950. New York
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TABLE II-i
Population Changes, 1950-1960, in Ten Largest Cities of 1950
New York
Chicago
Philadelphia
Los Angeles
Detroit
Baltimore
Cleveland
St. Louis
Washington
Boston
Total
Population,
1950
7,891,957
3, 620, 962
2,071,605
1, 970, 358
1,849,568
949, 708
914,808
856, 796
802, 178
801,444
Percent
Change
1950-1960
- 1.4
- 1. 9
- 3. 3
+25.8
- 9.7
- 1.1
4.2
-12. 5
4. 8
-13.0
Nonwhite
Population
1950
775, 516
509, 437
378, 968
211, 585
303, 721
226, 053
149,544
154, 448
284, 313
42,744
Percent
Change
1950-1960
+47.2
+64.4
+41. 2
+97. 2
+60.4
+45. 3
+69.3
+39.9
+47.3
+60.2
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II,
Characteristics of the Population, Part 1, United States
Summary, 1953, Table 86; U. S. Census of Population:
1960, General Population Characteristics, Final Report
PC(1) series, 1961, volumes for each state, Table 20;
U. S. Census of Population: 1960, Supplementary Reports
PC (S1)-7, "Rank of Cities of 100, 000 or More: 1960,''
June 16, 1961.
TABLE 3U-2
Selected Housing Characteristics, 1950-1960, in Ten Largest Cities of 1950
New York
Chicago
Philadelphia
Los Angeles
Detroit
Baltimore
Cleveland
St. Louis
Washington
Boston
Non-
Seasonal
Dwelling
Units
1950
2, 406, 169
1, 105, 692
599, 126
697, 620
521, 988
277,527
270,846
262,873
229, 609
221,974
Percent
Vacant
1950
1.8
1.5
2.3
4.2
1.7
3.1
1,6
1.7
2. 0
1.7
Non-
Seasonal
Housing
Units
1960
2, 735, 272
1,212,264
647, 914
933, 354
552, 050
289,734
282, 358
262, 383
262, 287
237, 596
Percent
Vacant
1960
3.0
4.5
5. 0
6.1
6.7
4.9
4.4
5. 2
3. 9
5.5
Percent of Non-
Seasonal Units
Vacant & Available
in Sound Condition
1950 1960
1.1
0.8
1. 3
2.7
1.0
1.8
0. 9
0. 7
1. 2
0.9
2.0
3.7
3..4
4,9
5.6
3.7
3.4
3.8
3.0
3J.9
Number & Percent of Non-
Seasonal Units With 1. 01
or More Occupants Per
Room
1950 1960
Per- Per-
Number cent Number cent
386,167
163, 007
56,405
65,822
51,787
31, 675
26, 645
53, 521
31, 035
27, 261
16.7
15.2
9.8
10.0
10. 2
12.0
10. 1
20.4
14. 1
12.7
325,060 12.2
not available
45,206 7.3
72,007 8.2
not available
29,010 10.5
27, 686 9.8
40, 842 16.4
31, 157 12.4
17,956 8.0
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Housing: 1950, Vol. I, General Characteristics, Part 1:
U. S. Summary, 1953, Tables 27, 29; U. S. Census of Housing: 1960, Advance Reports,
Housing Characteristics: States, HC(A1), Table 1; U. S. Census of Housing: 1960, Vol. HI,
City Blocks, Series HC(3), 1961, Table 1.
Units classified as vacant and available in sound condition are year-round, non-dilapidated
units available for rent or sale.
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continued to have a tight supply, with only 2 percent vacant, but the
others all reached 3 percent or more. In no case did vacancy levels
climb enough to suggest a real surplus of housing.
Still another test of the adequacy of the supply is the number of per-
sons per room in occupied housing units. Table 11-2 presents com-
parative information for 1950 and 1960 on the number of units with
more than one person per room. In every city for which we have
information, the proportion of units with more than one person per
room declined from 1950 to 1960. From a social welfare point of
view, city housing policies should aim at a reduction in the absolute
extent of overcrowding. Of the eight cities for which information is
available, five had fewer units with more than one person per room
in 1960 than in 1950, one had about the same number, and two had
an increase in absolute number.
This test requires qualification, however. As a result of changes in
the types of units enumerated, many single-room quarters were
counted in 1960 but not in 1950. In cities where a considerable number
of families live in one-room units, as in New York, 1950 figures
understate the extent of overcrowding. Consequently, the 1950-1960
increase in residential space per person was probably somewhat
greater in a number of large cities than our data show.
Extent of Improvement
On balance, the improvement in housing conditions is clearly noticeable
but probably limited. Further, we do not know how the gains were di-
vided among various groups in the population. Only a portion of the
vacant housing consists of low-cost units that new migrants can afford.
As we shall see in our closer look at New York, vacancy rates are
considerably higher in new and expensive apartments than in the old
stock. Similarly, the reduction of internal crowding may reflect gains
for middle-income residents rather than low-income groups. Nationally,
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Negroes are better off in terms of housing now than in 1950, but
they are still far behind the white population. In 1960, only 43
percent of units occupied by nonwhites were classified as sound
with all plumbing facilities, while 73 percent of white-occupied
units met these standards. 6
Thus the gains of the 1950's offer few grounds for complacency,
but they do offer hope for further improvement. As far as we can
tell from this quick survey of ten large cities, the old housing
stock remains almost fully utilized and continues to serve valu-
able social purposes. Operations of the housing market in the
1950's have provided some expansion of the supply of residential
space relative to population pressure, but unless increasing
volumes of new construction accelerate the abandonment of more
old housing, the time is not yet ripe for large-scale clearance.
If the housing market maintains the same relationship of new
construction to new population pressure that prevailed in the 1950's,
large-scale clearance of old housing would begin to wipe out recent
improvements in housing conditions. Only Los Angeles and Detroit
appear to be in a position where rebuilding may be possible without
lowering housing standards, and even here the situation is some-
what doubtful. Los Angeles has a favorable vacancy rate, but the
number of units with more than one person per room increased
from 1950 to 1960.
Without the departure of many former residents from the central
cities, it is clear that there could have been no real improvement
of housing conditions from 1950 to 1960. Despite the fears of
many cities about losing their middle-class elements, and despite
their inclination to regard population decline as an unfavorable
omen, both these developments have been necessary in order to
achieve vacancy levels' approaching desirable standards, and to
relieve residential crowding. Unless the patterns of population
movement and housing development change considerably in the
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future, large cities will have to continue losing population if they
are to provide decent living conditions for the migrant groups of
the mid-twentieth century.
Three Contrasting Regions
Three metropolitan regions will serve as test cases for detailed
study: New York, Los Angeles, and Hartford. These areas cover
a wide range of characteristics. The New York region is old and
intensively developed, by American standards. Los Angeles is new
and sprawling, Hartford old and relatively compact. But we are
not concerned with these differences solely as random illustrations
of the variety to be found in American urban regions. Our concern
is with the declining sections of these regions, their changing utili-
zation and their prospects for rebuilding.
The three study areas illustrate contrasts in a number of structural
features that relate in theory to the demand for new housing in central
locations -- the locations now being abandoned in the push to the sub-
urbs. We review the body of theoretical literature on this subject in
Appendix C, and we shall detail the relevant characteristics of our
three study areas when we consider their markets for new housing in
the following chapter. Briefly, structural features of major interest
are the strength of the downtown core and the access advantages of
declining locations over competitive vacant sites for new housing.
New York is a center-oriented region with a strong core, Los Angeles
an extremely decentralized region. Hartford has a moderately strong
core, but a large supply of vacant land highly accessible to the center.
These contrasting regions all have their declining sections, differing
in extent but similar in many ways. All are characterized by central
location, a concentration of old housing, the thinning out of former
residents, and a rapid growth of low-income groups. Further, all
these sections are still well utilized, and their new low-income occu-
pants show few signs of joining the march to the suburbs in the near
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future. Declining areas in our three regions display varying ability
to attract new housing, but we shall postpone judgment of their
prospects for rebuilding until we analyze the economics of new con-
struction in a later chapter.
New York Region: Population Shifts
The decade from 1950 to 1960 was one of profound change for the
New York metropolitan region. The major central cities -- New
York, Newark, Jersey City -- all lost population, but total popu-
lation movements were far greater than their relatively small losses
suggest. Appendix A presents detailed statistical information on
changes in population and housing for all three study regions. Data
cited there indicate a combined drop of 166, 000 from a 1950 popula-
tion of 8, 600, 000 in the central cities of the New York region, or a
loss of 1. 9 percent. When we analyze the population change separately
for whites and nonwhites, a more striking picture of massive residen-
tial shifts becomes clear. The three boroughs of New York City that
lost population -- Manhattan, the Bronx, and Brooklyn -- plus the de-
clining cities of Newark and Jersey City, lost a total of almost 600, 000
whites in ten years, and even this figure understates the total departure
of former residents.
A wave of Puerto Rican immigration into central parts of the New York
region does not register separately in these statistics, since most
Puerto Ricans are enumerated within the totals for white population.
The three declining boroughs of New York City, plus Newark and Jersey
City, had 443, 000 more Puerto Ricans in 1960 than in 1950. Thus
the loss of non-Puerto Rican whites was well over a million in this ten
year period.
Net out-migration was still greater than this loss of white population,
since a factor of natural increase is also involved here. Estimates
for the City of New York place net out-migration of non-Puerto Rican
whites at 1, 294, 000 for the 1950-1960 period. The reverse flow was
far smaller, consisting of a net in-migration of 163, 000 nonwhites and
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274, 000 Puerto Ricans. High rates of natural increase accounted
for additional gains of 188, 000 nonwhites and 157, 000 Puerto Ricans
in the City, while natural increase among whites partially countered
their huge out-migration. On balance, New York City lost 892, 000
non-Puerto Rican whites, and gained 782, 000 nonwhites and Puerto
Ricans, for a net loss of 110, 000.
Can we expect a rapid dispersal of Negroes and Puerto Ricans from
the central locations they now occupy? Relative diffusion of the
Negro population has been under way for some time 8 and a similar
pattern is detectable among Puerto Ricans, but two qualifications
are important. First, the decentralization has been solely relative,
with Negro and Puerto Rican populations continuing to grow in abso-
lute terms in all central areas. Second, even the relative dispersal
has been proceeding at a glacier-like pace, except for shifts within
the central cities themselves.
Appendix Table A-1. 3 depicts the regional decentralization of Negroes
from 1950 to 1960. Manhattan's share of the regional total dropped
markedly from 37.9 percent to 25. 5 percent, while New York City
outside Manhattan increased its proportion of the total from 35.8 to
44.4 percent, and the two New Jersey cities also registered propor-
tional increases. According to migration estimates, Manhattan even
had a net out-migration of 40, 000 nonwhites. But the proportional
decentralization has not yet been reflected in absolute numbers:
Manhattan and the remainder of the central cities all gained in Negro
population. And the position of the central cities relative to the entire
region barely changed at all, moving from 83. 2 percent of total regional
Negro population in 1950 to 81.1 percent in 1960.
Information on the Puerto Rican population is not available at the re-
gional level, but relative shifts from Manhattan to the Bronx and
Brooklyn seem to be.under way. Between 1956 and 1960, Manhattan's
share of total Puerto Rican enrollment in New York City schools fell
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from 43. 4 to 36. 9 percent, while the Bronx and Brooklyn gained
correspondingly (Table A- 1. 4). Once again, the shift was purely
relative, however, for Puerto Rican school enrollment increased
in Manhattan during this period.
These limited decentralization tendencies within the low-income
minotity groups suggest that the old central areas are not the
inevitable locations for an expanding Negro and Puerto Rican popu-
lation. Yet the limited scope of recent decentralization also suggests
that, in the near future, prospects for a further depopulation of the
declining areas will depend primarily upon the continuing dispersal
of white, non-Puerto Rican residents.
Population and Housing Demand in the New York Region
The housing demand that a given population generates depends directly
upon its organization into households. With adequate earning power
for each household to afford a separate dwelling unit, the more house-
holds in a population, the more dwelling units it will occupy. Changing
population totals do not in themselves indicate even the direction of
change in housing units required. When population declines, a shift
to smaller average household sizes can nevertheless produce a demand
for increased housing resources. This has been the experience of areas
losing population in the New York region.
White and nonwhite components of the population generate very different
housing demands in the New York area. Appendix Table A-1. 5 illumi-
nates some of the significant differences between the two populations.
The white population is an older one, with a smaller proportion below
the age of 18 and a greater proportion aged 65 and over in the region
at large, and in the central city areas of population loss. Differences
between the two racial groups have become more pronounced from
1950 to 1960, with notable increases in the proportion of nonwhites
under 18 and the proportion of whites 65 and over. In addition, the
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white population of the central cities has become more divergent
from the white population in the region at large during the 1950's,
with a substantially smaller proportion under 18 and a larger
proportion 65 and over.
These age differences suggest that the white population will con-
sist of smaller families than the nonwhite: families with children
will have, on the average, fewer children per family, and the
great number of people 65 and over will account for more child-
less families and single individuals. We can guess from these
statistics that for a given population, whites will generate a
greater demand for .dwelling units than will nonwhites in the
central cities. Evidence from the 1960 Housing Census points
clearly to this conclusion: average population per housing unit is
significantly lower for the white population than for the nonwhite
population in all the central cities (Table A-1. 6).
Although the central cities declined substantially in white population
from 1950 to 1960, those whites who remained were particularly
voracious users of housing. The new nonwhite population generated
less demand for housing in relation to its numbers. What was the
composite result in terms of housing demand? Dwelling unit com-
parisons for 1950 and 1960 are difficult to make, since the U. S.
Census definition of a dwelling unit changed in the interim, but we
have information for New York City (Table A-1. 7) that uses the 1950
definition for both years. The number of dwelling units increased
in Manhattan, the Bronx, and Brooklyn, while total population de-
creased. Average population per dwelling unit consequently fell
sharply. The implication that average household size must have
fallen, too, is consistent with the long-term reduction in household
size that has continued steadily in New York since the end of the 19th
century. 9
We have noted several factors suggesting a high level of housing
demand despite the loss of population in central cities of the New York
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region: small family sizes among the remaining white population,
and a decrease in population per dwelling unit in Manhattan, the
Bronx, and Brooklyn. The only sure gauge of the extent to which
the housing supply continues to be utilized is the proportion of
vacant units. Information for 1960 (Table A-1. 8) reflects the new
and broader definition of housing units. The New York region out-
side the central cities had a vacancy rate of 3.7 percent in 1960.
The central cities had lower vacancy rates, except for Newark with
its rate of 5. 2 percent.
These rates include vacant units in substandard condition. More to
the point for determining whether the declining areas are ready for-
clearance is the amount of unutilized housing in sound condition that
can be used for relocating displaced people. The vacancy reserve of
sound units is much lower (Table A-1. 9); in Brooklyn and the Bronx
it has increased only slightly since 1950.
Further, only part of this reserve consists of low-cost units within
the means of low-income families. The Manhattan vacancy reserve
of 2.5 percent undoubtedly includes many apartments in new luxury
buildings not yet fully rented at the time of the 1960 Census.
Numerous surveys in Manhattan have shown higher vacancy rates in
new buildings than in old. Surveys of vacancies in old-law tenements
(built before 1901) have indicated a decline from 16 percent in 1944
to 0. 1 percent in 1954. 10 Additional evidence of a severe shortage
of low-cost housing in New York appears in the experience of families
receiving City welfare aid and housed in single furnished rooms: of
14, 000 families in this category in 1960, 10, 000 paid rents ranging
from $60 to $200 per month for "essentially slum accommodations". 11
With the possible exception of Newark, the declining sections of the
New York region appear still to be heavily utilized as residential
areas. As of 1960, the void left by families moving to the suburbs
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was well filled, and the slowness of low-income minorities to
decentralize promises to maintain a steady demand for the old
housing for some time to come.
Vitality of New York's Declining Areas
Why have New York's declining areas remained so fully occupied?
Their high degree. of occupancy is particularly striking in view of
the age and deterioration of much of the housing stock. More than
one-third of the non-transient dwelling units in Manhattan in 1960
were in old-law tenements built before 1901; 20 percent of the
non-transient units in Brooklyn and 7 percent of those in the Bronx
in 1960 were also old-law tenements. In New York City as a whole,
16 percent of the housing units were classified as deteriorating or
dilapidated in the 1960 Housing Census. Substandard conditions
were still more evident in the other central cities, with 29 percent
of the housing units in Newark and 19 percent of those in Jersey
City deteriorating or dilapidated. 12
One reason for the continued utilization of old housing in New York
is that, as we have observed in most big cities, the old units have
made possible a raising of housing standards. Vacancy reserves
are still low in New York, but overcrowding has been reduced
notably since 1950. Units with more than one occupant per room
have declined in absolute number, as well as in proportion to total
housing in all central cities of the region (Table A-1. 9). In this
sense, intense utilization of the old areas reflects a general desire
for more residential space, and reflects also the failure of the
housing market to provide alternate low-cost housing capable of
meeting this need.
Beyond this typical situation for big cities, New York has some
special characteristics that promote continued use of the central
areas. Rent control is one of these special factors. In New York
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City, rents are still controlled by law in apartments completed
before the end of World War II. Rent levels in controlled apart-
ments are substantially lower than those in typical postwar units.
The effects are likely to be twofold: encouraging people to remain
in old central housing rather than move to the suburbs, and en-
couraging older couples who no longer need large apartments to
hold them rather than look for expensive smaller apartments in
new buildings. Both effects help account for the continuing utili-
zation of housing in the declining areas.
Other special influences may derive from the metropolitan structure
that led us to choose New York as a region to study. Although we
expect this structure to produce more clear-cut effects in the mar-
ket for new housing, it is likely also to influence the utilization of
older housing. The New York region exemplifies a structure that
is theoretically highly favorable for inlying housing: the core is
a powerful magnet, and vacant sites for new development are far
removed from the center. These factors can make old housing in
central areas more attractive than it would be in a region with a
weaker core or with highly accessible vacant land. This situation
contains elementsof great danger for the rebuilding of inlying areas.
If a regional structure that creates demand for new central housing
also prolongs the life of older central structures, acquisition costs
may rise to levels that block rebuilding.
Rebuilding the Declining Areas
We shall postpone a full consideration of prospects for rebuilding
the old areas for later chapters, but a few observations are in order
here. Areas that have declined in population cover a large part of
the central cities. Tabulations for small statistical districts in New
York City indicate that declining areas blanket all of Manhattan,
large parts of Brooklyn and the Bronx, and the inner parts of Queens 13
These sections differ considerably in a number of ways. Some are
occupied by old-law tenements with densities exceeding 250 dwelling
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units per acre of residential land, others by brownstones at lower
densities, and still others in Brooklyn, the Bronx, and 'Queens by
small structures with densities ranging from 20 to 100 units per acre.
Some, in and near Manhattan, have obvious access advantages to the
central business district; others, in the mid-Bronx and Brooklyn,
involve fairly long trips to the core. Some have high proportions
of deteriorated housing, and some have such major social problems
as juvenile delinquency and broken families.
All these characteristics play a part in determining the attactiveness
of such areas for new housing. The greater the access advantages,
the better the surrounding environment, the fewer the social problems
-- the more attractive these areas are likely to seem to developers of
new housing.
How much new construction went into these areas in the 1950's ?
Newark and Jersey City had relatively little new housing -- 6, 500
private units and 9, 000 units of public housing -- but new construction
boomed in New York City (Table A-1. 10). The declining boroughs of
Manhattan, the Bronx, and Brooklyn together attracted 136, 000 new
units of private housing, while public construction added another
60, 000 units.
This new private housing is not spread evenly throughout the declining
areas. In Brooklyn and the Bronx, much of the new construction is
not in declining sections, but in newer areas farther out where the
surrounding environment is in better condition. Similarly, many new
private apartment buildings in Manhatten are in "desirable" locations,
on streets where adjoining buildings are in good condition. Newark
and Jersey City have fewer desirable sections where new housing can
locate. Although publicly sponsored renewal programs could con-
ceivably alter the situation in the New Jersey cities, their present
lack of good environments may have had much to do with their small
volume of new private construction in the 1950's.
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At typical densities for new development in the three declining
boroughs of New York City, new private construction in the 1950's
covered some 700 acres of net residential land. Had this construc-
tion been integrated into plans for rebuilding old housing, it would
have constituted a basis for extensive renewal. We estimate the
total land area occupied by deteriorated housing in New York as
1145 acres (Appendix B), using a definition that limits deteriorated
housing to structures that are in dilapidated condition or are de-
teriorating and lacking in plumbing facilities. Thus the volume of
new private construction in the 1950's might have served as a basis
for clearing 60 percent of the land now occupied by deteriorated
structures, if the new development could have been induced to use
these sites rather than alternate locations.
Public housing construction in the 1950's occupied an estimated 700
additional acres of net residential land in Manhattan, the Bronx, and
Brooklyn. New public and private housing together utilized consider-
ably more land than the total area now covered by deteriorated housing
in these three boroughs.
We reserve for later analysis the question of how much new private
housing can conceivably be attracted to sites cleared of deteriorated
structures. Even this brief look at new construction suggests, how-
ever, that the demand for housing sites located in the declining
boroughs of New York is at a high level, and that population losses
from these boroughs do not indicate a drying up of the demand for
new housing, prbvlded that suitable environments are available for
new construction.
Los Angeles Region: Population Shifts
Los Angeles has not experienced the spectacular population shifts of
New York in the 1950's, but similar changes at, a smaller scale have
created areas of decline even in this newer, more dynamic region.
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Changes in the Los Angeles area are more difficult to chart, since
the sprawling City of Los Angeles contains rapidly growing sections
as well as declining ones. Thus the central city as a whole continued
to expand in the 1950's, but we can detect traces of the declining area
syndrome as we have found it in New York. Central city growth was
small in comparison with growth elsewhere in the region: population
increased 25.8 percent in the City of Los Angeles and 77.8 percent
in the rest of the region. Within the central city, nonwhite popula-
tion almost doubled, while white population increased only 17. 2
percent (Appendix Tables A-2. 1, A-2. 2).
Areas of population loss were concentrated in a zone surrounding
downtown Los Angeles and extending to the north and northeast. The
Los Angeles County Regional Planning Commission compiles data for
thirty-five statistical areas comprising the County. The three statis-
tical areas that lost population from 1950 to 1960 constitute this central
zone; their location is described in Table A-2. 7. Total population loss
in the three areas from 1950 to 1960 was 66, 000, or about 12 percent
of the 1950 total.
As in New York, the components of population change in these loss
areas were a net increase in minority group population, and a larger
net decrease in whites of native American background. The three
statistical areas consist of eleven communities in the City of Los
Angeles and three in unincorporated territory of the County; some
population information is available for the eleven City communities.
Seven of these had substantial minority-group populations in 1950,
with Negroes, other non-whites, and Mexican-Americans constituting
more than 20 percent of their population. In three of the seven cases,
minority groups accounted for more than 50 percent of the total popu-
lation. No information is available for the Mexican-American
population since 1950, but nonwhites registered gains in almost all
these communities since 1950, while total population declined. 14
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The major expansion of nonwhite population has not been in these
communities, however. Other parts of central Los Angeles have
attracted far greater numbers of nonwhites in the past decade.
Exposition Park, Green Meadows, and West Adams have all ex-
perienced more significant absolute growth in the nonwhite
population. These other central communities would have been
counted among the declining areas if not for their large gains in
minority population.
In Los Angeles, as in New York, decentralization of minority groups
was negligible in the 1950's. The City of Los Angeles accounted for a
slightly smaller share of the region's total Negro and Japanese popu-
lation in 1960 than in 1950, but both groups doubled in absolute size
within the City during this time.
Population and Housing Demand in the Los Angeles Region
For insight into the utilization of loss area housing, we must examine
age and household characteristics of the population. The nonwhite
population is younger than the white, both in the City of Los Angeles
and in the metropolitan region (Table A-2. 5). A greater proportion
of nonwhites than whites were under 18 years of age in both 1950 and
1960, and a smaller proportion were 65 or over. For both racial
groups, the City population was older than that of the region at large
in both Census years. Thus the City population of both groups is
likely to generate a greater demand for housing, in relation to its size,
than the population of the region at large: fewer children per house-
hold, and a greater proportion of childless older people suggest a
demand for more dwelling units among an older population than among
a younger one. As in New York, the white central city population is
likely to be a particularly great consumer of housing, with a signifi-
cantly higher proportion of old people and a lower proportion of
children than the nonwhites.
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Data on housing units occupied by the two racial groups in 1960
confirm these expectations. Average population per housing unit
was notably lower for whites (2. 76) than for nonwhites (3. 21) in the
City of Los Angeles. Within the areas of population loss, we have
comparable housing information for both 1950 and 1960, using the
1950 definition of a dwelling unit, but without a breakdown according
to race. The composite population per dwelling unit fell in all three
statistical areas during the 1950's (Table A-2. 7). The extent of this
decline was less than in New York, however, and the housing supply
changed differently. In New York City's declining areas, pressure
for additional housing was sufficient to bring about a net increase in
dwelling units despite the loss of population, while both dwelling units
and population declined in two of the three Los Angeles areas.
What do these population characteristics mean for the utilization of
housing in the declining areas? Central city housing was utilized
less fully in Los- Angeles than in New York in 1960; gross vacancy
rates were 6. 1 percent in the City of Los Angeles and 3. 0 percent
in the City of New York. But housing in the declining areas is more
fully utilized than housing elsewhere in the City. City Planning
Department estimates for the eleven declining communities indicate
a vacancy rate of 4. 7 percent as of October 1960, compared with a
rate of 5. 4 percent for the rest of the City. 15 These vacancy figures
include substandard units. Vacancy rates for sound units are some-
what lower (4.9 percent for the entire City), so that Los Angeles has
probably not yet achieved a satisfactory vacancy surplus for starting
large-scale clearance of its old areas.
Information on residential crowding also suggests that the removal
of old low-cost housing would be premature under present circum-
stances. Between 1950 and 1960, the number of units with more than
one occupant per room increased by 11 percent. This increase, in
the face of rising vacancy rates over the same period, probably in-
dicates that vacant units are largely in the high-cost brackets, and
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that low-cost housing is still in short supply. Housing in the declining
areas of Los Angeles thus retains considerable social value, accord-
ing to all the evidence we can mnster, but the situation is not one of
extreme housing shortage, as in New York. If present trends continue,
Los Angeles will have a surplus of old housing ready for replacement
long before New York.
Prospects for Rebuilding in Los Angeles
The declining sections of Los Angeles are not as diverse in character
as those in New York. Like their counterparts in New York, they are
centrally located, but they do not extend out as far from the core.
Densities of existing housing are more homogeneous, with single-
family homes on small lots the predominant type of development.
Net residential densities are mostly 8 to 10 units per acre, while
declining areas in New York range from more than 250 units per acre
in parts of Manhattan to less than 50 in parts of Queens.
Whether these characteristics will facilitate the rebuilding of declin-
ing areas in Los Angeles remains to be seen. Their central location
is likely to count for less in the housing market than central locations
in New York, since the core of Los Angeles is less important func-
tionally than the core of Manhattan. On the other hand, low densities
of existing development are likely to mean low site acquisition costs.
We shall investigate the implications of both these factors in later
chapters, but a preliminary look at new construction trends in the de-
clining areas furnishes some insight into prospects for rebuilding.
Information on new residential construction is not directly available
for Los Angeles areas of decline, but data on net changes in the
number of dwelling units suggest a fair amount of building activity.
Eight of the eleven communities had net increases in dwelling units
from 1956 through 1960, with a total increase of 3, 284 units. 16
This net increase takes account of conversions as well as new con-
struction, minus mergers and demolitions; it consists entirely of
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private housing. Total new construction probably exceeds the net
increase in dwelling units, since a number of units have been de-
molished for non-residential development and freeway construction
in these areas. Detailed information for the Westlake section just
outside downtown Los Angeles shows 1, 914 new units (including
conversions).constructed from 1955 through 1960, 1, 728 demoli-
tions, and a resulting net increase of 186 units. 17
The performance of Los Angeles' declining areas is not in the same
class as New York's building boom of the 1950's, but it does indi-
cate continuing interest in these areas on the part of developers.
At typical densities for new construction in this part of the region,
4, 000 new units would occupy a net land area of some 80 acres.
We estimate the total land area occupied by deteriorated housing in
the City of Los Angeles as 2, 755 acres (Appendix B), but much of
this land lies butside the declining sections, Still, it is clear that
rebuilding blighted housing in the declining areas will require
attracting new development that now locates elsewhere in the region.
The extent to which new development can be attracted into these
areas is the subject of our next two chapters.
Population and Housing Changes in the Hartford Region
The Hartford region presents a clear-cut case of population loss
coupled with racial change in the central city, and substantial
population growth in the suburbs. Central city shifts in population
from 1950 to 1960 closely parallel those we have found in the central
areas of New York and Los Angeles: a net loss of 28, 000 whites was
partly balanced by a net increase of 12, 000 nonwhites, with the dif-
ference constituting a net loss for the City of Hartford. Despite a
doubling of the nonwhite population in the central city from 1950 to
1960, the Negro minority showed weak signs of a relative decentrali-
zation. The City of Hartford had a somewhat smaller share of the
region's Negro population in 1960 than it had in 1950, but even in re-
lative terms the dispersal was minor (Table A-3. 3).
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In terms of numbers alone,, minority group expansion failed to fill
the gap created by a declining white population in Hartford. Once
again, however, we must look into population characteristics for
insight into the utilization of housing in the declining areas. The
gulf between white central city occupants and the total white popula-
tion widened significantly, with fewer children and more old people
in the center than in the region at large in both 1950 and 1960, but
with greater differentiation of the central city population from that
of the total region in 1960 than in 1950 at both ends of the age dis-
tribution. Age differences between whites and nonwhites in the
central city also sharpened between 1950 and 1960, with a signifi-
cantly higher proportion of nonwhites under 18 and whites over 65
in 1960 than in 1950. If we consider the white population of the
central city alone, it expanded faster in terms of old people than in
terms of children.
From these different perspectives, the view is the same: whites
remaining in the central city in 1960 were likely to be heavy con-
sumers of dwelling units, while nonwhites were likely to consist
of larger households generating proportionately less demand for
separate units,
Data on white and nonwhite population per dwelling unit confirm
these expectations (Table A-3.5). The difference in average popu-
lation per dwelling unit -- 2.87 for whites and 3.67 for nonwhites --
represents the widest gulf we have found so far in the declining areas
of our study regions. Average white household size is well within the
range we found in other loss areas, but nonwhite household size is
at the upper end of our range. The particularly large nonwhite
population expansion, which fell short of filling the population void
left by departing whites, also failed to fill the housing void.
Vacancy rates in the Hartford region point to the same conclusion.
Hartford had a surplus of housing in relation to the rest of its region;
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New York City, in comparison, had a lower vacancy rate than the
rest of its region. Yet the absolute gross vacancy level in Hartford
was a moderate one (5. 1 percent), falling between the levels that pre~
vailed in New York and in Los Angeles in 1960.
According to the indicators of housing utilization, Hartford made
real progress in raising housing standards from 1950 to 1960, and,
like Los Angeles, is now approaching a situation where clearance
and replacement of old units may soon be justifiable in social terms.
The net vacancy rate for sound housing units was 4. 1 percent in 1960,
and the number of units with more than one occupant per room de-
clined significantly since 1950. So far, the old housing is still well
utilized, but population pressure on the housing supply is clearly
easing in Hartford.
New Construction in Hartford's Declining Areas
Declining sections of Hartford consist primarily of low multifamily
structures, with densities of 15 to 20 units per net acre. As in the
other cities, the declining areas are centrally located, and some
consist of neighborhoods currently being abandoned by distinct ethnic
groups remaining from earlier migrations. One large area of de-
cline in Hartford was formerly an Italian section, but Italian residents
are now on the move to better housing elsewhere in the region. The
value of the central location of declining parts of Hartford, and the
significance of their existing densities, will be explored in later
chapters dealing with the feasibility of developing new housing in the
old areas.
New construction during the 1950's does not depict a promising pic-
ture for the future rebuilding of Hartford. Advance tract information
from the 1960 Housing Census reported a total of 57, 625 housing units
in the City of Hartford, an increase of 5, 196 over the number of dwell-
ing units counted in the 1950 Census. Within the City of Hartford,
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several outlying tracts gained population during this period. If
we exclude housing units in these tracts, the net increase in
housing units for City areas of population loss totaled 2, 656 from
1950 to 1960. 18 Part of this increase reflects the change in Census
definition from "dwelling unit" to "housing unit", but the bulk of it
represents new private housing.
At typical new construction densities for the old areas, 2, 000 new
units would use about 40 acres of land. Our estimate of land area
now occupied by deteriorated housing in Hartford is 185 acres
(Appendix B). Once again, if land cleared of substandard housing
in the declining areas is to be absorbed by new construction in a
reasonable period of time, new housing will have to be diverted
from alternate locations in the region. Whether the pace of new
construction in the old areas can be accelerated in this way is the
subject of the following chapters.
The Three Study Areas: General Findings
The declining areas of New York, Los Angeles, and Hartford all
show signs of life, both in utilizing existing housing and in attracting
new housing. We set out in this chapter to look into the question of
whether old housing in these areas is still in demand, whether new
groups of users have appeared to take the place of former residents
leaving the central cities. The old housing is indeed still needed in
all three study areas. In the declining parts of New York City, the
1960 situation was essentially one of housing shortage. Only the
New Jersey central cities of the region showed signs of under-
utilization of the housing stock. Los Angeles and Hartford exhibited
more excess capacity in the housing stock of their declining areas,
but their vacancy rates were moderate and suggest no massive aban-
donment of the central city in either region. We shall investigate
economic implications 6f these vacancy levels in Chapter IV, when we
analyze information on site acquisition costs in the declining areas. Social
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implications are already clear: the old housing is decidedly useful,
and has made possible an improvement in living conditions in all
three cities during the 1950's.
Although we shall not take on the task of explaining present occupancy
characteristics of the declining areas, we can venture some opinions
on the reasons for our contrasting findings in New York and in the
other regions. Housing condition seems to have little to do with the
results. If housing quality were a guide, we should expect to find
much higher vacancy levels in New York than in Los Angeles or
Hartford. More than 15 percent of the housing units in New York City
were classified as deteriorating or dilapidated in the 1960 Housing
Census; in Hartford, 9.3 percent of the units were so classified, and
in Los Angeles, 8.8 percent.19 Vacancy rates, as we have seen,
were in reverse order: 6. 1 percent in Los Angeles, 5. 1 percent in
Hartford, and 3.0 percent in New York.
A variety of individual factors can operate significantly in determining
the extent of demand for centrally located housing. Rent control in
New York City plays a part in slowing decentralization, age and income
distributions and household characteristics condition the demand for
dwelling units, the extent of in-migration of low-income people con-
ditions the size of the market for blighted housing. Yet with all these
influences, the structure of the region may also play a part in creating
demand for central housing. New York, with its strong central con-
centration of employment and its lack of vacant land for development
near the center, is our chosen example of a region that should theoret-
ically have a center-oriented market for new housing. Inasmuch as old
housing is a substitute for new, whatever center-orientation exists may
appear in the market for older central housing, as well.
In addition to checking on the utilization of existing housing, we have
also taken a look at decentralization tendencies among new migrant
groups in the cities. Slight proportional changes in the central con-
centration of these groups were noticeable in all three areas, but
even in this relative sense the dispersal has been very slow. In
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absolute numbers, minority groups expanded significantly in the
declining areas between 1950 and 1960. If recent trends are a
guide to the future, these newcomers will continue to maintain a
demand for the old housing in declining areas, but it is possible
that the continued dispersal of other residents will create some
surplus of old housing. To a limited extent, a surplus has already
developed in Los Angeles and Hartford. So far, this surplus is
desirable to retain as a vacancy reserve to facilitate normal turn-
over and mobility in the housing market. Within the near future,
however, Los Angeles and Hartford may be in a position to start
clearing their old housing. For New York, this time lies further
in the future, but the eventual development of a housing surplus can
be foreseen even in New York.
As a rough guide to prospects for rebuilding the areas of population
loss, we have looked at new residential development of the 1950's.
In all three study areas, we have found some new development in
declining sections, but our findings do not indicate that a rebirth of
these areas is under way. New development does not penetrate the
old areas evenly in any region. Even the building boom in New York
has bypassed some inlying areas, and the more limited new develop-
ment in Los Angeles and Hartford is by no means distributed equally
among the various declining sections.
The significance of this new construction is that central locations
still attract some residential development, even while the general
movement of population proceeds outward from the center. Though
some parts of the declining areas receive no new housing, these
areas on the whole are not stagnant. In the following chapter we shall
look more closely into locational patterns of the demand for new housing
in each of these regions, to determine the extent to which the generally
central locat ion of the old areas constitutes an asset in the housing
market. The insights of this phase of the study will help us to judge
what market advantages such areas offer for new housing in each of
our regions.
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CHAPTER III
REBUILDING THE DECLINING AREAS:
LOCATIONAL PREFERENCES IN THE MARKET FOR NEW HOUSING
The declining areas are still too useful to be replaced, both in the
regions we have selected for special study and in the large cities
included in our brief national survey. Yet changes in population
and the utilization of old residential structures may soon open up
possibilities for replacing surplus housing, provided that present
occupants continue to evacuate the declining sections of cities more
quickly than new migrants arrive on the scene. As the old housing
is abandoned, can the declining areas attract new private housing to
replace it ?
We have already noted some new development in -areas of population
loss within our three study regions, but we want to know whether
economic conditions are really favorable for such development, in
comparison with alternate opportunities at other locations. Our first
concern is with economic conditions that confront the developer within
declining areas. We have previously suggested two pre-conditions for
rebuilding these areas: (1) the value of cleared land for new housing
must be commensurate with its acquisition cost, and (2) the demand
for housing sites must be great enough to utilize all cleared land that
is not needed for environmental improvements (schools, public works),
within a reasonable number of years.
In this chapter and the following one, we shall investigate the first of
these pre-conditions. Achieving a balance between re-use value and
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site acquisition cost depends upon maintaining a favorable relation-
ship between advantages to the developer of building in declining areas,
and costsof development in these locations. This chapter is concerned
with the advantages; Chapter IV takes up the question of costs.
Since our objective is to assess the possibility of renewing the declin-
ing areas, we are interested in them not as they are now, but as they
may be transformed by rebuilding programs. For our purposes, their
present physical environment is temporary, and is subject to varying
degrees of change in the course of renewal. Only the location of the
old areas remains fixed. This location, as we have seen in our three
study areas, is a central one within the metropolitan region. Thus
the rebuilding problem is closely linked to the question of whether
central location is an asset in the housing market. A review of theo-
retical literature (Appendix C) presents persuasive evidence that the
center is less in demand for housing now than it was formerly, and
our analysis of three study regions has reinforced this conclusion by
documenting the movement of the white middle classes from the center
to the suburbs and the incipient decentralization of new minority groups,
as well. But all this evidence does not establish that consumers have
decisively rejected central locations. We have also found signs of life
in the form of new construction in areas of population loss. The sub-
urban exodus could conceivably reflect dissatisfaction with housing and
environmental conditions in the center, rather than with central location
as such.
Our task is to evaluate the strength of consumer preferences for central
housing locations, and its impact upon the economic considerations that
influence developers in their choice of sites. The extent of central pre-
ference, in conjunction with cost factors that we shall investigate later,
will determine whether the economics of new residential development
in our study regions facilitates or blocks new construction in the de-
clining areas. Our analytical approach, developed from the survey of
theoretical works, is to test the relationship between metropolitan
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structure and the demand for central locations. Thus we shall
analyze locational preferences against the contrasting structural
backgrounds of New York, Los Angeles, and Hartford, to deter-
mine whether preference patterns are consistent with our theoretical
expectations. To the extent that they are, we can establish a basis
for applying our findings to other regions with similar character-
istics, as well as a basis for coordinating general metropolitan plan-
ning with renewal objectives for centrally located areas.
The theoretical approach developed from our survey of the literature
can be summarized briefly. Metropolitan features that have been
recognized as salient influences are: (1) the strength of the core,
which may be defined in terms of the employment, shopping, rec-
reational, and cultural activities it offers; (2) the transportation
system of the region, which determines travel times from various
locations to the core; and (3) the proximity to the core of vacant sites
that may be competitive with locations in declining areas. These
factors in turn are likely to influence the density preferences of con-
sumers, which play a significant role in determining the economic
feasibility of housing in central locations.
As these factors operate in theory, central preferences will be strong-
est in a metropolitan region with a strong core, with substantial travel
time savings from inlying locations to the core, and with vacant land
relatively inaccessible. In such a region, consumers would theoret-
ically accept high residential densities in order to gain the advantages
of living close to the core. As the core weakens, as travel time ad-
vantages from inner locations diminish, and as vacant land becomes
more accessible, central preferences will weaken and consumers will
find less reason to accept high-density housing for the sake of living
close to the core.
In reality, many other factors are also involved in the choice of resi-
dential locations, and consumers differ considerably in their subjective
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evaluation of various factors. Such considerations as the prestige
of particular areas, the quality of the environment, social character
of the neighborhood, and the local school system all enter into loca-
tional decisions in the housing market. Nevertheless, most theo-
retical works emphasize structural factors within the region as
basic organizers of the residential pattern, and regard these other
considerations as modifying elements. Such an approach is particu-
larly appropriate for our purposes, since the "environmental"r factors
can be manipulated to a certain extent through renewal programs,
while the structural factors are less changeable. We want to know
whether the structural setting is appropikiate for :rebuilding, pro-
vided that environmental conditions are modified appropriately. Our
analysis in this chapter therfore follows most recent theoretical
works in seeking to relate locational characteristics of new housing
to the interaction of a limited number of variables in regional struc-
ture with aggregate patterns of taste among consumers in the market
for new housing.
We are particularly concerned with the degree of central preference
in the new housing market, and its relevance to the rebuilding of
declining areas. In addition to estimating the strength of central
preferences, we must also determine whether they encompass those
declining areas that are not immediately adjacent to the core, but
lie somewhat farther away, The "gray area" problem, as Chester
Rapkin sees it, is one of "massive deterioration in neighborhoods
that lack locational advantages."I We shall investigate the extent
to which central preferences involve such areas.
Thus, in addition to testing the theoretical model, we hope to enrich
it. One purpose is already clear: to determine whether central
preference is significant only in areas close to the core, or whether
its effects spread over a substantial part of the metropolitan region
in an extended gradient. Another objective is to quantify the con-
cept of strong and weak cores, and to measure the degree of central
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preference that is associated with cores of varying strengths.
Finally, we hope to determine the ways in which locational pre-
ferences enter into the market for new housing: to what extent
do they affect rents, vacancy rates, and densities? The results
will help resolve some of the perplexing questions of urban re-
newal: To what extent can older areas capitalize on their central
locations as an asset in attracting new housing? How strong a
core is necessary to stimulate housing demand for inlying sites?
How far out does a strong core extend its influence on the housing
market?
The method of this analysis is to study locational patterns of new
housing in the three regions for manifestations of central pre-
ference, and for evidence of the way in which this preference
registers in the housing market. To facilitate price comparisons
of similar housing units, and to obtain a sample with wide geo-
graphic coverage, we shall focus our attention on multifamily
rental units rather than single-family homes. The housing char-
acteristics of greatest interest are the general location of new
multifamily housing within each region, and three factors of great
economic significance in the housing market: the rents in com-
parable units located in zones of different travel-time to the core,
and locational variations in vacancy rates and densities.
Three Regional Structures
Structural features of major interest that have emerged from our
survey of theoretical literature are the strength of the downtown
core and the proximity of vacant land to the core. New York and
Los Angeles represent polar types of regions with respect to core
strength: New York is a highly center-oriented region, Los Angeles
an extremely decentralized region. Hartford is midway between the
two in the strength of its core, but unlike either New York or Los
Angeles, it has a plentiful supply of vacant land starting as close as
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seven or eight miles (twenty minutes travel time) from downtown.
Table rn-1 summarizes the main characteristics of each region.
Differences in core strength are clearly defined in terms of
employment: the Manhattan central business district contains 37
percent of all jobs in the entire metropolitan region, while down-
town Los Angeles provides only 9 percent of the employment in
its region, Employment in offices and financial institutions is
particularly significant, since income in these fields is high
enough to enable large numbers of employees to enter the market
for new housing. Downtown employment in these typically core-
oriented activities accounts for 61 percent of total employment in
offices and financial institutions in the New York region, while
downtown Los Angeles employs only 15 percent of the total office
and financial force in its region. New construction in the central
business district adds a dynamic perspective to this picture of core
employment strength: unparalleled office expansion in the Man-
hattan business area, which accounts for the overwhelming majority
of office expansion in the New York region, has produced 44. 7
million square feet of new office space since 1947. In Los Angeles,
new construction of 2. 5 million square feet in and near the core
represents only 16 percent of total regional office growth over the
same time span. During the same period, 6.5 million square feet
of office space (42 percent of the region's total) were developed in
the newly developing business area strung out for some 7 1/2 miles
along Wilshire Boulevard to the west of the downtown area.
Aside from employment opportunities, the core may influence
locational preferences for new housing by means of its shopping
and entertainment functions. Retail sales figures are the best
available indicators of shopping opportunities in the central busi-
ness districts. The relative core strength of New York compared
with Los Angeles is evident once again, with downtown sales
amounting to 13 percent of regional sales in New York and only 4
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TABLE I[1-4
Selected Characteristics of Three Study Areas
(1) Population,
1960 Census
(2) Persons entering
core area on
business day
(3) Total employment
in Central
Business District
(4) Percent of
regional employ-
ment in CBD
(5) Percent of
regional office
employment in CBD
(6) Square feet of new
office space con-
structed in CBD,
1947-1960
New York
14,759,429
3, 316, 000(1956)
2, 475, 900(1956)
37. 0(1956)
-61. 3(1956)
44. 7 million
Los Angeles
6,742,696
679, 000(1960)
244, 500(1960)
9.4(1960)
15(1960 est.)
2. 5 million
Hartford
525,207
not available
49, 48 0(1960)
24. 9(1960)
not available
not available
(7) Percent of
regional retail
sales in CBD, 1958 '13. 0 4.2 20.8
(8) Percent of change
in CBD retail
sales, 1954-1958 +8.0 -5.3 +3.4
(9) Miles from CBD to
nearest large
tracts vacant
buildable land 20 15 7-8
Regional definitions: New York, N. Y. -Northeastern New Jersey
Standard Consolidated Area (identical with 1950 Census Standard
Metropolitan Area), Los Angeles -Long Beach Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area, Hartford Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
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Table III-1
Sources: New York: (2) Regional Plan Association, Bulletin 91,
"Hub-Bound Travel in the Tri-State Metropolitan Region, "
April 1959, p. 10; (3), (4), (5) Edgar M. Hoover and
Raymond Vernon, Anatomy of a Metropolis, Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1959, p. 260; (6) John
McDonald, "The $2-Billion Building Boom, " Fortune,
LXI, No. 2 (February 1960), 119; (7), (8) U. S. Census
of Business: 1958, Vol. VII, Central Business District
Report, New York, N. Y., Area -- BC58 -- CBD55,
Tables 1A, 4A, and Retail Trade, BC58-RA1, United
States Summary, Table 8.
Los Angeles: (2), (4), (5), (6) Los Angeles Central City
Committee and Los Angeles City Planning Department,
Economic Survey ("Los Angeles: Centropolis 1980"),
December 12, 1960, pp. 19, 26, 30, 38; (3) Los Angeles
City Planning Department, using generous CBD definition
to include all major employment in and near downtown
core; (7), (8) U. S. Census of Business: 1958, Vol. VII,
Central Business District Report, Los Angeles-Long
Beach, Calif., Area -- BC58.-CBD43, Tables 4A, 5A.
Hartford: (3), (4) Hartford Area Transportation Study,
Connecticut Highway Department, using generous CBD
definition to include all major employment in and near
downtown core; (7), (8) U. S. Census of Business: 1958,
Vol. VII, Central Business District Report, Hartford,
Conn., Area -- BC58 - CBD35, Tables 4, 5.
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percent in Los Angeles, Downtown retailing is still more signi-
ficant in the Hartford area, where CBD retail sales are 21 percent
of regional sales. In recent years, all three downtown areas have
failed to keep pace with regional percentage increasesin retail sales,
but New York and Hartford have registered slight absolute gains
downtown while Los Angeles sales have declined 5 percent.
Downtown entertainment and cultural activity varies still more
strikingly than retail sales in our three core areas. Little need be
said about either the strength or vitality of Manhattan as a cultural
center: its significance is international, and its strength has grown
recently even in the generally moribund categories of the legitimate
theater and movie houses. In the former field, the number of playing
weeks in professional theaters has increased by an estimated 30 per-
cent or more in the face of a serious national decline2 Downtown
Los Angeles plays a negligible role in the region's entertainment.
Restaurants and night clubs are decentralized; musical and theatri-
cal performances are given either in Los Angeles outside the down-
town area or in the centers of outlying communities; movie theaters
are located primarily outside the downtown core. In Hartford the
situation is mixed: the main auditorium for musical and theatrical
events is just outside downtown, but restaurants and movie theaters
are largely decentralized.
Location of New Housing
Figures III-1 to 111-3 represent graphically the locational distribution
of new multifamily and single-family dwelling units (excluding public
housing) within our study regions for roughly comparable time spans
within the period 1956-1960. If consumers were totally indifferent
to the location of new units, we might expect to find similarities in
the locational distribution of single-family and multifamily units. The
economics of land use requires vacant land for the construction of all
but the most expensive single-family homes; distant zones where the
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FIGURE III - 1
Cumulative percentage of new single-family and multi-family dwelling units within 5-mile distance zones from center of New York
region, 1957-1960
Source: Regional Plan Association, "New Homes in the New Jersey - New York - Connecticut Metropolitan Region," 1957-1960;
based on building permit data for counties in the region. Total new single-family units: 158,761; total new multi-family units:
145,921. Public housing excluded.
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FIGURE III - 2
Cumulative percentage of total increase in single-family and multi-family dwelling units within 5-mile distance zones from center of
Los Angeles region, 10/56-4/60
Source: Los Angeles County Regional Planning Commission, distribution of dwelling types in 35 statistical areas of Los Angeles
County for October, 1956 and April, 1960; Security First National Bank, Los Angeles, building permit data for Orange County,
fourth quarter, 1955 through first quarter, 1959. Total increase: 148,730 single-family units; 128,726 multi-family units.
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FIGURE III - 3
Cumulative percentage of new single-family and multi-family dwelling units within 5-mile distance zones from center of Hartford
region, 1958-1960
Source: Connecticut Public Works Department Housing Division, building permit data for towns in region. Total new single-
family units: 10,919; total new multi-family units: 1,590. Public housing excluded.
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bulk of single-family housing has been built contain large tracts of
vacant land. If locations closer to the center offered no advantages
in marketing multifamily units, developers might locate them in the
same general areas where single-family subdivisions appear: land
costs are typically cheaper in these areas than they are closer to
the core, and the newness of such areas provides certain market
advantages in itself. Yet we find that in all three study regions new
multifamily housing is located significantly closer to the core than
new single-family developments. Evidently greater centrality is a
normal characteristic of multifamily housing, and in view of the
higher costs of this centrality, it would appear to reflect some degree
of consumer preference within the rental market. An additional factor,
however, may be the developer's desire to remove new multifamily
housing from areas where it would be in competition with single-
family homes.
In New York, almost 75 percent of the new multifamily housing lies
within ten miles of mid-town Manhattan. In Los Angeles, about 35
percent of the new multifamily construction lies within ten miles of
the core, but 70 percent lies within the fifteen-mile zone. Part of
this difference results from limitations in the Los Angeles data. In
Los Angeles, we are dealing with net increases in dwelling units
rather than total new units within each statistical area; some new con-
struction close to the core has been countered by the demolition of
older units for non-residential building and for the construction of
freeways. Nevertheless, the pull toward the center appears to be
greater in New York than in Los Angeles: the cumulative curve of
multifamily construction rises more steeply over the inner half of
the metropolitan region in New York than in Los Angeles. Differen-
tiation between multifamily and single-family locations is also greater
in New York, with wider distances separating the two curves.
To understand the shape of the multifamily curves, we must first take
into account differences in the transportation systems of the two regions.
Forty minutes of peak-hour travel time via the New York City subway
system and via rail and bus service to the New Jersey portion of the
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region corresponds approximately to ten miles from the core. Forty
minutes of peak-hour automobile travel time via the Los Angeles
street and freeway network corresponds roughly to fifteen miles from
downtown Los Angeles. Thus within forty minutes of travel time, we
find very similar proportions of the new multifamily housing in both
New York and Los Angeles.
This approach to determining the pull of the center is not complete,
however, without some consideration of the increasing costs that
developers encounter as they leave outlying vacant land and move
closer to the cores of these two regions. Economic analyses pre-
sented in the following chapter demonstrate that cost differentials
are many times greater as one approaches the center of New York
than they are as one approaches the center of Los Angeles. Thus
although multifamily housing is distributed similarly with respect to
travel time in both New York and Los Angeles, New York developers
incur a much higher cost differential to achieve this distribution than
do their counterparts in Los Angeles. We may deduce, therefore,
that the pull of the center, as reflected in market advantages to the
developer, must be substantially greater in New York than in Los
Angeles.
The Hartford region exhibits less differentiation than either New York
or Los Angeles. Distances separating the multifamily curve from the
single-family curve are smaller in Hartford than in either of the other
regions. The primary reason for this relative lack of separation is
the close proximity of vacant land: single-family homes are feasible
on vacant tracts seven or eight miles from downtown. Travel times
are quite short in the Hartford region. During peak commuting hours,
travel time to points five miles from the core averages some twenty
minutes, when weighted according to current proportions of automobile
commuters and bus riders. To go five miles farther in most directions
requires a total of some twenty-five minutes by car, and the number
of bus riders diminishes to negligible proportions.
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The pulling power of downtown Hartford appears to be quite sub-
stantial, for 70 percent of new multifamily units are located within
five miles of downtown Hartford rather than a few miles farther
out where extensive single-family development occurs. Since the
savings in travel time to the core are relatively small, other factors
must explain the apparent market advantages of these inlying locations.
One influence of some importance in the Hartford area is not a mar-
ket advantage but a limitation resulting from public policy: relatively
little outlying land is zoned for multi-family housing, and local de-
velopers consider the suburban zoning restrictions difficult to change.
A more significant market advantage is the network of public bus
transportation available within the five-mile limit that thins out signif-
icantly beyond it. Still another is the demand for walk-to-work housing
near some of the large insurance firms just outside the core.
Rent Differentials and Travel Time
The aggregate locational pattern of new multifamily housing in all
three study areas, as it is differentiated from the single-family pattern,
suggests that all three cores exercise material pulling power in the
market for new multiple housing units. This pulling power must con-
sist of advantages to the developer in renting his units. The most
likely market advantages would take the form of higher rents in more
central locations; greater ease of renting, which would be reflected
in lower vacancy rates in more central locations; or consumer accept-
ance of higher densities, which would enable developers to economize
on development costs in central sites having high land values. We can
better gauge the extent of central preferences in the three study areas
by examining these different characteristics of the market for new rental
housing.
To investigate rent differentials at different locations, we should ideally
obtain information on rents in identical housing units that differ only
in their location with respect to the core. The approach of this study
has been to eliminate major qualitative differences within the housing
63.
sample by including only units built since 1950, 3 separating apart-
ments in size categories according to number of bedrooms, adjusting
rents to take account of the presence of special features (e. g., air
conditioning) or absence of features normally included in new housing
in the region (e.g., free parking space in the Hartford area), and
by selecting new housing only in neighborhoods that local realtors
consider to have "good environments for renting. " To eliminate the
additional factor of differing transportation systems in the three re-
gions, units were classified according to peak-hour travel time from
the core by the dominant means of commuter transportation: subway
and commuter railroads in New York, automobile in Los Angeles,
and averages of bus and automobile time weighted according to the
proportion of bus riders and auto users in different parts of the
4Hartford area.
The resulting patterns of rents and travel times appear in Figures
M-4 to M-6, where efficiency apartments (without separate bed-
room), one-bedroom, and two-bedroom units are shown separately.
Information for New York and Hartford, drawn from extensive inven-
tories of rents in all units in a large sampling of new developments,
is presented in the form of median rents and median travel times to
the core for all units, grouped according to ten-minute time zones.
The Los Angeles sample consists of rents for individual apartments
based largely on advertized vacancies that were subsequently checked
in the field. Los Angeles information is presented as a plotting of
individual unit rents, since the number of units covered is too small
to permit the use of medians as a reliable index.
New Yorkers pay a far greater premium to live close to the core than
do residents of either Los Angeles or Hartford. For one- and two-
bedroom apartments, New Yorkers pay more than twice as much near
the core as they do on the fringe of our sample; for efficiency apart-
ments, they pay more than one and one-half times as much in central
locations as they do on the fringe. To determine whether these rent
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FIGURE III - 4
Monthly rents and travel times from center of New York region
Source: City of New York Department of City Planning, rental inventory of 14,152
dwelling units in 136 apartment developments constructed 1958-1959 in New York
City. Data grouped within 10-minute time zones from center, with median rent and
median time indicated for each group.
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FIGURE 1I - 5
Distribution of monthly rents and travel times from center of Los Angeles region
Source: Sample of 126 dwelling units in 115 apartment developments of similar
construction type completed 1950-1961. Information from: Henry A. Babcock
Consulting Engineers, Los Angeles; Federal Housing Administration, Los Angeles;
Prudential Insurance Company of America, Los Angeles; William Walters Real
Estate, Los Angeles; Los Angeles Times advertisements, April 16, 23, and 30, 1961.
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FIGURE 1i1 -6
Monthly rents and travel times from center of Hartford region
Source: Rental inventory of 619 dwelling units in 14 apartment developments con-
structed 1947-1960. Information from Federal Housing Administration, Hartford;
and Rowlson Real Estate and Insurance, Hartford. Data grouped within 10-minute
time zones from center, with median rent and median time indicated for each group.
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differentials between central and outlying locations reflect differences
in room size, additional information was obtained on the number of
square feet per apartment in a sampling of new two-bedroom apart-
ments constructed between 1955 and 1960. Ten new buildings in the
sample were located in the upper East Side of Manhattan, averaging
about 12 minutes in travel time to the core; nine were in Queens,
averaging about 35 minutes in travel time to the core. Rents per
square foot for the Manhattan group averaged $4.27 per month, com-
pared with an average of $2. 35 in Queens. On the rent curve for
two-bedroom apartments in Figure I-4, rents for apartments 12
minutes from the core are twice as high as rents in apartments 35
minutes away. The control sample corresponds closely, with square
foot rentals 12 minutes from the core 1.8 times as high as square
foot rents 35 minutes away. 5 (Certain differences in physical equip-
ment and levels of service do exercise limited influence upon these
rent differentials, however. We shall discuss these factors more
fully in Chapter IV.)
In Los Angeles, no significant locational differences in rent are
detectable for either of the two apartment-size categories in our
sampling. Hartford rents show a clear tendency to increase near
the center -- rent curves for all three apartment sizes tilt upward
toward the center -- but the differentials are very slight, amounting
to 4 to 6 percent increases for central locations in the relatively
narrow time-band covered by our sampling.
These regional differences must be seen in relation to the varying
core strengths that we have already discussed. New York, with 37
percent of its employment in the core, displays extreme central
preferences in its rent structure. Hartford, with 25 percent of its
employment in the core, has some noticeable central preference
influencing the housing market despite the small time-savings achieved
by inlying housing. Los Angeles, with 9 percent of its employment in
the core, has no distinguishable central orientation in its rent struc-
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ture, although considerable time savings to downtown are possible
from central locations. 6
In absolute numbers, Los Angeles has five times as many jobs
downtown as Hartford. -Nevertheless, the small Hartford core
acts as a magnet influencing rent levels, while the larger Los
Angeles core exerts no such influence. Differences in the over-
all regional distribution of employment probably account for these
contrasting rent patterns. Our Los Angeles housing sample has
been drawn from neighborhoods in the western sector of the Los
Angeles region, extending out from the core to take in the central
Wilshire Boulevard area, Hollywood, Beverly Hills, West Los
Angeles, Westwood, and Santa Monica. These districts, and the
adjacent Culver City area, contain 350, 000 jobs in themselves
(compared with 245, 000 downtown). If we add employment in near~
by non-central areas to this total, the number of jobs outside the
core that are readily accessible from the western sector comes to
664, 000. This large number of jobs scattered about the sector
and its environs undoubtedly sets up powerful cross-currents in the
housing market that negate the influence of downtown jobs on rent
levels in this sector. Housing locations anywhere in this sector
offer easy access to a large number of jobs; those sites that offer
special access advantages to the core can command no higher rents
than more outlying locations which offer special access advantages
to a number of other employment centers.
Similarly, retail shopping in and near the western sector upsets the
pull of downtown shopping. Retail sales within major shopping areas
in the western sector totalled 302.7 million dollars in 1958, compared
to 365.4 million downtown. Total retail sales in the sector plus near-
by San Fernando Valley shopping areas amounted to 436. 3 million;
the total number of retail stores was 1594, compared with 1460 down-
town, including 54 general merchandise stores and 13 department
stores, compared with 42 general merchandise and 4 department stores
downtown. 8
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The magnetic pull of Hartford's smaller core meets little inter-
ference from alternate centers of employment and shopping within
the sector where our housing sample is located. The Hartford
sample is drawn from neighborhoods situated west of downtown
lying predominantly within a one -mile band on either side of
Farmington Avenue in Hartford and West Hartford. Within this
sector, the pull of downtown dominates both employment and shop-
ping opportunities. Indices of accessibility to total employment
and to retail trade (prepared for a regional transportation study
using the gravity-model approach) were made available for loca-
tions included in our housing sample.9 These indices were derived
by dividing the region into small zones, obtaining figures for total
employment in each zone, dividing the employment in each zone
by a function of travel time from the location in question to the
employment zone, and summing all results for a particular location.
The resulting index reflects general accessibility from a particular
location to jobs and shopping everywhere in the region. For loca-
tions included in our sample, the general accessibility indices to
both total employment and employment in retail trade correspond
directly to travel times to the core. In Los Angeles, no general
accessibility index was available, but our own knowledge of employ-
ment and retailing within the sector included in the housing sample
indicates quite clearly that travel time to the core does not corres-
pond to general accessibility to all jobs and all retailing in the region.
The approach of general accessibility to all jobs and shopping In
the region (and ideally to entertainment and recreation facilities,
as well) is a superior way of gauging access advantages of particu-
lar housing locations. An index of this type is not available for most
metropolitan areas, however, and considerable time and expense are
required to prepare one. The alternate approach used in this study
requires measuring the proportion of employment and retailing in
the downtown core, rather than gauging the theoretical pulling power
of the core by means of the absolute amount of employment and re -
tailing located downtown. We can understand the rental patterns of
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Los Angeles and Hartford in terms of the relative weakness of down-
town Los Angeles and the relative strength of downtown Hartford.
Any judgment based on absolute quantities of core employment and
retailing would fail to take account of jobs and retail facilities in
non-downtown locations.
Scope of Rent Gradients
The New York region displays strong central preference in its rental
pattern. Since the New York housing sample extends over a broad
geographi6 range, its characteristics can help answer the question
of whether central preferences affect only a limited area near the
core itself, or whether they spread their effects over the housing
market in an sextended gradient. Figure III-4 illustrates an extended
rent gradient for our sampling within the City of New York, although
the slope of the gradient rises much more steeply near the core than
it does 30 to 40 minutes away. To push the analysis still farther
out from the core, two independent samplings of new rental units in
Westchester County were also obtained. Their median rents and
median travel times (within 10-minute time zones) are plotted in
Figure III-7, along with a repetition of the New York City rent gra-
dients for one-and two-bedroom apartments. Although the Westchester
units lie several miles beyond the outer edge of the New York City
sample, their travel times from mid-town Manhattan via commuter
railroad fall within the same range as travel times to housing in
outlying parts of the city served by slower subway trains. The
Westchester rent curves tilt consistently upward toward the core,
furnishing additional evidence of the extended rent gradient in the
New York region. As far out as our Westchester sample extends (to
the 40-49 minute time zone), greater centrality still appears to bring
higher rents.
The level of rents in Westchester is also of some interest in illus-
trating the unpredictable effect of commuting costs upon the housing
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FIGURE Il1 - 7
Monthly rents and travel times from center of New York region,
for apartments in Westchester County and New York City
Sources: Westchester sample A: survey of 600 units in 11 developments completed
1959-1961; information from Federal Housing Administration, New York.
Westchester sample B: survey of 1614 units in garden apartment developments
completed 1945-1961, Apartment Owners Advisory Council, White Plains.
New York City: see Figure 111-4.
Data grouped within 10-minute time zones from center, with median rent and
median time indicated for each group.
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market. Although travel times from the core to Westchester are
the same as travel times by subway to the upper Bronx and lower
Brooklyn, commuting costs are much higher to Westchester:
twenty-five dollars or more per month for railfare alone, compared
with subway fares of four dollars per month. Thus we might expect
to find lower rents in Westchester as compensation for higher travel
costs. Yet for dwelling units with comparable travel times (but with
slightly lower densities), Westchester rent medians range from five
to twenty dollars per month higher than New York City rent levels.
As several theoretical works recognize, commuting costs are a
highly subjective matter. For Westchester residents, life in the
suburbs evidently offers advantages that justify both higher rents
and higher commuting costs than they would have to pay in Brooklyn
or the Bronx. As a result, Westchester rent gradients are higher
than those for comparable travel times in the City, but central pre-%
ferences operate in both locations.
While the New York rental pattern is an extended gradient rather
than merely a peak near the core and a horizontal line farther out,
the gradient is nevertheless much steeper near the core than in
outlying areas. For one-bedroom units, rents increase by about 13
percent as travel-time diminishes from 42 to 26 minutes. Yet the
next time-saving of only 13 minutes (from 26 to 13 minutes median
time) brings a rent increase of 40 percent (from $142 to $200).
Clearly, minutes saved are worth more to the rental market near
the core than they are farther away, but the reasons are not at all
evident. In terms of metropolitan structure, multifamily units near
the outer margin of development may suffer from the potential com-
petition of new single-family housing as a feasible alternative to rental
housing. This competition may hold down rents in outlying locations.
Closer in, single-family homes decline in importance as a competitive
force.
Another structural feature of the New York region that helps explain
the steepness of rent gradients near the core is the lack of suitable
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environments for new rental housing in areas about 15 to 25
minutes from the core. These are the "gray areas" of decaying
-housing and unsightly industry in the older parts of Brooklyn and
Queens near Manhattan, upper Manhattan, and the lower Bronx.
As a result, the next practical alternative to living in a new building
10 to 15 minutes from the core is to move 25 minutes away; the
gradient of choices is discontinuous in this part of the range. High
rents near the core probably reflect in part the unavailability of
close substitutes for housing fifteen minutes or less from the core.
The transportation facilities of the region may also play a distinct
role in raising rent levels near the core. New Yorkers who live
close to the Manhattan business area find bus lines or even taxis
feasible for commuting, while those who live farther away must
descend to the far less pleasant subway system. In this sense,
transportation choices are somewhat discontinuous as distances
from the center of Manhattan increase.
Basic explanations for the rising slope of the rent curve near the
center undoubtedly derive largely from subjective consumer pre-
ferences, and from the premiums that different groups of consumers
will pay in order to save travel time. Probably consumers have
sorted themselves out along the rent gradient so that those who live
near the center value travel-time savings very highly. Recent in-
terviews with residents of new downtown apartments in several cities
have suggested that the downtown occupant places high value on having
the activities of the core close at hand. In addition to his trip to work,
he makes numerous other trips to core facilities for shopping or enter-
10tainment1 Time-savings multiply in importance as the number of
trips to the core increases for an individual. Whether for actual time-
savings on a large number of trips or solely for the psychological
satisfaction of having downtown facilities nearby, the New Yorker who
lives close to the core pays considerably more in rent to save a few
minutes in travel time than does the commuter who lives farther out.
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Conversely, he can save much more on his rent bill by moving a
few minutes farther away, if he can find a suitable environment,
then can the New Yorker who- lives thirty minutes from the core.
The Pattern of Vacancy Rates
Our first aggregate analysis of the location of new multifamily
housing showed strong central tendencies in all three study areas;
yet rental patterns indicate that only in New York can developers
reach substantially higher rent levels by building close to the core
rather than farther away. Rent differentials resulting from central
locations are small in the Hartford area, and apparently non-
existent in Los Angeles. Developers must find other types of
market advantages in central locations in Los Angeles and Hartford,
or they would build a greater proportion of new units on outlying
vacant land, in areas where new single-family construction is active.
One of these advantages can consist of greater ease in renting new
units, which reduces the risk of income loss through high vacancy
rates. In the opinion of developers and realtors consulted in all
three study areas, new units are a safer investment in good inlying
locations than in good outlying locations: they rent more quickly at
the start, and long-run vacancy experience is more favorable in
central locations. To the extent that information on vacancy rates
is available, it confirms these opinions in all three areas.
In Los Angeles, where rent differentials show no central orientation,
vacancy rates in comparable buildings decrease consistently as
locations become more central. A large sampling of idle electricity
meters in apartments of similar quality located in fifteen different
areas of the region indicates the following average vacancy rates for
1959 and 1960, arranged according to the distance of each area from
the core:1
Miles from core 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-25
Average vacancy rate(percent) 4.4 5.8 7.3 7.7
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Comparable vacancy information is not available for New York, but
various surveys of new apartments indicate lower vacancy rates in
Manhattan than elsewhere in the City, A 1959 survey of all postwar
apartments completed in New York City through the end of 1958 in-
dicated a City-wide vacancy rate of 2. 9 percent. 12 A different
survey of postwar units in Manhattan indicated an average vacancy
rate of 1. 6 percent from 1952 to 1956.13 These results are in
accord with the general opinion in real estate circles that Manhattan
vacancy rates in new housing are below those in the rest of the City.
At the regional scale, little information is at hand to test the equally
general opinion that vacancy rates in the City are below those in new
housing farther from the center of the region. According to the 1960
Housing Census, vacancy rates for standard rental units (with all
plumbingfacilities) were 2.0 percent in New York City and 4.0 percent
in the rest of the New York State part of the region. 14
Little information is available for the Hartford region. The best
approximation of over-all vacancy rates in standard apartments
that can be gleaned from advance reports of the 1960 Housing Census
is 4.2 percent for towns within five miles of the core, and 4.5 per-
cent for the remainder of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. 15
Densities and Central Preference
Another type of advantage to the developer is consumer tolerance of
high densities. This tolerance affects development cost rather than
rental income, and its benefits are limited by the increase in con-
struction and operating costs per apartment as the type of structure
shifts from walk-up to elevator buildings and from lighi to heavy
construction. Nevertheless, acceptance of high densities adds to
the developer's flexibility, permits him to reduce land cost per unit,
and within the limits of a particular building type may facilitate
economies of scale by allowing more units on a given site without
necessitating a shift to a more expensive type of construction.
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Density preferences within a housing market undoubtedly have
strong bases in local tradition and in prestige associations with
different building types, as well as in functional conveniences or
inconveniences of living in neighborhoods and structures of dif-
ferent densities. One of our hypotheses in this study is that the
same factors that condition central preference -- strength of the
core, distance to vacant land, time savings from central locations
-- will contribute to consumer acceptance of high densities in
central areas. High central densities are complementary to strong
central preferences, in theory, and we can expect to find the density
patterns of our three study areas consistent with their rental and
vacancy patterns.
Figure I-8, which plots average densities and average travel times
to the core for buildings grouped by ten-minute time intervals, con-
firms these expectations in the three study areas. New York densities
far exceed those of Hartford and Los Angeles across the entire range
covered by our sample. Density levels in New York City entail ob-
vious inconveniences: limited light and air, few ground-level facilities
for recreation, auto and subway congestion, parking spaces available
only in garage structures at considerable extra cost (more than fifty
dollars a month in Manhattan). Normal density standards furnish
some perspective on the extent of consumer tolerance of high densi-
ties in New York. Maximum recommended densities of the American
Public Health Association are 95 dwelling units per net acre in 13-
16
story buildings and 75 in 6-story buildings. Manhattan residents
in new 13-story buildings typically live at net densities ranging from
300 to over 500 units per acre. New 6-story buildings in areas from
25 to 50 minutes from the core are generally developed at about 150
dwelling units per acre.
In terms of light and air, these densities are not quite as oppressive
as the comparison with standards suggests. Our density statistics
apply to single buildings or small developments, most of which pirate
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Dwelling unit densities and travel times from centers of three study regions
Sources: Sample of 37 apartment buildings constructed in New York City 1954-
1961, from New York Department of City Planning; sample of 23 apartment devel-
opments constructed in Los Angeles region 1958-1961, from Los Angeles County
Department of Building and Safety and Prudential Insurance Company; sample of
14 apartment developments constructed in Hartford region 1947-1960, from Federal
Housing Administration and Rowlson Real Estate and Insurance. Data grouped
within 10-minute time zones from center, with average density and average time
indicated for each group.
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light and air from adjacent streets not counted in their own net
acreage or from air space over neighboring buildings. In addition,
the high densities of new 'buildings in central locations partly re-
flect their high proportion of efficiency and one-bedroom apartments.
So far as ground facilities and traffic congestion are concerned, how-
ever, these are indeed oppressive densities by any standards other
than those that dominate the New York housing market. To find new
apartments at lower densities, the New Yorker must increase his
commuting costs by moving to outlying areas served by commuter
railroads. His rent in these suburban areas, as we have noted, will
be slightly more than he would pay for an apartment with comparable
travel time via subway in outer Brooklyn or the Bronx. For shorter
travel times to the magnetic core of Manhattan, New Yorkers pay a
cost in terms of high density as well as high rent.
The downtown core also exerts strong influence on density patterns
in the Hartford region. All the new apartment developments over
two stories high are located within fifteen minutes of downtown,
where densities of new buildings typically range from 35 to 70 dwell-
ing units per net acre. The density curve declines sharply away
from downtown, for new housing twenty minutes away lies in the zone
where vacant land is readily available and developers find little ad~
vantage in exceeding a density of 20 units per acre for garden-type
apartments. The steepness of the Hartford curve thus reflects pri-
marily the small size of the region, plus the pull of downtown that
induces occupants to accept higher densities in central locations in
exchange for savings in travel time.
In Los Angeles, we found no evidence of central orientation in the
rent levels of new apartments, but some indication of central pre-
ference in the pattern of vacancy rates. A sampling of densities in
new multifamily construction reinforces the vacancy pattern in
demonstrating some degree of central orientation. This sample
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consists entirely of the predominant type of multifamily structure
in the Los Angeles area: two-and three-story buildings of frame
and- stucco construction. Within the limits imposed by this type
of building, densities are somewhat higher near the core than in
outlying areas, but limitations of the sample conceal an important
emerging trend. Tall elevator structures (4 stories and higher)
have been uncommon in Los Angeles for some time- A few were
built in the 19 2 0's and 301s, primarily in central areas. A recent
revision of zoning height limits has triggered construction of tall
luxury buildings, with about ten major developments completed or
under construction in the western sector since 1955 and many more
planned. None of the recent developments are near the downtown
core; all within the western sector are in the Beverly Hills and
Westwood areas, about 35 to 40 minutes in travel time from the
core.
Since these new elevator structures are still exceptional in Los
Angeles, they were not included in the relatively small density
sample of representative construction. They are significant, how-
ever, as an emerging characteristic of new multifamily housing
in the region. If they were included in a density curve of all new
apartment development, the curve would probably reach a peak
in the 35-40 minute time zone, where a small rise in density is
evident in the curve of ordinary construction. In an over-all per-
spective, the density patterns of new housing in Los Angeles suggest
limited preference for central sites, with locational preferences
currently shifting to a new non-central orientation.
Conclusions
Analysis of locational preferences in the market for new housing
within the three study areas confirms the theoretical approach, at
least as far as multifamily development is concerned. New York
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exhibits clear and substantial central preferences; Hartford has
similar tendencies but their effects are undercut by the proximity
of vacant land; Los Angeles presents an ambiguous picture sug-
gesting only weak central preferences that have little or no effect
on rent levels.
We set out to learn whether consumers have rejected central loca-
tions for new housing. The answer depends upon metropolitan
characteristics. In New York, with its strong center and lack of
accessible vacant land, consumers prefer central locations to the
extent of paying sizable rent premiums and living at extremely
high densities in new buildings near the core, In Hartford and Los
Angeles, where the regional structures are less favorable, for the
center, consumers prefer central housing to a lesser degree, but
they pay slight rent premiums and accept higher densities at central
locations in Hartford, and they occupy inlying housing in Los Angeles
more fully than outlying units of comparable quality.
What do these findings mean for attracting new housing to the de-
clining areas? In terms of the strategy of renewal planning, they
corroborate what has long been recognized on an intuitive basis:
strengthening the downtown core is an important means of stimu-
lating market demand for inlying housing. They also underline the
importance to the housing market of travel-time differentials be-
tween various parts of the region and the downtown core. Transpor -
tation systems that change travel-time relationships between central
and outlying locations (for trips to the core) can alter the demand
for new housing in these locations. New facilities that decrease
travel times to vacant land without creating proportional effects in
central locations can reduce the attractiveness of inlying areas for
new housing.
Analyses of locationalpreferences in the housing market can furnish
useful guides for renewal planning, for housing preference patterns
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play a key part in determining maximum feasible cost levels for
new development. Urban areas in which central preference is an
important factor in the housing market can undertake renewal
programs on central sites even if costs to the developer are higher
than in more, outlying areas. The only relevant standard is that
costs must be commensurate with market advantages in a given
location. Where central preference is weak or non-existent, the
successful renewal of obsolete areas near the core requires keeping
development and operating costs competitive with those in outlying
locations. The pattern of locational preferences in a housing market
establishes the extent of leeway within which developers' costs can
rise above levels prevailing in other parts of the region. Without
further research into existing cost structures, however, we cannot
say whether a given preference pattern permits or obstructs the
rebuilding of older areas, or whether contemplated public policies
will succeed in reshaping the locational pattern of new housing.
To illustrate the applicability of locational preference analysis to
determining the feasibility of renewal, let us return to the rent
gradients for New York City. In our initial rental sample, we elim-
inated housing located in poor environments that might have adverse
effects on rent levels. As a result, the sample contained very few
units with travel-times of 15-25 minutes to the core: this time zone
consists largely of the "gray areas" of New York, with decaying
housing and inferior environments. Let us now add our rental in-
formation for these units in poor environments to the rest of the
rent gradient. The results appear in Figure I-9, where median
rents and median times are plotted for the new sample at points A,
B, and C.
Not only are these rents below the original gradients at the same
location; they are even below rents in more outlying locations. In
terms of our approach, the depressed rent levels at these locations
reflect their undesirable environment. Renewal programs that
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provide new housing in an improved environment should be able to
achieve rent levels in the range shown by the shaded areas, raising
them toward the extrapolated gradients for good environments. (As
we have already implied, major housing programs in these locations
may also have the effect of reducing rent levels in more central
areas by providing close substitutes for central housing where none
now exist.) At the very least, improved environments should be
able to raise rents to the level found in the vicinity of 25 minutes
from the core. This analysis suggests that development and operat-
ing costs in areas within the 15-25 minute zone can safely exceed
comparable costs farther from the core, but they should not be far
above costs at the 25-minute interval.
For a full analysis of renewal potential, locational patterns of costs
as well as preferences should be investigated. Locational preferences
can be understood in terms of the metropolitan factors that we have
isolated for this analysis. The extent to which cost patterns corres-
pond to locational preferences in the three study regions is the
subject of our next chapter.
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CHAPTERIV
THE ECONOMICS OF NEW HOUSING IN THE DECLINING AREAS
Central locations have important market advantages for new hous -
ing in New York, slight advantages in Hartford, and negligible ad-
vantages in Los Angeles. Taken alone, these market character-
istics neither promote nor retard the construction of new housing
in central areas. If development costs were equal througholit a
region, consumer locational preferences alone would determine
where new housing could earn the greatest return on investment.
But development costs vary within urban regions: land costs differ
from site to site, and real estate taxes differ in each taxing juris-
diction within a region. Developers have a certain degree of flexi-
bility in coping with cost differences. They can adjust densities to
take account of different land costs, and they can vary building types
to achieve different construction and operating costs per dwelling
unit. The object of these adjustments is always to produce a housing
unit that will yield a satisfactory return on investment, a unit whose
rental income will exceed yearly costs by an amount sufficient to
compensate the equity investor.
Wherever such adjustments succeed in producing a satisfactory re-
turn on investments, new housing is feasible. To evaluate the pros-
pects for developing new multifamily housing in the declining parts
of our study regions requires bringing together three separate
elements that enter into the investor' s calculations: cost levels
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confronting developers, the rents they can achieve with particular
kinds of dwelling units, and their methods for adjusting the housing
product to yield a satisfactory return within the limits established
by cost factors and market characteristics. Rent information
gathered for the preceding chapter serves to establish the rent level
component of this investigation. In this chapter, we combine rent
data with information on land, development, and operating costs to
see whether developers can work out acceptable densities and
structural types to produce a satisfactory return on new housing in
the declining areas. To understand current cost and market con-
ditions, we look first at areas within each region where construction
has been active, then apply our findings to the declining areas.
This analysis produces surprising results, Despite the widespread
view that new private development is not economically feasible in
the declining "gray areas, " we find that all three study regions meet
the first requirement for rebuilding. Site costs and re-use values
are roughly in line in all three regions -- though the Hartford case
is marginal. These results are the more striking because only New
York displays clear and strong central preferences in the new hous-
ing market. Nevertheless, the balance of land costs and re-use
values is clearly favorable for rebuilding the old areas of Los Ange-
les as well as New York, and favorable with only slight qualifications
in Hartford.
New York Development Costs
According to the findings of the New York Metropolitan Region
Study, the cost of developing new apartments in most of the built-
up sections of New York City -- including the declining areas -- is
so high that necessary rents will price such apartments out of the
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reach of all but the wealthiest groups. Speaking of these inner areas
of the region, Hoover and Vernon observe:
Members of the middle income group who insist upon
tolerable structures are effectively excluded; this
group could not afford to exploit the access advan-
tages of such locations by rebuilding. Such an op-1
eration.,, is too costly except for the very rich.
To demonstrate that this conclusion is incorrect, we shall work
through the cost and return analyses that every developer must make,
and determine what rent levels are necessary to produce a satisfac-
tory return on investments in the declining areas, and whether such
rents are obtainable. At the same time, we shall present a picture
of typical multifamily development practice throughout the region,
for if new housing is to be truly feasible in the old areas, it must
not involve economic disadvantages. New housing must conform to
normal investment expectations, and offer returns competitive with
those at alternate locations that developers now find attractive,
Several components of development cost are more or less constant
throughout the New York region, as well as throughout the Los Ange-
les and Hartford regions, and therefore exercise little influence in
the developer' s choice of building locations within the region. Con-
struction costs for comparable apartment structures vary so slightly
that developers consider them approximately equal throughout the
New York area. Building code requirements within the various
legal jurisdictions of the region offer no significant opportunities
for structural modifications that might reduce the cost of new apart-
ment buildings in particular locations. Operating costs are also
constant throughout the region, depending on building type and
level of service rather than location. The major elements that
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vary with location are property taxes and land costs; the extent to
which they influence the locational pattern of new housing depends
upon their importance within the total cost structure for new build-
ings, and upon the extent to which they vary within the region.
Property Tax Levels
Contrary to the popular impression that real estate taxes are high-
est in the central city and grade off to significantly lower levels in
the suburbs, information for the New York region indicates that tax
differences are not major ones, and do not follow a center-oriented
pattern. The main problem in comparing tax rates for different
communities is to secure reliable estimates of the relationship be-
tween assessed value and actual market value of properties. The
New York State Board of Equalization and Assessment prepares
equalization ratios, reflecting their estimate of the percentage of
market value used in local valuations, for the five boroughs of New
York City and five other cities in the region. Table IV-1 presents
a comparison of estimated tax rates in these communities, derived
by multiplying the equalization ratio for each community by its
nominal tax rate for 1959.
These rates are somewhat higher than actual rates, since the equal-
ization ratios are based on market values for 1952 and 1957, which
have subsequently risen in generaL For purposes of comparison,
however, they do indicate that central areas suffer from no major
tax burden in comparison with outlying sites. Rates in several
Westchester cities are higher than those in New York City. Within
New York City, differences are minor between Manhattan and the
Bronx, Brooklyn, or Queens. If we assume a new dwelling unit with
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TABLE IV-1
Property Tax Rates for Communities in New York Region, 1959
Community Estimated Tax Rate
(Percent of full market value)
City of New York:
Manhattan 3. 86
Bronx 3. 70
Brooklyn 3.41
Queens 3. 11
Richmond 2. 73
Westchester County:
Mount Vernon 4. 36
New Rochelle 4. 07
Rye 3. 78
White Plains 3. 35
Yonkers 3.27
Source: New York State Department of Commerce, "Real Property
Taxes in Cities of New York State, 1959, " M-575-r, based
on equalization ratios established by State Board of Equali-
zation and Assessment. Tax rates include city, county,
and school-district taxes due in 1959.
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a market value of $10, 000 and treat these estimated tax levels as
actual rates, Manhattan taxes will be $75 per year higher than
Queens taxes - a difference that can be overcome by a monthly rent
six dollars higher in Manhattan than in Queens. As we know, Man-
hattan apartments command a rent premium far higher than that
needed to wipe out this tax differential. The only tax difference that
appears significant in Table IV-1 is the gap between Richmond and
the other boroughs of New York City. Despite an apparently favor-
able tax level, Richmond has been too inaccessible from the core of
the region to attract more than a small amount of new multifamily
housing. The major alternatives for new apartment locations (within
the New York State portion of the region) are Manhattan, Queens,
Brooklyn, the Bronx, or Westchester County. Among these alter-
native locations, tax differences are minor.
To check on the accuracy of this comparison and its applicability to
new construction, information was obtained from real estate de-
velopers on the proportion of assessed value to development cost for
new apartment buildings in areas of recent construction activity.2
These ratios, applied to 1959 nominal tax rates, produced the
following estimated tax rates:
Manhattan 3. 18 percent
Bronx 3. 19
Brooklyn 3.20
Queens 3 20
White Plains 3. 10
According to this information, gaps between tax levels are still
narrower than they appeared in Table IV-1. Within New York City,
differences are negligible. The White Plains rate is so close to
those in the New York City boroughs that the total tax differential
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for a $10, 000 dwelling unit would amount to a maximum of ten dollars.
Tax levels, then, seem to constitute no obstacle to rebuilding the
inner parts of the New York Region.
Land Costs in the New York Region
Land costs in New York follow the pattern of rents and densities
that we observed in Chapter III. Rents and densities are much high-
er in the center of the New York region than in outlying locations.
Land costs for inlying apartment sites reflect the high rent-earning
capacity of central land, and are many times higher than costs in
other parts of the region. In Manhattan, most land in areas of re-
cent apartment activity sells for prices ranging from twenty to
seventy dollars per square foot. 3 Prices vary considerably in dif-
ferent Manhattan locations. On Fifth Avenue, prices go as high as
one hundred fifty dollars per square foot. Prime sites in Greenwich
Village cost sixty dollars per square foot, while less favored Village
sites are thirty to forty dollars. Good sites on the Upper East Side
bring prices of sixty to seventy dollars per square foot. Other
sites, away from the prime locations, cost twenty to thirty dollars
per square foot. In all these cases, site acquisition costs involve
paying for existing buildings on the land.
In the other boroughs of New York City, land prices seldom exceed
ten dollars per square foot for apartment sites. The best locations
in Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx bring ten dollars, but most
apartment sites in these boroughs cost less than five dollars per
square foot. Average locations in Brooklyn and the Bronx are three
to four dollars per square foot; in Queens, they range from three to
five dollars. These sites are also covered with existing buildings,
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but typically the densities are much lower than in Manhattan. In
some cases, single-family houses occupy the sites, but more often
developers must pay for low multifamily structures.
Apartment sites in Westchester County are generally in built-up
areas, readily accessible to commuter railroad stations. Here the
prices are usually four to five dollars per square foot, but occasion-
ally land sells for as much as eight dollars per square foot in choice
locations. Site acquisition for Westchester apartment houses gen-
erally requires clearing existing structures of low or moderate
density.
Vacant land in the New York region sells at lower prices, but little
of it is easily accessible to public transportation. The Bronx has
some vacant land near the Westchester County line, far removed
from subway connections, selling for one to two dollars per square
foot. Vacant land in Brooklyn, equally inaccessible to public trans-
portation, sells for comparable prices. Queens has some vacant
land within range of the subway network; prices for this land range
from one to three dollars, depending on physical suitability of the land
for building. Vacant land in areas outside the City of New York --
Westchester County and the New Jersey counties of Essex and Hud-
son -- sells for one to three dollars per square foot. In Westchester
County, garden apartment developers pay from one to two dollars
per square foot for vacant land within driving distance of commuter
railroad stations.
These prices, based on recent sales of land to apartment developers,
are consistent with development opportunities in locations where new
construction has been active. Our objective is to discover whether
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development costs are too high to provide a satisfactory return on new
housing investments in the inner areas of New York where construction
has not been active. As a first step, let us see how land prices in the
inactive areas compare with those in the rest of the region.
Many redevelopment projects in New York have been located in areas
of Manhattan highly accessible to the core (fifteen minutes or less in
travel time) where little unsubsidized housing has appeared in recent
years. Land for these projects has cost from twenty to forty dollars
per square foot, 4 a price level corresponding to the lower end of the
twenty-to-seventy dollar range we noted previously for areas where
new apartment construction has been active. Manhattan locations
farther from the core offer lower land prices: site acquisition costs
have ranged from nine dollars per square foot for land in Harlem to
fifteen dollars per square foot for a site on the Upper West Side near
Central Park. Site acquisition costs for public housing projects in
Manhattan have been still lower, ranging mostly from seven to eleven
dollars per square foot for locations fifteen to twenty minutes from
5
the core. With the exception of highly accessible locations near the
core, land prices in the inactive areas of Manhattan are clearly lower
than typical prices in active construction areas. Whether they are
low enough to match the earning capacity of this land remains to be
seen.
Land costs in the declining areas of other boroughs are below Man-
hattan levels. Redevelopment sites near the commercial core of
downtown Brooklyn, some twenty-five minutes from 42nd Street in
Manhattan, have cost from six to nine dollars per square foot, but
advance acquisition estimates for one prime site indicate a cost of
twenty-four dollars per square foot. Away from this secondary
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commercial core, public housing site costs are indicative of price
levels in the declining areas. Land costs for most housing projects
outside Manhattan have ranged from three to seven dollars per square
foot, for built-up sites near public transportation and accessible to
the core in twenty to thirty-five minutes. These prices are somewhat
higher than the three-to-four dollar range that we have found in typi-
cal active areas in Brooklyn and the Bronx, and the corresponding
three-to-five dollar prices in Queens. Some additional market ad-
vantage would therefore seem to be necessary to attract investment
to these more expensive locations.
Figure IV-1 brings together information on land prices for redevelop-
ment and housing project sites, excluding housing projects built on
vacant land. Land prices in these old areas decline as travel time
from the core increases, but prices vary considerably for any given
degree of accessibility. In addition to travel time from the core, the
density of previous development is a major factor influencing cost
levels. Figure IV-2 presents public housing land costs per square
foot as a function of dwelling units per acre on the site before clear-
ance, using only those project sites that were predominantly resi-
dential before acquisition. The obvious relationship between density
and acquisition cost calls attention to existing density as a critical
factor influencing the redevelopment potential of declining areas. In
Manhattan, public housing sites were previously developed at den.-
sities between one hundred and two hundred dwelling units per acre
of total project area. Projects in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens
generally use sites that had been developed at densities of between
twenty and one hundred dwelling units per acre. To the extent that
high acquisition costs block the rebuilding of old areas in Manhattan,
the high density of previous development plays a role in inhibiting
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current change. In other regions, where the declining areas have
never been developed at very high densities, site acquisition costs
are not likely to reach Manhattan levels.
The Adjustment of Cost Factors
How significant are the differences in land prices within the New York
region? On a square foot basis, land costs for apartment sites in
Manhattan are often twenty times as high as those in the outer
boroughs. Sixty dollars per square foot is a typical price for Man-
hattan luxury apartment sites, while apartment land in outer Brook-
lyn and the Bronx sells for as little as three dollars per square foot.
But the costs that matter for apartment developers are not prices
per square foot; they are development costs per unit and yearly
operating outlays. We have noted in Chapter III that new apartments
are developed at much higher densities in the center of the New York
region than in outlying areas. Thus the land cost per dwelling unit
need not be twenty times higher on sixty-dollar land than it is on
three-dollar land. By reducing the amount of land per unit in central
locations, the developer can hold down the land cost per unit even
where land prices per square foot are high.
The developer' s ability to adjust costs in this way is limited by a
number of factors. If he could build central housing at twenty times
the density of outlying housing, he could equalize land costs per unit,
but high densities bring extra costs of their own. Tall buildings
mean heavy and expensive construction, with much unproductive in-
terior space given to corridors and elevator shafts, and a need for
such expensive service features as extra elevators and underground
parking levels. High densities thus raise unit construction and
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operating costs at the same time that they reduce unit land costs. In
addition, consumers may prove unwilling to accept high densities if
they entail loss of light and air, and zoning laws set an upper limit
on both density and land coverage. As a result, New York developers
do not build in Manhattan at twenty times the densities they use in
Brooklyn; they build at about three times the Brooklyn densities --
400 to 500 dwelling units per acre on expensive Manhattan land,
compared with 150 on cheap land in the other boroughs.
This .higher density reflects not only taller building types and fuller
land coverage, but also a high proportion of small dwelling units. As
table IV-2 indicates, efficiency apartments constitute only a small
proportion of new dwelling units in outlying locations, but account
for a major share of new units in the center of the region. Two-
bedroom apartments, on the other hand, represent one-fourth of all
new units in outlying areas, but shrink to half that proportion in the
center.
Of the two methods for increasing density, taller structures make
possible major density increases, while shifts in apartment size
distribution allow only small supplementary gains. Thus increases
in density typically bring about the higher unit construction and op-
erating costs that are characteristic of tall buildings. As a result,
the problem of selecting an optimum density is one of balancing
economies in unit land cost against increased unit construction and
service costs.
In adjusting development costs, the objective is not to minimize unit
cost but to achieve a satisfactory return per unit investment. Part
of the cost adjustment, therefore, may represent a strategy for -
0TABLE IV-2
Size Distribution of New Apartments by Travel Time
from Core, New York City, 1958-1959
Minutes from core:
Efficiency (0-
bedroom)apart-
ments
1-bedroom
2-bedroom
3-bedroom or larger
Total
0-9 10-19 20-29
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
750
686
203
65
1704
44. 0
40. 3
11. 9
3. 8
100. 0
1443 33.4
2074 48. 0
728 16.8
78 1.8
4323 100. 0
439
1033
496
119
2087
21.0 1013
49.5 2259
23.8 1187
5. 7 191
100. 0 4650
Source: Rental inventory used in Chapter III, Figure III-4. Travel time calculations described in
Chapter III, footnote 4.
30-39 40-49
21. 8
48. 6
25. 5
4. 1
100. 0
215
798
348
27
1388
15. 5
57. 5
25. 1
1. 9
100. 0
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increasing unit rent rather than merely holding down costs. To
achieve higher rents, developers may provide such special construc-
tion features as outdoor balconies, central air conditioning, and
decorative lobbies and exteriors. Special service features -- door-
men, elevator operators, superior property maintenance -- also
represent ways of attaining higher rents. Construction and service
costs play a dual role in the cost adjustment process: they are par-
tially determined by the choice of density, but they are also deter-
mined in part by independent decisions to vary the levels of facilities
and services in order to achieve desired rent levels. As this type of
variation suggests, developers may overcome high land costs not
merely by raising densities to economize on development costs, but
also by producing a superior product that can command a rent
premium.
Examples of Cost Adjustment
In studying the cost adjustment process, we must take account of all
these factors -- density, construction cost, operating cost -- as
variables that are manipulated to produce an acceptable investment
"package. " In Table IV-3, a number of examples are given to
illustrate the ways in which New York developers adjust costs in a
variety of locations with differing land prices within the region.
Columns 1 through 5 describe costs and their adjustment in areas
where apartment construction has recently been active. On the ba-
sis of these current methods of development, feasible development
alternatives have been prepared for hypothetical locations in the
declining areas; these alternatives are presented in columns 6
through 8. Information on current cost levels and development
practice in different parts of the region is derived from a series of
TABLE IV-3
New York Region: Financial Calculations for One-Bedroom Apartments
Location:
Travel time from
downtown
Land cost per sq. ft.
Building type
D. U. per acre
Sq. ft. per d. u.
Land cost per d. u.
Construction cost per d. u.
Total investment per d. u.
Equity share (1/3)
Mortgage (2/3, 6%,
20 years)
Yearly operating cost
Tax rate
Yearly taxes
Total yearly cost
Yearly rent
(Monthly rent)
Cash surplus over cost
Less yearly interest and
amortization (8. 5% of
mortgage)
Net cash return
Return on equity
1
Manhattan
5-9 min.
60. 00
15-story el.
500
87
5220
16000
21220
7073
14147
660
.0318
675
1335
3600
(300)
2265
1202
1063
15. 0%
2
Manhattan
10-19 min.
20. 00
12-story el.
350
124
2480
13000
15480
5160
10320
420
.0318
492
912
2520
(210)
1608
877
731
14. 2%
3
Queens
25-34 min.
10. 00
6-story el.
160
272
2720
10000
12720
4240
8480
350
.0320
407
757
2100
(175)
1343
720
623
14. 7%
4
Brooklyn-
Bronx
35-39 min.
3.50
6-story el.
150
290
1015
8500
9515
3172
6343
350
0319
303
653
1680
(140)
1027
539
488
14. 6%
5
White Plains
(Westchester)
40-44 min.
4.50
6-story el.
120
363
1634
9000
10634
3545
7089
350
.0310
330
680
1800
(150)
1120
603
517
14. 6%
6
New York
Declining
Area
15-24 min.
5. 00+
6-story el.
150
290
1500
9000
10500
3500
7000
350
0319
335
685
1800
(150)
1115
595
520
14. 9%
7
New York
Declining
Area
15-24 min.
9.00
6-story el.
150
290
2610
9000
11610
1161 '
10449*1
350
0319
370
720
1680
(140)
960
758*
202
17. 4%
8
New York
Declining
Area
15-24 min.
4. 50+
3-story
50
871
4000
8000
12000
1200*
10800*:
300
.0319
382
682
1680
(140)
998
783*
215
17. 9%
*c FHA Financing: 90% mortgage, 30 years, 7 1/4% yearly interest and amortization.
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interviews with New York realtors and public officials, and from
published cost analyses of recent apartment buildings. 6
Assumptions for these case examples reflect conservative estimates
of typical current conditions. Financing terms are those that a build-
er could secure from conservative banking institutions. In actual
practice, a developer may secure a mortgage covering considerably
more than two-thirds of development cost, as we assume here. In
practice, property taxes may be somewhat lower than those presented
in the table: our assumption is that New York City assessments are
75 percent (and White Plains assessments 62 percent) of full develop-
ment cost, including full site acquisition cost.. In reality, land
assessments are often somewhat lower.
Discussions with realtors indicated that a yearly return of approxi-
mately 15 percent on equity investment, after payment of interest
and amortization, is necessary to attract risk capital into most apart-
ment developments in the New York area. The case examples all pro-
duce returns of about 15 percent, according to our assumptions. The
conservative nature of these assumptions with respect to financing
and property taxes probably results in an understatement of the return
on equity. No specific allowance has been made for vacancies, how-
ever, so that the indicated rates of return are not likely to differ
7greatly from realistic conditions.
Column 4 describes the basic New York apartment house: six stories,
undistinguished in appearance, with minimum physical features (no
balconies, plain lobbies, red brick facing) and minimum service.
This type of building, found in large numbers in Brooklyn, the Bronx,
and Queens, provides the cheapest new apartments available in the
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area. Rents are typically forty dollars per room, with three and a
half rental rooms normal for a one-bedroom apartment. This type
of structure is a reasonable investment on land costing three to four
dollars per square foot. At a characteristic density of 150 dwelling
units per net acre, the land cost per unit is a little over one thousand
dollars. Developers sometimes pay somewhat more for land per unit
to build this type of structure for the same general rent level. Fif-
teen hundred dollars per unit for land is the upper limit, and at this
cost rents may have to go up slightly.
Land for apartment houses sells for as much as ten dollars per
square foot in the best parts of the Bronx (Riverdale) and Queens
(Forest Hills, Main Street-Flushing). Column 3 illustrates how
developers adjust their costs to build in these locations. Building
height typically remains at six stories, but density increases slight-
ly. The dwelling unit itself is a more expensive product, with an
outdoor balcony and perhaps central air conditioning. By virtue of
superior physical equipment, a location more accessible to Manhat-
tan, and desirable neighborhood associations, the apartment can
command fifty dollars a room, or $175 per month for the unit. Under
these circumstances, the developer can afford to pay more than $2500
per unit for his land.
Within Manhattan, but away from key prestige locations, land prices
of twenty dollars per square foot require a more decided shift to
higher density. Typical densities here are about 350 dwelling units
per acre, in buildings twelve storids high. These are fully fireproof
buildings, with concrete floors, in contrast to the lighter semi-
fireproof construction permitted in six-story structures. Unit con-
struction costs rise substantially, but part of the increase reflects
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higher standards, including more expensive exterior finish and more
elaborate lobbies. Service costs also rise, reflecting a higher level
of service, with a doorman and parking attendant on the payroll, In
recognition of superior location and the level of physical plant and
service, rents rise to sixty dollars per room, or $210 per month for
a one-bedroom apartment. Unit land costs, at $2500, remain about
the same as in the best Queens locations.
To create a suitable investment in Manhattan prestige locations, the
builder must improve his product still more, while he raises density
higher. On the sixty-dollar land in column one, developers build at
densities of about 500 dwelling units per net acre, using buildings
fifteen stories or higher. Rooms are larger, kitchen equipment is
more elaborate, and the level of service is still higher. Rents in
these luxury buildings are $85 per room, $300 per month for a one-
bedroom unit, Land cost per unit is over $5000 at this location;
Manhattan developers often pay $6000 or $7000 per unit for luxury
apartment sites.
At the other extreme of the region in terms of location are suburban
sites for apartment houses. Land in White Plains, more than forty
minutes from 42nd Street in Manhattan by commuter railroad, sells
for four to five dollars per square foot in locations suitable for apart-
ment houses. These locations are generally within walking distance
of the railroad station. Here the developer' s response is to provide
a building very similar to the basic 6-story apartment house of
Brooklyn and Queens, with slightly more expensive features and some-
what lower density. One-bedroom apartments in Westchester bring
rents of $150 per month, ten dollars more than apartments in outer
Brooklyn or the Bronx, but this small differential is enough to permit
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slightly higher expenditures for land and construction in Westchester.
Land cost per unit in this White Plains example is $1600.
In presenting these case examples, we have adopted the perspective
of the individual builder confronted with a set of costs that he must
combine in attempting to work out a satisfactory investment. From a
broader perspective, the cost and rent combinations that developers
achieve in different locations are not merely the way of overcoming
a given level of land costs: they are also the justification for the level
of land costs. Sixty dollars per square foot constitutes a market price
for luxury apartment land in Manhattan only because reasonable invest-
ments can be worked out at this price level. If they could not, land
would not sell for apartments at this price.
Apartment land in New York generally contains existing structures
that must be cleared, however. To the extent that these structures
produce income, they constitute an independent standard governing
the value of the site in its present use. Land sales for apartment re-
use are feasible only if the site has a re-use value to the developer
greater than the value of land and buildings in present use. In the
land markets of the various sections of New York where apartment
construction is active, re-use value, supported by the investment
possibilities we have described, clearly exceeds present value of
land and buildings on a sufficient number of sites to provide a steady
supply of marketable land.
Investment Possibilities in the Declining Areas
We have looked into current methods of adjusting development costs
to market rents in a variety of New York locations. What can be done
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in the declining areas? According to our analysis in Chapter III,
accessibility to the core is a potent market factor in the New York
region. As a result, the locational advantages of the older areas
with respect to core access should enable them to command higher
rents than more outlying areas, provided that their environment is
upgraded from its present condition, Let us assume that new one-
bedroom apartments approximately twenty minutes from midtown
Manhattan bring in rents ten dollars higher per month than compar-
able apartments thirty-five minutes away in Brooklyn and the Bronx.
Under these conditions, calculations in column 6 indicate that de-
velopers can pay more than five dollars per square foot for land, a
price within the three-to-seven dollar range that we have found to be
typical of land costs in the declining areas outside Manhattan. The
land cost per dwelling unit in this case is $1500, a price consistent
with present practice in developing six-story apartment houses in the
outer boroughs of New York City. In this calculation, density has
been held to the same level of 150 dwelling units per net acre that
prevails in more outlying locations. Thus the cost of land constitutes
no significant obstacle to rebuilding the older areas outside Manhattan.
Economic conditions are sufficiently favorable to permit new apartment
developments comparable to those in the outlying parts of Brooklyn and
the Bronx, provided that the environment is reclaimed so that it exer-
cises no depressing influence on rent levels. Further, the rent levels
we assume here are far below the luxury category.
Some sites in the older areas will involve clearance costs higher than
three to seven dollars per square foot. Public housing sites in Harlem
have cost about nine dollars per square foot, while sites elsewhere in
Manhattan have cost as much as eleven dollars per square foot for
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public housing and fifteen dollars per square foot for urban renewal
projects. If these sites are suitable for apartments with rents of
$175 or $210 per month, as in columns two and three, land costs of
ten dollars and twenty dollars per square foot will be consistent with
development opportunities, but even at lower rents these land costs
do not rule out new development. All our examples so far assume
conventional financing at conservative terms. If we substitute the
type of financing available for mortgages insured by the Federal
Housing Administration, which would be available in official urban
renewal project areas (under the FHA section 220 rental housing
program), developers can pay higher land prices even if rents re-
main at the moderate levels prevailing in outlying New York City
locations.
Under FHA financing, mortgages cover 90 percent of total develop-
ment cost, and the mortgage term is thirty years or longer. Con-
ventional financing, as we have defined it, provides for loans of two-
thirds of development cost, with a mortgage term of twenty years.
Even if we assume a rent of only $140 per month, nine dollars per
square foot is a feasible land price for six-story apartment buildings
at a density of 150 dwelling units per acre, under the FHA financing
terms used in column 7. As a result, the Harlem land price of nine
dollars per square foot is not excessive for typical New York six-
story apartment houses, within :the framework of an urban renewal
project that will improve the environment and make available FHA
financing. If rents higher than $140 can be obtained, land prices
higher than nine dollars per square foot, and equal to those of public
housing sites in Manhattan, are feasible for new construction.
Rebuilding the declining areas may call for some construction at
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densities lower than 150 units per acre. With FHA financing, three-
story walk-up buildings are feasible on land selling for $4. 50 per
square foot. Column 8 presents calculations for a development of
this type, with one-bedroom apartments renting once again for only
$140 per month. Land prices in the declining areas of Brooklyn, the
Bronx, and Queens are thus compatible even with densities of 50 units
per net acre, with the aid of FHA mortgages. This density would not
be feasible for Manhattan, however, unless subsidies were available.
So far as typical New York developments are concerned, our calcula-
tions demonstrate clearly that the declining areas present no major
economic difficulties. Outside Manhattan, new developments com-
parable to current construction in outer Brooklyn and the Bronx --
and with the same general rent levels -- are economically feasible
with conventional financing. In Manhattan' s older areas, the same
types of development are economically feasible through FHA financ-
ing. The requirements for such new developments in the declining
areas are that the environment must be improved so that it does not
depress rent levels below those in more outlying locations, and de-
velopment densities must approximate those now current in more
outlying locations. With FHA financing, developers have sufficient
leeway so that either of these requirements may be relaxed to some
extent in the declining areas of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens.
Los Angeles Cost Components
In Los Angeles, as in New York, the only cost components that vary
significantly with location are property taxes and land costs. Con-
struction and operating costs are constant throughout the region for
comparable structures and comparable levels of service. Building
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codes within the region do not differ sufficiently for any community to
offer large savings in construction cost by permitting cheaper struc-
tural designs. Limited savings are possible in a few cases. Beverly
Hills permits frame and stucco construction to a height of four sto-
ries, while the City of Los Angeles requires heavier construction
when a building exceeds three stories. Code differences of this
order, while important for some locational decisions, constitute no
major cost disadvantages in the centrally located declining areas.
Property taxes follow no clear-cut geographic pattern, but the cen-
tral city rate is somewhat higher than rates in a number of outlying
communities that serve as alternative locations for new multifamily
housing. We have reliable tax information for Los Angeles County,
which contains the bulk of all new multifamily housing.in the region.
According to informed estimates, assessment practice within the
County is to evaluate residential property at approximately 25 per-
cent of full value. Effective tax rates therefore equal one-fourth the
nominal rates. Table IV-4 presents effective tax rates for commu-
nities in Los Angeles County; these rates are a composite of county,
city, school, and special taxes for 1960-61.
Average tax rates for communities grouped according to distance
from downtown Los Angeles show no consistent variation with respect
to location. The average rates hover around two percent, except for
communities between 25 and 35 miles away from the core, where the
rates are higher. On the average, property taxes are no higher in
central locations than in outlying areas, but the averages conceal
some important differences among individual communities. The City
of Los Angeles, with its tax rate of 2. 02 percent, compares unfavor-
ably with several outlying communities where developers have recently
TABLE IV-4
Property Tax Rates for Communities in Los Angeles County,
(Estimated percentages of full market value)
1960-61
Miles from
core: 0-5 6-10
Vernon 1. 76 Beverly
Los Hills
Angeles 2. 02 Commerce
Glendale
Montebello
South Gate
Huntington
Park
Maywood
Alhambra
Monterey
Park
Inglewood
San
Gabriel
Lynnwood
Bell
South
Pasadena
Culver
City
Pico
Rivera
Average: 1. 89 Average:
11-15
Pasadena
1.27 Burbank
1.55 Gardena
1.74 Arcadia
1.76 Downey
1.84 Rosemead
San
1.88 Marino
1.92 Temple
2.01 City
Compton
2. 02 So. El
2. 02 Monte
Torrance
2. 03 El Monte
2. 03 City of
2.06 Industry
Paramount
2.07 Norwalk
Hawthorne
2. 11 Bellflower
Whittier
2.36 Santa Fe
Springs
1.92 Average:
16-20
1. 65 El Segundo
1.68 Santa
1.84 Monica
1. 90 Signal Hill
1.98 Duarte
2.00 Sierra
Madre
2. 02 Monrovia
Bradbury
2. 02 Lawndale
2. 05 Irwindale
Hermosa
2. 06 Beach
2. 08 Dairy
2.13 Valley
Baldwin
2. 14 Park
2. 25 Miranda
2.28 Hills
2. 29 Manhattan
2. 32 Beach
2. 33 Artesia
2..
2.
45
08 Average:
21-25
1. 51 Long
Beach
1. 66 Lakewood
1.81 San
1.99 Fernando
Rolling
2. 09 Hills Est.
2. 13 Palos Ver-
2. 16 des Est.
2. 16 La Puente
2. 25 Rolling
Hills
2. 29 Azusa
W. Covina
2.31 Walnut
Redondo
2.35 Beach
Covina
2. 36
2.
2.
26-30
Pomona
1. 57 Glendora
1. 92 San Dimas
2. 17
2.20
2. 32
31-35
La Verne
Claremont
36-40
2. 32 Avalon
2. 35
1. 95
1. 93
2.00
2.03
2.09
2. 17
2. 19
2.22
2.26
2.28
2. 36
41
41
1. 99 Average: 2. 09 Average: 2. 23 Average: 2. 34 Average: 1. 95
Source: Los Angeles County Assessor, Listing of tax rates for different communities in Los Angeles County, S-74, 10/60. County assess-
C4'
.1-
ments are approximately 25 percent of full market value; tax rates shown are therefore 25 percent of nominal tax rates.
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been locating new multifamily housing: Beverly Hills (1. 27 percent),
Long Beach (1. 57 percent), Pasadena (1. 65 percent), Santa Monica
(1, 66 percent), Burbank (1. 68 percent), and Glendale (1. 74 percent).
For a dwelling unit with a development cost of ten thousand dollars,
yearly property taxes in the City of Los Angeles would exceed those
in Santa Monica by thirty-six dollars, or three dollars per month on
the rent bill. In a region such as New York, where central locations
have considerable value in the rental market, this difference would be
negligible. In Los Angeles, where centrality apparently has little
effect on rent levels, the tax difference is worth noting. We shall
test its significance for housing in the declining areas when we
analyze case examples of housing investments in the Los Angeles
region.
Land Costs
In the New York region, land costs for apartment sites are many
times higher in central locations than in outlying areas, following
the general pattern of rent levels. The Los Angeles region contrasts
sharply on both counts. We have already noted the lack of any clear
rental pattern related to distance from the core in Los Angeles; land
costs also seem to have very little to do with distance from the center.
Figure IV-3 presents the estimated range of land prices that apart-
ment developers currently pay for sites in desirable neighborhoods
lying in the western sector of the region, the same sector that we have
used for our rental sampling. 8 As in New York, these sites all in-
volve some clearance of existing structures. The general pattern
of land prices in this sector of Los Angeles is remarkably flat,
Except for a slight dip near the core, in a relatively low prestige
area, and a marked rise around Beverly Hills and Westwood (33 to
KwA
i.-SANTA
MONICAI~ HIL I l sY
15 20 25 30 35
FIGURE IV - 3
Site acquisition costs for new apartment developments, western sector. of
Los Angeles region, 1959-1960, and travel times from center
40 45 50
Minutes from center
$/sq. ft.
30,
25 [-
20[
15
10
5
5 10
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40 minutes from the core), all prices fall within the narrow range of
three to five dollars per square foot.
These price estimates represent typical sites for new apartment con-
struction in Los Angeles. They do not include such special sites as
land on Wilshire Boulevard itself, or land with value for commercial
development. Characteristically, these sites are on residential side
streets, and require the clearance of old one- or two-family houses.
Since the prices are derived from recent land sales for apartment
development, they necessarily reflect land costs in areas that de-
velopers consider satisfactory for new multifamily construction. As
a result, these estimates neglect areas where land has not recently
been marketed for apartment development. Except for a few isolated
sales, we know very little about land prices in the inactive older
areas of Los Angeles. According to the limited available information,
and in the opinion of well-informed appraisers, land costs for com-
parable sites in the declining areas are lower than those we have
cited in the Wilshire sector. In most cases,. the old areas of Los
Angeles are not encumbered with high density structures, but only
with singlefamily and duplex houses, so that there is little reason
to expect higher prices in these areas than in the neighborhoods now
being rebuilt along Wilshire Boulevard.
Two current urban renewal projects in Los Angeles furnish some
insight into the cost of acquiring large tracts of land, rather than
searching out small parcels at reasonable prices. The huge Bunker
Hill project, covering 136 acres immediately adjacent to the central
business district, is expected to cost an average of $8. 78 per square
foot for real estate purchases and acquisition expenses, according
to current appraisals. This land has considerable commercial value.
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The project plan calls primarily for office and retail development,
plus some 3000 dwelling units in apartment towers. The appropriate
comparison here is with land adjacent to the central business district
of another city: in New York, land costs are over forty dollars per
square foot for renewal projects with comparable locations.
A second renewal area near downtown, but with less value for com-
mercial development, is likely to be more representative of the costs
of clearing sizable sections of the declining areas. This is the Tem-
ple Project, occupying 183 acres about five minutes from downtown.
Current appraisals indicate a probable gross project cost (including
land acquisition, clearance, relocation, site improvements, and
overhead) of $4. 33 per square foot. Land acquisition alone is prob-
ably in the vicinity of three dollars per square foot, a price within
the range shown in Figure IV-5 for land slightly farther from the
9
core.
Cost Adjustments in Los Angeles
With land prices relatively constant for apartment developments
throughout the area, the task of adjusting costs to produce satis-
factory investment possibilities is much simpler in Los Angeles
than it is in New York. Nevertheless, some adjustments are neces-
sary, as the case examples in Table IV-5 indicate. Once again, in-
formation on current practice provides us with a basis for judging
how developers can manipulate densities, construction costs, and
operating costs in locations within the declining areas. This inform-
ation on current development techniques is derived from a combina-
tion of interviews and published studies of apartment development and
operating costs in Los Angeles. 10
TABLE IV-5
Los Angeles Region: Financial Calculations for One-Bedroom Apartments
3 4 5 6 7 8
Location:
Travel time from
downtown
Land cost per sq. ft.
Building type
D. U. per acre
Sq. ft. per d. u.
Land cost per d. u.
Construction cost per d. u.
Total investment per d. u.
Equity share (1/3)
Mortgage (2/3, 6. 25%,
20 years)
Yearly operating cost
Tax rate
Yearly taxes
Total yearly cost
Yearly rent
(Monthly rent)
Cash surplus over cost
Less yearly interest
and amortization
(8. 8% of mortgage)
Net cash return
Return on equity
Los
Angeles
5-9 min.
3.00
2-story
65
670
2010
7500
9510
3170
6340
265
.0202
192
457
1500
(125)
1043
558
485
15. 3%
Los
Angeles
10-19 min.
3.50
2-story
60
726
2541
7500
10041
3347
6694
265
.0202
203
468
1560
(130)
1092
589
503
15. 0%
Los Los Angeles
Angeles W. Hollywood
20-29 min.
3.00
2-story
55
792
2376
7500
9876
3292
6584
265
.0202
199
464
1500
(125)
1036
579
457
13. 9%
30-34 min.
4.00
2-story
50
871
3484
7500
10984
3661
7323
265
.0202
222
487
1680
(140)
1193
644
549
15. 0%
Beverly
Hills
33-37 min.
8.00
3-story
65
670
5360
10000
15360
5120
10240
330
.0127
195
525
2400
(200)
1875
901
974
19. 0%
West Los
Angeles
40-44 min.
3.00
2
-story
40
1089
3267
7500
10767
1077*
9690*
265
.0202
217
482
1380
(115)
898
703*"
195
18. 1%
Santa
Monica
45-49 min.
3. 50
2
-story
50
871
3049
7500
10549
3516
7023
265
.0166
175
440
1560
(130)
1120
618
502
14. 3%
9
San
Fernando
Valley
50+ min.
1.50
2-story
45
968
1452
7500
8952
2984
5968
265
.0202
181
446
1440
(120)
994
525
469
15. 7%
Los Angeles
Declining
Area
5-35 min.
5.00
2-story
50
871
4355
7500
11855
1186*
10669*
265
0202
239
504
1500
(125)
996
774*
222
18. 7%
* FHA Financing: 90% mortgage, 30 years, 7 1/4% yearly interest and amortization.
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Rents for new apartments are lower in Los Angeles than in New York,
and the range of variation is much narrower. Typical one-bedroom
units in Los Angeles generally rent for between $120 and $140 per
month, while New York rents start at $140 for one-bedroom apart-
ments and go as high as $250. Thus the range of typical cost adjust-
ments must be smaller in Los Angeles, and the costs lower. Con-
struction costs are markedly lower in Los Angeles, since the mild
climate permits light exterior walls, and central heating facilities
are unnecessary. Individual electric heaters are installed in each
apartment, so that each tenant pays for his own heating costs. As a
result, Los Angeles operating costs are also relatively low. Financ-
ing costs, on the other hand, are slightly higher in Los Angeles than
in New York, with six and one-quarter percent representing a typical
interest rate for 20-year conventional mortgage loans.
Small variations in density constitute the main method of adjusting
costs in Los Angeles. The most common type of apartment structure
in Los Angeles is a two-story building of frame and stucco construc-
tion. Development densities for this type of structure vary from
about 40 to 70 dwelling units per net acre, depending in part upon the
size distribution of units within the building, as well as upon ground
coverage. Within the limits that are feasible for this type of struc-
ture, developers find it advantageous to build at the maximum den-
sities that consumers and the zoning laws will tolerate. In near-
central locations, land prices alone do not require very high densi-
ties, but developers commonly build at the upper end of the normal
range. Column 1 of Table IV-5 depicts an example of development
near downtown, where a return above 15 percent is feasible by build-
ing on three-dollar land at 65 units per acre. In locations successively
farther away, as shown in columns 2 and 3, densities are slightly
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lower while land costs vary from $3. 00 to $3. 50, and rents vary from
$125 to $130. In prime locations of West Hollywood (column 4), where
rents of $140 per month can be obtained, lower densities are typical,
despite land costs of $4. 00 per square foot.
In all these cases, developers consider a return of fifteen percent
sufficient to justify investments in new housing. Developers of
luxury housing, where rents are $200 and higher for one-bedroom
units, expect a higher return -- about 20 percent or more -- in view
of the greater risks involved in building for the relatively small Los
Angeles high-rent market. In Beverly Hills, where land costs are
more than twice as high as those prevailing in the rest of the region,
developers can operate successfully only by providing a luxury pro-
duct, with more expensive finish and interior equipment, and a
swimming pool on the grounds. Thus in column 5, we have higher
unit construction costs, and a three-story building to provide high
density with lower land coverage. The lower property taxes of
Beverly Hills are also a factor permitting this type of development
on land costing $8. 00 per square foot.
In the Sawtelle area of West Los Angeles, developers have recently
placed new units on the market at rents below the typical range, by
using FHA financing. -Column.6 demonstrates the way this financing
operates; the mortgage terms are identical with FHA terms in New
York. By reducing the proportion of equity and the yearly level of
interest and amortization below the terms of conventional mortgages,
FHA financing permits lower rents for a given level of land costs in
this case. Alternately, FHA financing would permit higher land costs
for a given rent level. This type of financing requires compliance
with FHA development standards, which permit maximum densities
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of 40 units per net acre (50 units per acre on corner lots).
Still farther from the Los Angeles core, Santa Monica presents con-
ditions similar to those in the inner parts of the region, with com-
parable rent levels and land costs, but a lower tax rate. The typical
cost adjustment, appearing in column 7, is quite similar to those we
have already described, but the density is lower than that in column
2, where land costs and rents are the same.
Even on vacant land, Los Angeles developers do not reduce densities
much below the levels prevailing on sites that must be cleared of
prior development. Vacant land zoned for apartments, with utilities
available, sells for $1. 50 to $2. 00 per square foot in desirable San
Fernando Valley locations. As column 8 indicates, developers
produce housing at the lower end of the typical ranges of both density
and rent -- 45 units per acre at $120 per month -- in this outlying
location.
Possibilities for the Declining Areas
The calculations in Table IV-5 illustrate the typical land costs that
developers currently pay in Los Angeles. Costs up to $3. 50 per
square foot, or up to $3000 per unit, are feasible for ordinary apart-
ment developments. Our limited information on land costs suggests
that acquisition prices in the declining areas are not likely to exceed
these levels. Where acquisition costs are higher, FHA financing can
permit development at current rents and densities up to a cost of
$5. 00 per square foot. Calculations in column 9 assume a density
of 50 dwelling units per net acre, and a rent of $125 per month for
a one-bedroom unit. At this rent, which represents the lower end
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of the usual range, developers can earn over 18 percent on their equity
by using FHA financing.
So far as we can determine rebuilding the declining areas of Los
Angeles poses no major economic problems for the developer, des-
pite the weakness of central preference in the market for new housing.
As in New York, public subsidies will be needed to improve community
facilities and the general environment of the older areas. But in Los
Angeles, even more clearly than in New York, land prices in the older
areas are fully consistent with development costs and with market
rents, provided that developers are permitted to build the type of
structures that they now use elsewhere in the region, at densities that
are typical of current practice.
Hartford Cost Components
The costs that vary with location are identical in Hartford and our
other regions: they are land costs and taxes, while construction and
operating costs for comparable buildings and levels of service are
virtually equal throughout the region. Of the two costs that vary
significantly, property tax levels are difficult to compare accurately,
because of the vagaries of assessment in the City of Hartford. Table
IV-6 presents effective 1959 property tax rates for towns in the Hart-
ford region for which estimates are available. The equalization ratio
for the City of Hartford is uncertain, and revaluation of properties is
now in process. The effective tax rate for Hartford in Table IV--6
follows estimates of current Hartford renewal studies in assuming
assessments at two-thirds of development cost. The effective rate
of 3. 11 percent for the central city indicates a sizable disadvantage
in relation to effective rates elsewhere in the region, but some
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TABLE IV-6
Property Tax Rates for Communities in Hartford Region, 1959
(Estimated percentages of full market value)
Miles from
Core: 0-5 6-10 11-15
East Hartford 1. 63 South Windsor 1. 71 Windsor Locks 1. 58
West Hartford 2. 15 Bloomfield 2. 27 Avon 1. 62
Wethersfield 2. 15 Newington 2. 34 East Windsor 2. 07
Hartford 3. 11 Glastonbury 2.45 Simsbury 2. 15
Rocky Hill 2. 52 Vernon 2.46
Manchester 2. 78
Average: 2.48 Average: 2.35 Average: 1.98
Source:
Capitol Region Planning Agency, "1959 Tax Rates for Towns in CRPA
Region." Equalization ratios from State of Connecticut, Assessor' s
Report to the Tax Commissioner (Fiscal Year ending Feb. 1959) for
all communities except the City of Hartford. Equalization ratio for
Hartford estimated as 2/3 of full value in Rogers, Taliaferro, and
Lamb, Renewal Program for Downtown Hartford, Connecticut, pre-
pared for City of Hartford, 1960, pp. II-31, II-37. Above informa-
tion covers 15 of the 21 cities and towns in the Hartford Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area, omitting Canton, Cromwell, Enfield,
Farmington, Suffield, Windsor.
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developers believe the actual Hartford rate for new housing is only
slightly above that of West Hartford.
If our estimated effective rates are realistic, property taxes on a ten-
thousand dollar dwelling unit will be almost one hundred dollars more
per year in Hartford than in Wethersfield or West Hartford, two
alternate locations for new apartments in the center of the region.
We shall investigate the effects of this differential upon housing in-
vestments when we develop case examples for the Hartford region.
Aside from the tax rate in the City of Hartford, however, central lo-
cations do not involve higher taxes than outlying sites. All but a few
towns in the outer five-mile rings of the region had higher effective
rates in 1959 than the core cities of Wethersfield, West Hartford, and
East Hartford. Property taxes are thus unlikely to create special
burdens for developers of new housing in the centrally located are as
outside of Hartford, but we shall have to look more closely into the
effect of taxes on the feasibility of rebuilding Hartford' s declining
areas.
Land Costs in the Hartford Region
Acquisition costs for apartment sites in the Hartford region are
clearly higher in central locations than in outlying areas, but the
differences are small in comparison with those we have noted in New
11York. Land in desirable locations near downtown Hartford has
recently been sold for apartment development at about $2. 50 per
square foot. Sites ten to twenty minutes away from downtown, in
Hartford and West Hartford, have been priced generally between
$1. 50 and $2. 50 per square foot. In these near-central locations,
building sites must first be cleared of existing structures. Farther
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out, vacant land zoned for apartments sells for fifty cents to one
dollar per square foot. Figure IV-4 presents a compilation of sales
prices for a number of apartment sites in the sector extending west-
ward from downtown Hartford where our rental information in Chap-
ter III has been obtained.
The density of prior development is an important factor affecting
these prices. Apartment builders have been able to assemble good
sites in the central areas by buying spacious single-family homes on
large lots. The mansions of the late 19th century, built to generous
density standards, provide sites for current apartment development.
Where the old mansions have not been converted to profitable rooming
houses, a house standing on 20, 000 square feet of land may sell for
$30, 000, or $1. 50 per square foot of land. Close to downtown, the
price will be about $2. 50 per square foot for a comparable building
on a large lot. These are feasible prices for new apartment develop-
ment; they represent actual recent sales to developers. Prices are
low enough for the developers, however, in part because the once-
gracious homes of another generation, built at relatively low densi-
ties, are a major source of land for new construction.
The other declining sections of Hartford, in contrast, consist largely
of housing built initially for a middle-income market, at significantly
higher development densities. In these areas, some three-family
homes on lots 50 feet wide and 125 feet deep currently sell for
$25, 000 to $30, 000, or approximately four to five dollars per square
foot of land. Other sites in these areas sell for three to four dollars
per square foot. We may overlook the difficulties of site assembly,
on the assumption that programs for renewing the ,old areas would
involve public acquisition of land through condemnation proceedings,
0
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but the land cost would be approximately the same under either public
or private acquisition. In typical locations within the declining areas
ten to fifteen minutes from downtown, three to five dollars per square
foot seems a reasonable land price to assume in investigating pros-
pects for attracting new development. In less densely developed
parts of the old areas, however, land prices will be lower.
Cost Adjustments in Hartford
Once again, our method for evaluating the significance of differences
in property taxes and land prices is to look into the nature of current
cost adjustments in are as where new construction is active, and apply
adjustment techniques to the declining areas that are consistent with
current practice in active locations. Information on current cost
levels and densities is derived from interviews with FHA officials
and local realtors. 12
The range of rents in new apartments is relatively narrow in the
Hartford region, but it reflects a central orientation in the housing
market. For one-bedroom apartments in our rental sample, rents
range from $125 to $147 per month in locations less than ten minutes
from the core. Comparable apartments ten to twenty minutes from
the core rent for $120 to $138 per month; our sample included no
one-bedroom apartments more than twenty minutes from downtown
Hartford. On the basis of this rental information, plus information
on rents for two-bedroom apartments farther than twenty minutes
from the core, we may estimate rents for new one-bedroom apart-
ments as $140 close to the core, $130 from ten to twenty minutes
away, and $120 more than twenty minutes away. This pattern of
higher rents in more central locations helps overcome (and helps
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create) higher land prices in central locations, but developers must
also make some adjustments in density to compensate for differences
in land price.
The range of typical densities is somewhat greater in Hartford than
in Los Angeles, and it exhibits a decidedly central orientation. Apart-
ment buildings less than ten minutes from the core are mainly four-
story elevator structures, with densities of about seventy units per net
acre; one recent building near downtown is ten stories high, with a
density of 225 dwelling units per acre. Most new buildings ten to fif-
teen minutes from the core are three-story walk-up structures, with
densities of fifty to sixty units per acre. Farther out, two-story
walk-ups predominate, with densities typically about twenty units to
the acre. These density differences reflect not only changes in
structural type, but also differing size distribution of apartments. As
Table IV-7 indicates, efficiency and one-bedroom apartments con-
stitute the only units close to the core in our sample, while two-
bedroom units are the only type that appear more than twenty minutes
from the core. This extreme specialization in unit types undoubtedly
reflects both a desire to reduce costs in central locations, and an
adaptation to the nature of the market in outlying areas.
Table IV-8 presents a series of examples illustrating typical cost
adjustments within the Hartford region. As in New York and Los
Angeles, a return of fifteen percent on investment is generally con-
sidered the test of feasibility for new apartment development. Con-
struction and operating costs are slightly lower than those in New
York, but considerably higher than those in the warm climate of Los
Angeles. If we take the vacant outlying site represented in column 3
as our starting point, we can see how developers adjust unit costs as
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TABLE IV-7
Size Distribution of New Apartments by Travel Time
from Core, Hartford, 1950-1960
Minutes from core: 0-9 10-19 20-29
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Efficiency (0-
bedroom)
apartments
1-bedroom
135
139
49. 3
50. 7
46 17.5
156 59. 3
2-bedroom
Total
0
274
0
100. 0
61 23. 2
263 100. 0
82 100.0
82 100.0
Rental inventory used in Chapter III, Figure 111-6.
Travel .time calculations described in Chapter
III, footnote 4.
0
0
0
0
Source:
TABLE IV-8
Hartford Region: Financial Calculations for One-Bedroom Apartments
2
Hartford
3
West
Hartford
4
Hartford
Declining Area
5
Hartford
Declining Area
Travel time from
downtown
Land cost per sq. ft.
Building type
D. U. per acre
Sq. Ft. per d. u.
Land cost per d. u.
Construction cost
per d.u.
Total investment
per d. u.
Equity share (1/3)
Mortgage (2/3, 6%,
20 years)
Yearly operating cost
Tax rate
Yearly taxes
Total yearly cost
Yearly rent
(Monthly rent)
Cash surplus over cost
Less yearly interest
and amortization
(8. 5% of mortgage)
Net cash return
Return on equity
5.9 min.
2.50
4-story el.
70
622
1555
8300
9855
3285
6570
330
0311
306
636
1680
(140)
1044
558
486
14. 8%
10-15 min.
1. 75
3-story
50
871
1524
7600
9124
3041
6083
300
.0311
284
584
1560
(130)
976
517
459
15. 1%
20-29 min.
.50
2-story
20
2178
1089
7900
8989'
2996
5993
300
.0215
193
493
1440
(120)
947
509
438
14. 6%
10-15 min.
4.00
3-story
50
871
3484
7600
11084
1108*
9976*
300
. 0311
345
645
1560
(130)
915
723*
192
17. 3%
10-15 min.
2.00
2-story
35
1245
2490
7900
10390
1039*
9361*
300
.0311
323
623
1500
(125)-
877
679*
198
19. 1%
* FHA Financing: 90% mortgage, 30 years, 7. 25% yearly interest and amortization.
o'
Location
1
Hartford
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land prices and taxes rise. Total development cost per unit is $8989
in column 3, with a land cost of fifty cents per square foot, a tax rate
of . 0215, and a monthly rent of $120.
In column 2, ten to fifteen minutes from the core, the land price
rises sharply to $1. 75 per square foot and the tax rate jumps to . 0311.
The adjustment is a particularly favorable one, bringing both an in-
crease in density and a lower unit construction cost. Generally,
higher density implies higher unit construction cost, as we have noted
in discussing cost adjustments in New York. When the structural
type is limited to walk-up buildings, however, an extra story lowers
rather than raises unit costs. Thus the adjustment in column 2,per-
mits developers to hold total unit development costs to $9124, an
increase of only $135 over the development cost in column 3, despite
the greatly increased land price. The higher rent available in this
location ($120 per year) effectively counters the modest development
cost increase, as well as the tax increase of $91 per year, so that a
return of fifteen percent is still possible.
Site costs still closer to the core rise to $2. 50 per square foot
(column 1), but the tax rate remains the same. Here the density
adjustment succeeds in keeping land costs per unit to approximately
the same level as in column 2, but construction and operating costs
rise. The increase in building height to four stories marks a switch
from walk-up to elevator structures, with a resulting need for extra
mechanical equipment as well as a loss of interior space for elevator
shafts. The rise in development costs exerts a two-fold effect by
also increasing the taxable value of the property; thus taxes rise
slightly, even though the rate remains the same. Yearly operating
costs also increase, but the rise of $120 in annual rent covers the
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combined cost increases, so that return on equity remains around
fifteen percent.
Prospects for Declining Sections of Hartford
The problem of rebuilding the old areas of Hartford is one of coping
with higher land costs than we find in the areas where apartment de-
velopers are now operating. This is a problem unlike those we have
encountered in New York and Los Angeles, where land costs in the
declining areas were in line with costs in comparable active areas.
In Hartford, land costs in many older areas are likely to exceed
even those in more accessible locations, where new apartments can
command higher rents. Land prices in good locations less than ten
minutes from the core, where rent levels reach a peak for the Hart-
ford area, are about $2. 50 per square foot. We estimate land costs
in areas ten to fifteen minutes from the core as approximately three
to five dollars per square foot.
Column 4 presents one workable approach for developing new apart-
ments in these locations. We assume a moderate rent level consis-
tent with the access advantages of the declining areas, using the same
rent as in column 2. We assume further that consumers will accept
the same density that they now accept in areas of comparable accessi-
bility. Thus the adjustment is that of column 2, utilizing three-story
walk-up structures at a density of fifty units per net acre. In this
case, however, we make use of FHA financing, with its lower equity
requirement, and lower yearly carrying charges than conventional
mortgages. Under these circumstances, developers can afford to pay
land prices of $4. 00 per square foot -- the middle of our estimated
price range -- and still earn a reasonable return on investment. To
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the extent that our assumptions prove unworkable, land costs will have
to be subsidized. If rents of $130 per month are not available, or if
three-story walk-up buildings fall out of favor, $4. 00 per square foot
is too high a land cost to permit a normal return on investment.
Taller elevator buildings could be substituted, using FHA financing,
but the pattern of current density preferences in Hartford suggests
that such buildings are marketable mainly in locations offering special
site or access advantages not likely to be found in most declining areas.
If two-story buildings are used, together with FHA financing, column
5 indicates that land prices of $2. 00 per square foot can be compatible
with market opportunities in the'kray areas'.' Here we assume a den-
sity of thirty-five dwelling units per acre, rather than the twenty-per-
acre now found in more outlying locations, but this increase in den-
sity appears reasonable in view of the access advantages of inner
locations in Hartford. This price level for land would, of course,
require a write-down from the estimated acquisition cost of three
dollars or more per square foot.
Conclusions
If we have estimated these site. acquisition costs accurately for
Hartford, FHA financing can just barely enable developers to pay
the necessary price for land in the declining areas. In parts of these
areas, prices will undoubtedly be lower than our estimated range;
here the developer will have a little leeway in adjusting his costs to
market rents. Elsewhere in the older areas, some subsidy may be
necessary to make new development feasible, but large write-downs
of land cost will not be required so long as development is limited
to three-story walk-up buildings. If plans for rebuilding call for
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lower densities than those now prevailing in central locations, land
prices will be out of line with re-use possibilities. This last condi-
'I 
i
tion, however, would impose a strain on the economics of gray area
development in any of our regions: if developers cannot build the type
of structures in the declining areas that they now use in comparable
locations, at densities typical of current practice, they will have
difficulty earning a normal return.
Where public policy aims at facilitating the same type of new develop-
ment within the declining areas that now takes place elsewhere in the
region, the main task is to raise environmental standards to the level
of presently desirable locations. If the environment is improved to
this extent and FHA financing is made available, land prices in the
declining areas are roughly compatible with current types of develop-
ment and current rents in comparable locations within all three study
areas.
Our exploration of development costs and their adjustment in the light
of varying market circumstances has helped identify a number of
critical factors affecting the first pre-condition for rebuilding: a
balance between site costs and re-use values. In the following chap-
ter, we shall test each study area for the second pre-condition: a
sufficient scale of demand to permit replacing deteriorated housing
within a reasonable number of years. We can then apply our findings
on both counts to a formulation of the general requirements for re-
building declining areas, and to the problem of developing appropriate
public policies to accomplish this rebuilding.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Hoover and Vernon, op. cit., p. 175.
2. Information from Abram Barkan, James Felt and Co.; William
Lese, Pease and Elliman; Jacob Perlow; Frederick Rose,
David Rose and Associates.
3. Land cost information from interviews with Walter Lampe,
Chief Appraiser, Federal Housing Administration, New York,
and with the following New York realtors: Abram Barkan,
James Felt and Co.; Jacob Perlow; Frederick Rose, David
Rose and Associates. Further information on land costs de-
rived from report by Peter Stone for New York Metropolitan
Region Study, November 1957, on file at Regional Plan
Association.
4. Land prices in redevelopment areas given in City of New York
Committee on Slum Clearance, Title I Progress, January 29,
1960, pp. 24-25. Prices include planning and land acquisition
costs, converted to square foot costs for gross project area.
Travel times from the core have been calculated on the basis
described in Chapter III, footnote 4.
5. Land prices for public housing projects given in New York City
Housing Authority, Project Statistics, December 31, 1960;
prices used are land costs per square foot of private property,
for projects completed after 1950. Information on the charac-
ter of each site prior to acquisition was obtained separately
from the Housing Authority; land that was predominantly
vacant is excluded from this discussion of land costs.
6. In addition to interview sources cited above in footnote 3, in-
formation has been made available by Charles Abrams, and
by Frank Kristof of the New York Housing and Redevelop-
ment Board. Published cost estimates appear in "How A
Builder Figures, " Fortune, LXI, No. 2 (February 1960),
243-246; New York City Planning Commission, Urban Re-
newal: A Report on the West Side Urban Renewal Study,
1958; and the following reports of the New York City Com-
mittee on Slum Clearance: Lincoln Square (1956), Hammels-
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Rockaway (1956), Penn Station South (1957), Riverside-
Amsterdam (1958), Soundview (1959). Tax rates are those
cited on p. 92; information on rents and densities from sources
cited in Chapter III.
7. A further source of profit for the developer that we exclude from
this investment framework consists of income tax advantages
resulting from deductions during the construction period and
from depreciation allowances after the building is completed.
For a discussion of tax advantages in apartment development,
see Daniel M. Friedenberg, "The Coming Bust in the Real
Estate Boom, " Harpers, CCXXII, No. 1333 (June 1961), 29-40,
8. Land cost estimates have been obtained for apartment sites in
the sector of Los Angeles surrounding Wilshire Boulevard,
extending the full length of the Boulevard, from downtown Los
Angeles to the Pacific coast at Santa Monica. Sites for which
prices were obtained lie predominantly within a one-mile belt
on either side of Wilshire Boulevard; all estimates are based
on recent sales to apartment developers. Sources were inter-
views with Claude Cunningham, Assistant Chief, Land Division,
Los Angeles County Assessor; R. Douglas Burrows, Vice-
President and Chief Appraiser, Security First National Bank;
Charles Shattuck and Kurt Shelger, Appraisers; Robert Filley,
Vice-President, Western Real Estate Research Corporation;
Nelson Smith, Prudential Insurance Co.; Hal Wiseman, Nor-
man Construction Co.
9. Information on Bunker Hill and Temple Projects from Los Ange-
les Community Redevelopment Agency.
10. Interview sources are those cited in footnote 8. Additional in-
formation from Federal Housing Administration, Los Angeles,
and the following published studies: Henry A. Babcock, Report
on the Economic Phases of the Bunker Hill Renewal Project, Los
Angeles, California, Community Redevelopment Agency of the
City of Los Angeles, May 15, 1956; and Stanford Research
Institute (James H. Forbes, Jr., Frederick P. Lyte, Emil L.
de Graeve), Feasibility of a Residential Rental Development in
the Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project, Community Redevelop-
ment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, May, 1957.
11. Land cost information for the Hartford region consists of prices
paid in recent transactions, and prices asked in recent sales
offerings, for sites in the same general locations used for the
rental survey in Chapter III. Most of these locations are in a
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sector extending west of downtown Hartford in a one,-mile band
on either side of Farmington Avenue in Hartford and West Hart--
ford. Information on sales prices and offerings from John
Rowlson, Rowlson Real Estate and Insurance, Hartford; and
Robert Weisberg, Suburban Associates, Bloomfield.
12. Sources are Federal Housing Administration, Hartford (John B.
Maylott, Director); Robert Stone, Goldberg and Stone, Man-
chester; John Rowlson, Rowlson Real Estate and Insurance,
Hartford.
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CHAPTER V
THE REGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR REBUILDING OLD AREAS
New York, Los Angeles, and Hartford meet the first pre-
condition for rebuilding their declining areas; potential re-use values
it it
of gray area land for new housing are roughly in line with site acqui-
sition costs in all three cities, though Hartford is something of a
borderline case. So far, we have said nothing about the quantity of
new development that may be feasible, or the rate at which cleared
sites can be put to new uses. These additional considerations enter
into the secondpre-condition for a rebuilding program. As we define
it, the second requirement is that the demand for new housing sites
must be great enough to utilize all cleared land not needed for environ-
mental improvements (schools, community facilities), within a
reasonable number of years.
New York and Los Angeles pass the second test, but Hartford does
not. Why is Hartford the weak member of the trio on both counts?
How do such dissimilar cities as New York and Los Angeles both
meet the full set of prerconditions for rebuilding? Which factors seem
to exert the strongest influence upon the feasibility of attracting new
housing into the old areas? By combining an analysis of possible re-
building rates with our earlier analysis of land costs and re-use
values, we shall draw into focus some of the most important factors
governing the feasibility of rebuilding programs.
Under present conditions, three-factors are of outstanding importance;
the degree of central preference in the housing market, the relation-
ship between the density of previous development on the site and the
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density of new development, and the size of the market for new multi-
family housing. Future shifts in metropolitan structure are likely to
alter both land costs and demand characteristics, but the key issue
ahead is whether large migrations of low-income people will continue
to populate the aging neighborhoods. A continuing flow of low-income
newcomers will argue for the retention of old housing on social grounds,
at the same time that it gives continued economic value to this housing.
Land Utilization Rates for New Construction
The rate at which new housing can absorb cleared sites in the older
neighborhoods depends upon how much multifamily housing can be
attracted into such areas in the future, and the development density
of this housing. In the previous chapter, we have demonstrated the
economic feasibility of building typical non-luxury apartment houses
without major public subsidy in the declining areas of all three cities.
For New York, let us assume that the type of new residential con-
struction predominating in Manhattan requires special sites close to
the central business district, or in areas of particularly high pres-
tige. This Manhattan luxury housing, with its high rents, seems an
unlikely candidate for the old neighborhoods in upper Manhattan and
in the inlying parts of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens.
The market from which these declining areas can draw is the medium-
rent apartment house sector, which is currently locating in various
parts of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens. For this market, the
older areas can offer the attraction of a location closer to the center
of the region -- a factor of great importance in New York rental
housing. If cleared sites could offer good surrounding environments,
new housing there could probably earn rents above prevailing levels
farther away where new apartment houses are currently being devel-
oped. But our calculations in the preceding chapter assumed only
that new housing in areas to be rebuilt would command the same rents
as those in the cheapest new apartments in the region, or forty dollars
per room per month. With FHA mortgage aids, developers can pay
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full land costs for these inner sites and offer locational advantages at
attractive rents.
Thus the basis for our estimates of New York land utilization rates is
the amount of new private construction in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and
Queens -- the new housing that can conceivably be attracted to the
inner areas. (We shall exclude new multifamily housing in suburban
areas, on the assumption that suburban locations are a necessary
feature of such housing.) In the past decade, these boroughs had a
varying volume of new housing construction. The early part of the
decade was not a time of great development, owing in part to material
shortages during the Korean War. By the end of this period, con-
struction rose to boom levels. We shall exclude the boom of the late
1950's by counting only housing completions from 1951 through 1960,
thus omitting the many starts in 1959 and 1960. In the first part of
this decade, Queens still had considerable vacant land available, with
a resulting high rate of new construction despite the Korean War. To
discount the vacant land factor, for Queens we shall take note only of
the slower 1956-1960 rate of completions.
The ten-year total completions, including Queens projected from the
1956-1960 volume, were 108, 524 new dwelling units in private multi-
-1family structures. At current development densities, this housing
would require 724 acres of net residential land for the ten-year period,
or 72 acres per year. If development were at the somewhat lower
densities now prevailing in urban renewal project areas -- densities
which would be feasible without subsidies in the many older areas
where land costs are seven dollars or less per square foot -- the
land utilization rate would be 109 acres per year.
New York also has a large public housing program to consider. In the
case of public housing, new Manhattan developments are likely candi-
dates for utilizing sites cleared in the older neighborhoods, and of
course public housing now built in various parts of the Bronx,
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Brooklyn, and Queens could also go into such areas. The 1951-1960
volume of public housing construction was 70, 306 units, occupying
865 acres of land atcurreritpublic housing densities, or 87 acres per
year. New York City Housing Authority plans call for an accelerated
rate of construction in the coming years, 2 but we shall assume that
construction in excess of the 1951-1960 rate will go to vacant outlying
sites.
Thus the combined rate of land utilization of private housing and pub-
lic housing at current densities is 159 acres per year. If private
housing were developed at typical urban renewal densities, the rate
would be 196 acres per year.
Are these rates likely to continue? We have attempted to project
reasonable rates by excluding such clearly temporary phenomena as
the 1959-1960 boom, and the 1951-1955 Queens construction wave on
vacant land. Further, we have totally excluded the boom in Man-
hattan luxury housing. Public housing construction seems quite
likely to continue at rates at least as high as those of the 1950's.
The market for private moderate-rent multifamily housing consists
primarily of small families; we have previously noted that only 25
to 30 percent of the new private units in the outer boroughs have more
than one bedroom (Table IV-2). Population projections for the region
foresee a continued increase in the age categories likely to constitute
single people, young married couples with no children or one pre-
school child, and older couples whose children have left home.
In the absence of a careful housing market study, we see no reason to
assume a sharp decline in apartment construction for New York City.
Aside from a recession, the major factor that could cause a reversal
would be a continuing shift of preferences to favor single-family homes,
but such a shift would be likely to work gradual rather than sudden
changes. And our 1951-1960 rates reflect the period of greatest
suburbanization that the United States has ever experienced.
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Time Required for Rebuilding in New York
At present, old housing in New York is so heavily utilized that a pro-
gram to replace all deteriorated housing would create a serious
housing shortage. The 1960 Housing Census reported only 53, 000
non-seasonal non-dilapidated units vacant and available for rent or
sale. In contrast, 147, 000 housing units were classified as either
dilapidated, or deteriorating and lacking in plumbing facilities -- in
either case, unlikely to be suitable for rehabilitation, and a prime
target for clearance. Additional vacancies in the region outside New
York City add another 78, 000 units to the reserve of sound units for
relocation, but the combined reserve is still smaller than the stock
of deteriorated housing in the City alone, and there are many addi-
tional detfriorated uhits in the rest of thearegion.
New construction will replace deteriorated units with housing priced
too high for low-income groups. If we could be sure that replacement
units would bring about a filtering of other housing to lower cost levels,
rebuilding might work no hardship even in the absence of a large
vacancy reserve. But as the housing market has operated until now,
new housing barely keeps pace with an expanding demand resulting
from new household formation. Since we project a volume of new
housing consistent with recent experience, new development is likely
to create only a small surplus for filtering down to lower levels.
Thus the lack of a suitable vacancy reserve should exercise a power-
ful constraint upon any effort to remove worn-out housing from the
scene.
If the old housing were to become increasingly vacant, the ability to
rebuild cleared sites with new housing need not exercise such a con-
straint. Our estimate of the land area occupied by deteriorated
housing is 1145 acres. At the combined land utilization rate for
private and public housing that could conceivably be attracted to
cleared sites in the old areas, 7. 2 years would be required to rebuild
these 1145 acres at current development densities (see Appendix B).
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If the private housing were built at typical densities for urban renewal
projects, less than six years would be required.
An alternate objective for New York might be the replacement of all
old-law tenement houses. These are structures built before 1901, with
physical characteristics that make successful rehabilitation extremely
difficult. We estimate that old-law tenements occupy 1552 acres of
land. Absorption of these sites would require 9. 8 years at current
building densities, or 7. 9 years if private housing were to follow urban
renewal densities.
If we take account of the current rate of deterioration of old housing,
an additional 27 acres of land would require clearance during each year
of a program designed to eliminate all deteriorated structures. Cal-
culations in Appendix B indicate that replacement at current densities
would require an extension of the rebuilding program from 7. 2 to 8. 5
years.
How realistic are these time estimates? It is clear that drastic
measures would be necessary to divert all new private multifamily
housing from the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens to designated clearance
sites. In addition to- such incentives as FHA financing aids and en-
vironmental improvements, measures would have to be taken to re-
strict or prohibit new apartment construction outside the declining
neighborhoods. Not the least of the problems would be persuading
private developers of moderate-rent apartments to build in Negro and
Puerto Rican enclaves. Realistically, only a portion of this new
building could be attracted to the sites that had just been cleared of
deteriorated housing.
In addition, the scale of clearance would have to extend beyond land
occupied solely by substandard housing. To carve out suitable build-
ing sites might require demolishing some adjoining structures. On
the other hand, new residential development would not be expected to
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utilize all land that had been cleared. Some areas would be better
suited to non-residential development -- industry, commerce, insti-
tutions. Even in residential areas, a good deal of land would be needed
for new schools and other community facilities.
Several points are clear from this discussion:
1. The present utilization of old housing in New York is a far
more serious constraint for a rebuilding program than the
ability to utilize cleared sites.
2. A large potential demand for cleared land exists in the
volume of current moderate-rent private housing as well
as the volume of public housing.
3. An energetic program to rebuild cleared sites need not
require an astronomical time-span to complete the job.
4. Even a partially successful program could initiate a
program of rebuilding through gradual replacement in
those sections of the City where environmental deficien-
___ cies are least serious.
Land Utilization Rate in Los Angeles
With a larger vacancy reserve, Los Angeles is probaly better
equipped to begin rebuilding its deteriorated housing in the near future.
Although we do not know the cost levels of vacant housing, some 46, 000
non-dilapidated permanent units were vacant and available in the City
of Los Angeles in 1960, and another 66, 000 in the rest of the region.
Substandard units -- dilapidated, or deteriorating and lacking plumbing
facilities -- totalled 24, 800 in the City of Los Angeles. We estimate
the land occupied by these units as 2755 acres (Appendix B). How long
will it take to rebuild them?
These substandard units are located primarily in the central sections
of Los Angeles. Most are within five miles of the core, some are five-
to-ten miles away, and a sprinkling are farther removed. The potential
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market for housing sites in these locations is a limited one. In con-
trast to New York, centrality plays only a minor role in the Los
Angeles housing market, registering chiefly in the form of lower va-
cancy rates in more central locations. With environmental improve-
ments, we assume that the inner areas can offer only average advan-
tages for new residential development, and cannot hope to divert very
much housing that now goes to prestige areas farther away. Our
assumption is that the potential market consists of new multifamily
housing now locating elsewhere in the central areas, within a radius
of ten miles from the downtown core. In terms of land costs and
likely returns, this type of development is economically feasible
without public subsidies on land in the declining areas.
From 1950 to 1960, inultifamily units increased by 98, 000 within this
zone. The volume of new construction was probably somewhat higher,
since a number of units were lost to freeway construction and other
public works. But let us assume a new construction volume of 98, 000.
At typical Los Angeles density, the land utilization rate was 196 acres
per year. All substandard units could be replaced at this rate in 14. 0
years. If new construction followed the slightly lower densities pre-
scribed by the Federal Housing Administration, rebuilding would
require 11. 2 years. The growth rate of substandard housing in the
past decade has been negligible. A moderate allowance for clearing
newly deteriorated housing would not lengthen these time-spans
materially.
The extent of future demand for multifamily housing in Los Angeles
is difficult to project without a detailed housing market study. Yet
several factors suggest a continuation of the present high volume.
The market for this housing, as in New York, consists mainly of
single people, young married couples, and older people -- three
groups likely to continue increasing in the Los Angeles population.
Rents for these units are moderate, so that no volatile luxury market
is involved. Further, the rents we calculated for this housing in
Chapter IV are at the low end of the typical Los Angeles scale, where
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the market is likely to have greatest staying power.
The time required for a rebuilding program in Los Angeles is longer
than our estimate for New York, in part because Los Angeles has no
public housing program. Still, the time-span is finite in Los Angeles,
as in New York. With due allowance for unrealistic elements in the
assumptions, it is clear that Los Angeles also has a sizable potential
market for cleared sites.
Rebuilding Capacity in Hartford
The very limited demand for new multifamily housing sets a low
ceiling on the potential ability of new development to absorb cleared
sites in Hartford. Only 13 percent of the new housing units in the
metropolitan region from 1958 to 1960 was in multifamily structures,
compared with 48 percent in New York and 46 percent in Los Angeles
4
at about the same time. Further, the City of Hartford can attract
only part of this small regional total, for the advantages of central
location are not particularly strong in the Hartford housing market.
A careful study of the rental market conducted in 1959 projected an
annual average of 3, 500 new dwelling units of all types for the Hart-
ford region through 1970. 5 If we assume the multifamily market as
approximately 15 percent of total housing production, new construc-
tion will provide some 5, 000 multifamily units in the 1960-1970 decade.
On the basis of past performance, the City of Hartford seems unlikely
to attract much more than half the regional total of new apartments,
or 2500 units in ten years. The housing market study estimated
approximately this range of activity, consisting of 1, 800 moderate
rental units in and near downtown Hartford, plus some luxury housing
that might compete with high-priced single-family homes. This esti-
mate assumes, as we do, public action to create housing sites in a
desirable residential environment.
At current central city densities, the land absorption rate for 2500
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new multifamily units in ten years would be only 5 acres of net resi-
dential land per year. If construction were at a slightly lower density
of 35 units per-acre, which would require some land subsidy, 7.1
acres per year could be utilized.
How does this rate compare with the land that could be cleared through
a program to eliminate all deteriorated housing? We estimate that
some 185 acres of land in the City of Hartford are currently occupied
by dilapidated housing and deteriorating housing lacking in plumbing
facilities (Appendix B). At the projected absorption rate of 5 acres
per year, 37 years would be required to rebuild cleared areas. Even
at the higher rate of 7.1 acres per year, 26 years would be required.
At current rates of housing obsolescence for Hartford, land utilization
for new apartments could barely keep up with the clearance of newly
deteriorated areas. From 1950 to 1960, we estimate a yearly increase
of 6. 6 acres of land occupied by substandard housing. Thus the present
capacity to rebuild housing sites could be utilized entirely to keep pace
with growing obsolescence, without making any inroads on the backlog
of substandard areas.
Hartford also lacks a suitable vacancy reserve for undertaking a rapid
program of replacing deteriorated housing in the old residential
neighborhoods. But even if the rate of abandonment were to accelerate,
it is clear that the potential for rebuilding clearance sites with new
housing is severely limited in Hartford.
Factors Conditioning the Feasibility of Rebuilding
All three study areas meet the first pre-condition for rebuilding -- a
balance between site costs and re-use values -- but only New York
and Los Angeles have a sufficient potential capacity to rebuild cleared
sites in a reasonable period of time. Three sets of characteristics
best explain our findings:;
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1. Metropolitan structural features that condition the degree
of central preference in the housing market.
2. The relationship between the density of previous develop-
ment on clearance sites and the density of new development.
3. The size of the market for new multifamily housing.
Metropolitan Structure
The economic requirements for attracting new housing to"gray
area locations do not call for any particular type of regional structure.
We have found some new housing to be economically feasible in the
declining areas of such contrasting regions as New York, Los Angeles,
and Hartford. Although certain metropolitan elements are powerful
organizers of locational demand within the housing market, no par-
ticular element is a sine qua non for attracting new housing to the old
areas. As we have seen clearly in the case of Los Angeles, housing
preferences need not even be centrally oriented in order to generate
sufficient re-use value for rebuilding inner locations. The sole general
requirement that must be met if any new housing is to be feasible as a
private investment is that development and operating costs must be
commensurate with market advantages.
Thus the feasibility problem must be approached from the dual per-
spective of both costs and returns. Metropolitan structure enters into
the return side most clearly. A strong downtown core, and a lack of
inlying vacant land, promote rental demand for central locations.
Taken alone, a strong downtown core appears to exercise the stronger
influence. In Hartford, with a moderately strong central business
district, inlying housing brings a rent premium despite the availability
of large tracts of vacant land within a short drive of the center. In
Los Angeles, where vacant land is far removed from the center but
the core is relatively weak, the only noticeable sign of central orienta-
tion appears in residential vacancy rates, which are lower in central
than in outlying locations.
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Densities Before and After Rebuilding
On the cost side, the major variables that we have noted within each
region are tax rates and land costs. The influence of tax differentials
in retarding new housing development in central areas has probably
been overrated; we have found present central city tax rates generally
compatible with the economic requirements of new housing. Land costs
are by far the more significant variable. The question of prior density
is important because of its relation to land costs.
Current land costs, as we have seen, depend very much upon the den-
sity of previous development. Where past development has been at
high density, as in Manhattan, land costs are high enough so that some
special market compensations must be available if developers are to be
attracted. In Los Angeles, the low density of prior development
facilitates gray area site acquisition at prices that are fully compatible
with normal rental returns, even though rents are no higher in central
areas than in more outlying locations. In Hartford, differences in
prior densities between areas where rebuilding is now active and the
less active locations, largely account for land cost differentials that
will make renewal of the declining areas difficult, unless some sub-
sidies are available.
Although the density of previous development is a critical factor
influencing land acquisition costs, high densities and high land prices
can be overcome in several ways. One typical cost adjustment that
we have encountered is to build new housing at high densities where
land costs are high. This type of adjustment has its limitations,
since unit construction costs rise as densities increase, but it con-
tributes significantly to the private developer's ability to build in high-
cost locations. The feasibility of high-density construction as a develop-
ment tactic is also limited by the degree of consumer acceptance of
multi-story living -- a factor we shall consider in connection with the
size of the multifamily market.
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High land costs can also be overcome by reducing other costs. Thus,
FHA mortgage financing, with generous loan commitments at interest
rates below those prevailing in the conventional mortgage market, can
provide an economic basis for new housing in some high-cost locations
in New York and Hartford. Other measures to reduce development and
ope rating costs -- tax reductions, easing of building code requirements
-- could conceivably help developers work out an acceptable investment
package in locations where land costs are high.
Densities of the past thus influence new development densities, but
with some room for modification. This influence takes the practical
form of setting minimum density ranges for new development, which
developers cannot easily undercut without some form of subsidy. To
the extent that low density is marketable, the developer can use a
generous amount of high-cost land and recoup his investment through
high rents. But the market thins out when prices become very high.
If $3-per-square-foot land is used for single-family homes on small
lots, a single lot would cost the purchaser some $15, 000, pricing the
finished home well beyond the mass market.
Under present cost conditions, land cleared of housing built at multi-
family densities must generally be re-used for multifamily housing,
but moderate density reductions may be possible. With FHA finan-
cing, but without further subsidy, new development in New York can
bring densities down from 200 to 150 units per acre in some areas,
and from 80 to 50 per acre in others.
Density increases, on the other hand, greatly facilitate the economics
of rebuilding. New development is easy in most of Los Angeles, be-
cause densities of 50 or more units per acre replace old housing at
8 to 10 units per acre.
Only a sharp downward break with densities of the past creates severe
economic problems. When the declining areas of cities are vacated to
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a greater extent than they are now, land costs may well fall to levels
that will permit drastic density reductions. In the meantime, programs
to replace old housing will have to confront the powerful influence of the
past, working through high land costs.
Size of the Multifamily Market
We have already noted in this chapter the strong connection between
the size of the market for new multifamily housing and the rate at which
cleared sites can be utilized. In the last few years, multifamily housing
has accounted for 48 percent of all new private housing in the New York
metropolitan region, 46 percent in Los Angeles, and only 13 percent in
Hartford, with consequences that we have already seen for the potential
rate of rebuilding.
Nationally, multifamily units have been accounting for about- 20 percent
of total private housing starts in recent years. From 1958 through
1960, the multifamily proportion has ranged from 18 to 21 percent; in
the first seven months of 1961, this proportion has gone up to 25 per-
6
cent. Multifamily demand is by no means constant, however. In
the early 1950 Ts, the multifamily share ranged from 9 to 15 percent
nationally. 4
Future volumes of multifamily construction are likely to depend upon
many factors that are national rather than local in character. The
most significant recent analysis of the national market for rental
housing calls particular attention to the high price of renting an apart-
ment, in comparison with the cost of owning a home, and to oppor-
tunities for broadening the rental market through changing this price
relationship. Many measures would have to be applied at the national
level to be effective; equalizing tax treatment for renters and home-
owners, making FHA financing as attractive for apartment develop-
ments as it is for single-family homes.
Yet even if the national multifamily construction rate is at a. high
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level, one can easily imagine regions in which the demand for multi-
family housing will be far below the national proportion. Small metro-
politan areas, with vacant land readily accessible to downtown, with
employment centers distributed throughout the region, may be weak
both in central preference and in multifamily demand. If such regions
have declining areas consisting of old housing developed at moderate
or high densities s6metime in the past, acquisition costs may represent
a serious obstacle to rebuilding. Land prices of two to five dollars per
square foot are far too high for most single-family housing; yet areas
of old multifamily structures are currently unlikely to be available at
lower prices. If we assume that single-family housing is the only
feasible residential re-use for loss areas in such a region, two al-
ternatives are open. Land prices would have to be heavily subsidized,
or rebuilding could be postponed until the old structures are practically
worthless.
In regions with considerable multifamily activity, the situation is
different. We have already noted in Chapter I that many regions be-
sides New York and Los Angeles have had sizable volumes of apart-
ment construction recently: Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington, San
Francisco, San Diego, Miami, Minneapolis, Atlanta, and Seattle.
Here the rebuilding of central areas will depend upon the ability to
attract a sufficient portion of the total into areas slated for rebuilding.
Metropolitan structure is important in this connection, for the degree
of central preference in the new housing market will have much to do
with the location of new developments.
The centralized character of the New York multifamily market is clear
from all our analyses; outlying sites on vacant land can hardly compete
with inner locations in New York City. Inlying locations within the
City are unlikely to attract much new housing so long as their environ-
ments remain inferior, but we argue that with environmental improve-
ments they can capitalize on their locational assets. Neither Los
Angeles nor Hartford can exercise comparable power in pulling the
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region' s new multifamily housing into inner locations, so that environ-
mental upgrading is likely to work smaller changes in their patterns
of new housing. Thus the potential rate of rebuilding is slower in Los
Angeles than in New York -- despite a large multifamily volume --
while the City of Hartford probably cannot capture more than half the
limited multifamily development in its region.
Regional Characteristics in the Future
The analyses in this study place heavy emphasis on current conditions.
What can we expect in the future? Metropolitan regions have been
changing rapidly in the last few decades, and consumer preferences
have also been shifting. Future changes will undoubtedly influence the
economic conditions we have described, but the direction of influence
depends upon the par ticular patterns of change that may emerge.
We can foresee several possibilities that would affect locational
preferences. Further decentralization of jobs and services is likely
to reduce preferences for inlying locations. If new housing is to be
feasible, development and operating costs will have to fall corres-
pondingly. Job decentralization will probably have the additional
effect of promoting the abandonment of old inlying housing. To the
extent that it does, acquisition costs are likely to drop, but we cannot
tell whether they will fall sufficiently to remain in line with a slipping
demand for new housing in central locations.
Changes in metropolitan transportation may trigger large shifts in
central preferences. The abandonment of commuter railroad lines
serving the suburbs is likely to increase preferences for central
locations, provided that in-town transportation does not deteriorate
and that the location pattern of employment remains stable. Cur-
tailment of public transportation service to the older areas is likely
to produce an opposite effect by depriving these areas of current
access advantages to the core. Highway programs that provide
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relatively greater access benefits for outlying land than for the aging
central areas are also likely to shift consumer preferences away from
inner locations. Once again, the net effect is difficult to forecast,
since this type of shift may also speed the abandonment of existing
housing.
Changes in density preference may also have a dual result, affecting
both old housing and new housing. If consumers insist on increasingly
lower densities for new housing, development and operating costs in
the declining areas. must fall to levels that will enable developers to
provide lower density structures, if rebuilding is to be feasible. But
if consumer rejection of high densities operates in the market for old
housing as well as new, clearance sites may come on the market at
prices below current levels.
On the cost side, the key question for the future is whether old
structures will decline in value soon enough to match any decrease in
central preference or any increasing rejection of high densities. Here
the basic factors are the extent of demand for low-cost housing and
the supply that becomes available. A drop in the migration of low-
income groups to the cities would curtail demand, and thus accelerate
the process of abandonment as earlier occupants raise their incomes
and move to better housing.
We foresee a continuing high level of demand for low-cost housing in
most large cities for the next decade or two. If this expectation is
correct, the cost of clearance sites will depend upon the operation of
the housing market in expanding the amount of satisfactory housing
available to residents of the old areas. The rate at which suburban
housing filters down to low-income population groups is crucial in
this respect. In a broader sense, this question revolves around the
ability of the private housing industry -- or of public housing alter-
natives -- to offer acceptable rehousing possibilities to present
occupants of deteriorating structures. If the housing industry fails
this test, the old housing will remain an economic asset, and
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rebuilding will be difficult.
Other cost factors can also impede rebuilding. Tax differentials
within a metropolitan region may widen in the future. We found property
taxes in the central cities of our three study regions close enough to
those in outlying locations so that they do not deter new construction
in centrally located areas. If the central cities lose a major part of
their property tax base through decentralization, and if alternate
taxes are not devised, tax levels may take on greater significance.
If, on the other hand, suburban tax levels; rise quickly as a result of
increasing governmental costs for schools and public works, the
differentials may not widen greatly. Much will depend upon changes
in local tax structure, and upon the ability of political and legal
mechanisms to equalize tax burdens.
Clearly, the effects of future changes in metropolitan regions cannot
be predicted by partial analysis. Decisions to build new housing will
reflect the total structure of costs and returns in the old neighbor-
hoods and elsewhere in the region. Careful observation of the housing
market will be necessary to determine the effects of changing condi-
tions as they unfold. The most predictable effects are those that
might arise from an expansion of housing supply, particularly the
supply of units at price levels that low-income groups can afford.
Change in this direction is likely to mean an accelerated abandonment
of poor housing, and a lowering of its acquisition cost. Changes that
affect preferences for multifamily housing and central locations will
have more complex results, since they may have an impact on the
demand for old housing as well as new construction.
The complexity of these last effects -- the differing impact of shifting
preferences upon new construction and old housing -- is at the root of
the rebuilding problem. If preferences that dominate the market for
new housing were reflected in the market for old housing, widespread
changes in taste would result in the abandonment of old units that failed
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to meet contemporary standards. But the problem of rebuilding is
that the old units are not abandoned quickly, and they retain enough
value so that clearance is expensive. The economic difficulties of
replacing old housing thus reflect a division in the housing market
between the demand for new and! old housing.
Most large cities have a dual housing market. A large part of the
population can exercise its choices freely over a wide range of housing
possibilities. If prevailing taste among this group shifts from multi-
family to single-family housing, as it has recently, a majority can
leave their apartments and find suitable homes, whether new or pur-
chased from earlier occupants.
Another sizable part of the population does not have the income that
would allow so free a choice. The low-income group, regardless of
its preferences, must occupy the cheapest units on the market. We
have every reason to suppose that low-income groups now occupying
the discarded housing of the old neighborhoods actually share the
same general preference patterns of middle-income groups living in
better housing in superior surroundings. Because they do not have
the means to satisfy these preferences, large numbers of them con-
tinue to live in housing that neither they nor other groups want any
longer. But their forced occupancy gives value to this housing, so
that clearance and replacement are difficult. At the same time, the
old neighborhoods serve a useful social purpose in providing housing
for low-income groups, although not the type of housing that many
present occupants would freely choose. Regardless of the quality of
the housing, however, a strong community life often develops in these
areas, so that their premature clearance creates genuine hardships
and social dislocations for people forced to move.
This duality in the housing market could be reduced by a rise in the
incomes of lower economic groups relative to the cost of housing, or
by an expansion of the supply and variety of low-cost housing. As long
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as the dual market persists, rebuilding the aging residential areas
will be difficult economically -- though possible in many cases -- and
unadvisable socially, except on a limited and gradual basis.
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CHAPTER VI
REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC ACTION
PART 1: MAJOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES
The rebuilding of cities is now a matter of general public concern.
City governments have deliberately begun to take a hand in shaping
the future of old residential areas, but the development of public
policies for the rebuilding process is a difficult task. Results of
this study provide a sharp definition of some major issues involved
in the choice of appropriate objectives for public policy, and a
number of guidelines for achieving particular goals.
Population and housing characteristics demonstrate quite clearly
that old housing is still well utilized in the large cities, and that
recent population shifts out of the declining areas have improved
housing conditions materially for low-income groups.
If public policies are to serve the general welfare, should struc-
tures be cleared and replaced as long as they have a useful function?
The declining areas of most large cities serve the important social
purpose of providing housing for low-income people, and current
migration flows into the cities suggest a continuing heavy demand
for low-income housing for at least the next decade or two. Under
.present conditions, the large-scale clearance of aging neighbor-
hoods will deprive low-income people of valuable housing resources,
as well as causing severe social problems in the forced uprooting of
residents.
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Despite the evident need for old housing, many cities have cleared
large residential areas for urban redevelopment projects. The
search for additional real estate taxes, the political value of phys-
ical symbols of progress, aesthetic objections to decaying neighbor-
hoods, and the application of current housing standards to structures
built fifty or more years ago have all justified such clearance pro-
grams. But the adverse social consequences of harnessing rebuilding
policies to these limited approaches have become increasingly evident,
and policy changes are clearly in order.
If public policy accepts the objective of clearing only surplus housing,
what can be done with the declining areas? Major alternatives are:
1. Leave these areas untouched until they are virtually
abandoned, then acquire the properties at reduced
prices, clear them, and rebuild the cleared sites
for new purposes.
2. Rebuild these areas gradually, replacing the old housing
in small parcels as vacancy rates rise.
The first alternative raises serious problems of maintaining public
services during the lengthy period of abandonment and dislocating
remaining residents after utilization falls to a low level. The second
is more difficult to achieve, but avoids both these problems. Gradual
rebuilding also offers opportunities for promoting greater variety
within an area than is likely with a massive clearance and rebuilding
at one time.
A choice between the two depends once again upon public objectives.
The main social issue that is raised here concerns freedom of resi--
dential choice. I suggest the maximizing of individual choice as a
suitable goal in making this decision. Although neither alternative
would force occupants of the old housing to leave in the near future,
the first would eventually displace those that remained, and past
experience suggests that a large number will remain even when
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occupancy has declined for many years. In addition, a gradual
rebuilding will offer some residents a chance to find new housing
without leaving the community, and will widen the choices available
to non-residents who are in the market for new housing.
If these are the objectives -- to limit clearance to structures that
are no longer useful, and to maximize residential choices for the
individual -" gradual rebuilding is a suitable technique. But how
can public policies start this process? Public action can help
create the pre-conditions for a gradual rebuilding, and public
action is vital to accomplish the final conditions for a transforma-
tion of the older areas. We shall take a closer look at both types
of action in this chapter.
The three cities we have studied in detail have all initiated public
programs to rebuild some of their older areas. In New York, new
and interesting policies have been developed to bring about a plan-
ned rebuilding. In Los Angeles, certain basic policies are still
being formulated for dealing with the aging neighborhoods. In
Hartford, where the pre-,conditions for rebuilding are lacking,
public policies face particularly difficult obstacles. We shall re-
view the current situations in all three cities, to see what help our
research can offer for coping with realistic problems.
Urban Renewal and Low-Cost Housing
Public policy for rebuilding old areas of the city must recognize a
large and continuing demand for low-cost housing. Renewal policies
should thus reflect general policies concerned with housing for low-
income people. In the past decade, huge migrations of low-income
groups from rural areas to the cities have kept steady pressure
behind this demand. The greatest of these migrations, the move-
ment of Negroes from the rural South to the urban North, reached
peak levels in the 1950's. Yet the Negro population remaining in the
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South, an obvious source of future migrants, also grew to record
levels by 1960. With large migrations likely to continue, and with
high birth rates among recent low-income arrivals, the pressure
for low-priced. housing is not likely to subside quickly.
One important job for public action is to help ensure an adequate
supply of low-cost housing to meet the needs of people who are
unable to afford either new housing or old housing in good condi-
tion. In the 1950's, population losses in the large central cities
helped make possible a general improvement in living conditions,
with a reduction in overcrowding and a wider choice of vacant
units in sound condtion. But programs of large-scale clearance
in the old residential areas would reverse this favorable trend,
unless they were supplemented by other means of expanding the
supply of housing within reach of low-income groups. Whatever
the goals of public activity in the old residential areas, they should
take account of the need for keeping a large supply of low-priced
housing on the market.
It is obvious to observers of urban renewal practice in the United
States that policy-makers have often been insensitive to this con-
sideration. Projects to clear old housing and develop high-cost
apartments provide tangible symbols of civic progress, augment
the property tax base, and enhance the appearance of formerly
run-down sections. Such projects are also justified by pointing
out the poor physical condition of the old housing, and by urging
the social objective of bringing "middle-class leadership" back to
central areas. These narrow approaches to urban renewal should
be modified to take account of total housing needs in the community.
A recent study of capital requirements for urban renewal illustrates
this fault in renewal policy in its review of the program of a repre-
sentative medium-sized city. The renewal program for Case City
(New Haven, apparently), based on an application of architectural
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standards to various parts of the city, calls for the redevelopment
or rehabilitation of areas where two-thirds of the population now
live. The low-income groups now occupying these areas cannot
afford the costs of new or rehabilitated housing, and would have to
be relocated elsewhere. Without a substantial low-income housing
program, "Case City would be faced with the prospect of replacing
the population of those areas where two-thirds of the city's people
now live with a market drawn from the stable areas where one-
fifth of the city's population lives, plus some suburban returnees.
The authors note that such a program is possible only if incomes rise
for a large part of the population, and if a substantial proportion of
disposable income goes for housing expenditures.
Renewal programs of this kind would have highly destructive effects
if they were put into effect in the near future. Fortunately, such
programs have moved slowly in the past, so that they have not
destroyed enough low-cost housing to affect the general improvement
from 1950 to 1960, although they have certainly retarded improve-
ment in New York. Despite the limited progress of most renewal
programs to date, however, they have had many unfortunate effects.
The very act of. clearing an area and scattering its occupants often
destroys valuable and unique social ties that have developed over
many years.
As early as 1937, George Orwell found disturbing evidence that slum
clearance in English cities disrupted many cherished features of
personal and communal life. "When you walk through the smoke-dim
slums of Manchester, " he noted, "you think that nothing is needed
except to tear down these abominations and build decent housing in
their place. But the trouble is that in destroying the slum you de-
stroy other things as well." 2
Current renewal policies have barely caught up with Orwell's in-
sights. A 1959 advisory report to the Mayor of New York examined
City renewal practices of the 1950's and characterized relocation
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experience in very much the same way:
Forcing people to leave their old neighborhoods is
probably the major source of bitterness and opposition
to slum clearance. Slums, after all, are neighbor-
hoods and communities. They teem with people who like
the place in which they live for simple but deep-rooted
reasons.
Many careful studies have documented and detailed the intricate net-
work of personal and social relationships that are often found in
low-income communities. 4 If anything is to be learned from the
bitter experience of large-scale clearance projects (some of which is
chronicled in these studies), it is that any necessary rebuilding of
such communities should be carried out slowly, and that displaced
occupants should be offered relocation housing within remaining por-
tions of the same community.
Put differently, recent experience with clearance projects argues for
a policy that will maximize the individual's opportunity to choose his
community, his housing, and the time when he wishes to move. Cities
with active renewal and public works programs have disrupted the
lives of many thousands of their residents in the last decade. Urban
renewal projects since 1949 have encompassed areas containing
230, 000 families, almost all with low -incomes, and the majority
nonwhites with particularly difficult problems in finding good housing. 5
In the face of this massive use of public power to interfere with resi-
dential choices, the reaction of an elderly woman in New York to a
proposal to change the name of Third Avenue exemplifies an increas-
ingly common public attitude: "They should leave this city alone I
They should keep their cotton-pickin' fingers off 1" 6
Major Alternatives for Rebuilding Policies
Two guidelines for the scale of rebuilding programs are clear so far:
1. Our analysis of recent migration and housing trends
indicates a need for limiting the total scope of re-
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building to the number of surplus low-cost dwelling
units, in order to avoid removing needed housing
from the market.
2. Numerous sociological analyses indicate the desir-
ability of avoiding a forced displacement of low-income
people from communities where they have strong ties.
Thus the scale of rebuilding neighborhoods where
community life is strong (i. e., non-transient areas)
should ideally be limited according to the amount of
locally available relocation housing for people who
wish to stay in the area. As the occupants gradually
abandon the old housing in such an area, rebuilding
can proceed in a series of stages.
These guidelines allow a first approximation to public rebuilding
policies -- suggesting a slow rate of rebuilding under present con-
ditions in most big cities -- but the major policy alternatives for
the old neighborhoods involve more complex considerations. These
alternatives are (a) to postpone rebuilding until the areas are vir-
tually abandoned, or (b) to maintain a steady rebuilding process,
replacing the old structures as they deteriorate or become vacant.
The first of these alternatives, waiting for abandonment, is sure to be
a process drawn out over several decades, with a great likelihood
that much of the housing will still be occupied as long as it is avail-
able. We have some examples of gradual abandonment of neighbor-
hoods that once served as reception areas for the great waves of
European immigrants at the turn of the century. The West End of
Boston reached its population peak around 1910, when over 32, 000
people lived there. The area declined steadily in succeeding decades,
as the foreign-born population and their children moved on to newer
locations. By 1950, population had fallen below 17, 000, but the
housing vacancy rate was only 5 percent. In 1950, a large part of
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this area was earmarked for an urban redevelopment project.
Official project designation came in 1952, and the impending
clearance of the area was publicized repeatedly until the actual
land taking in April, 1958. Large-scale abandonment began, but
the majority of units were still occupied at the time of land acqui-
sition, when the vacancy rate reached a peak of 38 percent,
The Lower East Side of Manhattan had a similar process of decline,
but without the threat of clearance. The area filled with immigrant
Jews and Italians, reaching a population peak of 541, 000 in 1910.
As these occupants moved on to better housing, no further immigrant
waves replaced them, with the exception of a small influx of Puerto
Ricans. Population reached a low of 205, 000 in 1940 and held at
about the same level in 1950. During this long period of abandon-
ment, the number of dwelling units shrank from a high of 108, 000
to a low of 71, 000 a proportionately smaller reduction for housing
than for population and the vacancy rate never exceeded 30 per-
cent. 8
After the process of abandonment is well advanced, what types of
people remain in an area? Those who remain have special reasons
to do so. Grebler describes the Jews who stayed on the Lower East
Side as "the poor, the orthodox, the servers of cultural needs, some
of those having businesses in the area, and the aged. " 9 Firey, in
his study of the North End of Boston, maintains that long-term resi-
dents of this area were those who wished to identify with Italian
culture and the Italian community. 10 An analysis of occupants in a
redevelopment area in Indianapolis characterizes the most persistent
residents as the "indolent, " the "adjusted poor, " and the "social
outcasts. " A long process of self-selection is at work here. When
a majority of the population leaves an area, people who remain clearly
have some special attachment to the place. Having chosen deliberately
to remain, they are likely to be most severely affected by forced re-
location.
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Thus, even at the end of a long waiting period, rebuilding an old
neighborhood will still involve a considerable amount of forced
uprooting and the destruction of remaining community life among
a particularly vulnerable part of the population.
This pattern of decline would also entail serious problems during
the long process of abandonment. When population is thinning out
while -the physical equipment of the area remains intact, service
costs would be high in relation to the number of people deriving
any benefit from local facilities. As Raymond Vernon has pointed
out (Appendix C), streets and utilities would have to be maintained
at previous levels for a dwindling population; police and fire pro-
tection could not be cut back; school structures would have to be
maintained for small enrollments. Capital investments in modern
facilities or environmental improvements would be difficult to justify
against other claims for public funds, since the life of these facilities
would be geared to the uncertain life expectancy of the old housing.
Declining areas would probably receive minimum service and no new
investment, despite the needs of remaining low-income people.
Gradual Rebuilding
The alternate approach is a process of continuous rebuilding, keeping
pace with the gradual abandonment of old housing. Such a program
would be difficult to manage, but the potential gains are significant.
The pattern of change is evolutionary: new residents enter in small
numbers each time a handful of new buildings is completed. This in-
flux would prevent any problem of underutilization. Services and new
facilities would be related to new housing as well as old. At no stage
would it be necessary to force large numbers of residents out of the
area. Rebuilding would proceed by small increments, with each stage
depending first upon the voluntary abandonment of old housing units.
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Individual choices of residential location would remain unrestricted
for low-income residents, and would be expanded for people in the
market for new housing, At each stage, some low-income people
would be displaced, even though clearance would be limited to
deteriorated and predominantly vacant structures. Those displaced
would have an opportunity to relocate in other housing within the
same area, since an adequate localvacancy reserve would be one
cornerstone of the gradual rebuilding policy. The availability of
some new housing within the community would widen residential
choices for residents of the area with rising incomes who might
want better housing in the same locale, and for outside people who
would have an additional area in which to find some new housing.
Finally, gradual rebuilding would promote internal variety in an
area , rather than the homogeneity of a large-scale ,clearance
project rebuilt all at once.
If new housing is to be attracted into the declining residential areas,
their physical setting will have to be improved significantly, with
the provision of new community facilities and a high level of public
services. These environmental changes would also benefit occu-
pants of the old housing. By making the area more desirable
generally, environmental upgrading might slow the process of abandon-
ment and might encourage rehabilitation of older structures. From
a social point of view, these are desirable side effects, providing an
improved environment for low-income people and prolonging the use-
ful life of existing structures. To the municipal tax assessor, such
benefits may bring small joy if they slow the process of new develop-
ment. His perspective, however, should not be decisive.
Environmental improvements, coupled with a steady process of re"
building,may also raise the cost of site acquisition in the older areas.
To the extent that a rise in price reflects increased utilization of the
old structures, no conflicts with public objectives will ai-ise, since
rebuilding is not to be attempted while areas are still heavily utilized.
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But site prices may rise because of speculative rebuilding values
in an area where new development is active. If price increases
threaten to block new development, or to force up new densities to
undesirable levels, the municipality may be able to forestall price
inflation by a policy of advance property acquisition before rebuilding
and environmental improvement are well under way. Early property
acquisition need not influence the timing of clearance: buildings
could be leased for operation, or could be operated by the city until
they are ready for replacement. Alternately, the city might obtain
long-term options to buy properties at current prices before making
major public investments in an area.
In some circumstances, gradual rebuilding may be inconsistent with
desired directions of change. Some old residential areas may be
better suited for non-residential functions in the future. Such transi-
tions from residence to industry or large institutions, for example,
may involve a general realignment of the street pattern, the provision
of different utility systems, and a radically different land pattern. In
such cases, rebuilding in small stages may be virtually impossible
because of the sheer magnitude of physical change and reorganization.
Some types of new development -- heavy industry, truck terminals --
may have a deteriorating effect on the environment for remaining
residents rather than aiding in the provision of good residential services.
These severe constraints on gradual rebuilding are not likely to be
typical. Where residential areas are to remain residential in the
future, slow rebuilding will indeed create more complex physical
planning problems than complete clearance. But the advantages of
gradual rebuilding are considerable in bypassing the problems of slow
decline and eventual dislocation of the remaining community.
Creating the Conditions for Gradual Rebuilding
Policies to achieve a gradnal rebuilding of the old residential areas
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consist of two separate phases: creating the pre-conditions for
rebuilding, and accomplishing the actual transformation of old
areas. We have learned a great deal about the pre-conditions and
the critical points at which public action can influence them. Less
information is available about the final conditions for rebuilding,
but the general nature of the problem is clear, and we shall review
some current renewal plans that aim at a gradual rebuilding process.
Two basic lines of attack are open to public action designed to
strengthen the pre-conditions for attracting new development into
the old residential areas: increase consumer preferences for these
locations, and reduce development and operating costs for the devel-
oper. The relationships that we have noted between metropolitan
structure and locational preferences in the housing market point the
way for the first approach. To raise consumer demand, public action
can be taken to strengthen the downtown core in terms of employment,
service, and recreational facilities; increase the access advantages
of the old areas to downtown or to other activity centers; remove
competitive vacant land from the market; and of course, improve
the local environment in declining areas.
Speciffc action to accomplish these objectives could take many dif-
ferent forms, depending upon local circumstances and the nature of
city and metropolitan planning programs within each region. Downtown
renewal programs, changes in the transportation system, the acquisi-
tion or regulation of vacant land, all constitute approaches to manipula-
ting the functional structure of the region. Any of these actions will
have highly significant side effects, and none are likely to be under-
taken solely to promote rebuilding in the declining areas. But these
are illustrations of the ways in which planning programs can conceiv-
ably increase consumer demand for housing sites in the areas to be
rebuilt.
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Where costs and returns for new housing are out of line in the
declining areas, the other line of approach is to lower costs.
Direct financial subsidies are an obvious method: tax abate-
ments and low-interest loans, for example. Less direct methods
involve devaluing slum properties, by such techniques as enforcing
building and occupancy code requirements to the point where de-
teriorated housing becomes less profitable to the owner, or
formulating tax policies for the same purpose. All these methods
are highly complex and generate many side effects; they cannot
be undertaken without careful study of the housing market and
analysis of the likely results of contemplated action, In a housing
market where low-rent units are scarce, code enforcement mea-
sures may result in a transfer of maintenance costs from owners
to tenants through rent increases. Where low-cost units are in
large supply and vacancies are growing, prudent policy may simply
involve waiting for vacancy rates to rise high enough to turn prices
downward. Measures to expand the supply of superior low-cost
housing, such as well-conceived public housing programs, are also
likely to help devalue deteriorated structures in the declining areas.
An aspect of the abandonment of declining areas that appeared very
clearly in our three regional analyses is the slowness, of minority
group dispersal from central locations. Where continued occupancy
of the old housing represents the free choice of individuals who wish
to remain in their communities, such decisions should be respected.
To a certain extent, however, decisions to remain in the old areas
result from discrimination in the private housing market, or from
fear of discrimination. The elimination of such artificial barriers
to free choice of residence is an objective that needs no further
justification. Fair housing legislation and other steps to open the
suburban market to all groups in the population will widen the range
of choice for minority families, and will probably also speed the
vacating of substandard housing in the older areas.
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The total demand for multifamily housing in a region is a critical
factor in meeting the pre-conditions for a gradual rebuilding of
old residential neighborhoods. As we have already noted, action
at the national level may be more significant than any local mea-
sures in broadening the market for multifamily homes. Neverthe-
les s, the same local actions that promote demand for the old
inlying areas are likely to promote an acceptance of multifamily
densities as one condition of living near the center of the region.
Local programs to reduce development and operating costs in
rebuilding areas may also make possible a reduction in rents to
levels competitive with the cost of owning a single-family home.
Finally, local experiments with design innovations in multifamily
structures may stimulate increased interest in this type of housing.
Municipal governments exert considerable power over the pattern
of new apartment construction through the regulation of maximum
densities in zoning legislation. Density regulations for areas to be
rebuilt must steer a course between two conflicting objectives. In
order to make new buildings feasible on expensive cleared sites,
density regulations should permit fairly intensive development.
But in order to use the limited multifamily market as an effective
force in rebuilding many old areas, maximum densities should not
go so high as to exhaust the total potential for new apartments in
just a few locations. Both criteria must enter into the choice of
appropriate densities, for zoning itself is a tool for rebuilding and
may reduce current land prices by controlling maximum develop-
ment densities. The choice of densities should therefore reflect
a careful consideration of the general demand for space for multi-
family housing in a region and the supply of feasible sites, as well
as the economics of new development and the preferences of occu-
pants of new housing.
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Final Conditions for Rebuilding
In areas that meet the pre-co-nditions for rebuilding, attracting new
development will require still further public action. Developers of
new housing usually avoid the declining areas where deteriorated
old housing is concentrated, although this is not inevitably the case.
A major task for public action is to remove whatever stigma keeps
new development out of the aging neighborhoods.. Most .current
efforts in this direction emphasize the selective clearance of badly
blighted properties, the provision of new community facilities
(schools, parks, playgrounds), traffic improvements, redesigning
of streets to enhance their appearance, and occasionally the develop-
ment of a modern shopping plaza. An important feature in all these
current plans is the rehabilitation of much of the older housing.
Although most of these deliberate programs for rebuilding residential
areas are too new to permit an evaluation of results, several general
considerations are already clear:
1. Old residential areas differ markedly in their ability
to attract new private housing, with important con--
sequences for public programs. Some areas have
special advantages for new housing: good accessibility
to a center of activity, proximity to prestige locations,
attractive views, or other special site characteristics.
In such areas, little public action may be necessary to
spur private rebuilding of cleared sites. Later in this
chapter, we shall discuss such an area in Los Angeles,
where the sole public expenditure required to set off a
wave of rehabilitation and rebuilding was the administra-
tive overhead for a series of building inspections and
code enforcement orders.
In contrast, some areas are so lacking in attractions that
private building seems unlikely, even with environmental
improvements. In such areas, private developers may
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have to receive special financial incentives, or per-
haps some form of public housing is the only feasible
type of new development. A successful rebuilding
program is likely to encompass both extremes among
old neighborhoods, as well as many in between. To
cope with such a broad range of rebuilding areas will
require more than nere reliance on private develop-
ment: special inducements will have to be offered in some
areas, and varying degrees and types of subsidy may
be required in others. New York already has such a
varied tool kit available; we shall discuss it at greater
length later in this chapter.
2. One way to regard these differences is in terms of the
differing multiplier effect of public investment in
generating private investment in different areas. From
the point of view of municipal finance, this relationship
will be an important one, but a socially responsible re-
building program will seek goals other than maximizing
this multiplier effect. Investments in public facilities
and the community environment are more than techniques
to attract new development; they are also means for pro-
viding good services and surroundings for residents of
the older buildings.
3. Residential areas will also differ with respect to the
amount of clearance and rehabilitation that is justified
at any stage of a rebuilding program. Although the rate
of rebuilding would be geared to the availability of va-
cant units within the area, the physical characteristics
of structures will affect the types of treatment used in
the rebuilding program. Certain types of structures,
such as the brownstones in New York, are particularly
suited to rehabilitation. Others may be of a structural
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type unsuitable for modern needs (old-law tenements),
or may be uneconomical to rehabilitate because of
poor condition or absence of necessary facilities.
4. The use of rehabilitation may have to be sharply
limited in low -income areas, for rehabilitated rental
units may well be too expensive for most low-income
families. Under these circumstances, where re-
habilitation would mean removing units from the low -
cost inventory, government-induced rehabilitation
should move no faster than the growth of vacant reloca-
tion units in the area, or the rise of incomes in the
community. Present rebuilding programs generally
call for extensive rehabilitation of older units, but
these programs often envision a substantial amount of
relocation out of the area. In many areas, however,
moderate rehabilitaion may be within the means of
present occupants.
5. The public cost of gradually rebuilding old residential
areas is sometimes lower than the cost of urban re-
newal clearance projects and sometimes in the same
general range, but public investments are largely for
community facilities rather than for land write-downs.
Information has been compiled for eleven renewal
projects that emphasize the conservation and re-
habilitation of existing structures rather than large-
scale clearance; all are located in cities over 100, 000
in population (Table VI-1). Net project costs per net
acre of land (excluding streets) range from $19, 000
for the Mack-Concord Conservation Area #1 in Detroit
to $268, 000 for the Harlem Park Project #2 in Baltimore.
In many cities, costs for these projects are considerably
lower than the average costs per acre for clearance
projects, but costs for the two types of programs show
TABLE VI-1
Selected Characteristics of Conservation-Rehabilitation Projects
Net Project Cost
City and Net Project Size of Project Net Project Per Net Acre for
Project Cost (Thou- (Acres Exclud- Cost Per Clearance Projects
sands of ing Streets) Net Acre (Thousands of
Dollars) (Thousands Dollars)
of Dollars) Average No. of
Cost Projects
Atlanta:
University
Center 7,806 101.4 77.0 24.8 4
Baltimore:
Harlem Park N.2 5,871 21.9 268.1 269.8 11
Chicago:
Illinois Institute
of Technology 2,961 27.9 106.1 202.4 22
Columbus:
Market Mohawk 7, 384 67.0 110.2 77.9 1
Denver:
Whittier School 1,101 7.8 141.2 49.1 2
Detroit:
Mack-Concord
Conservation
No. 1 3,895 205.0 19.0 110.1 8
Nashville:
East Nashville 20,270 359.5 56.4 212.3 1
New Haven:
Dixwell 11,285 187.1 60.3 297.0 2
Wooster Square 23,052 169.5 136.0
Oakland:
West Oakland
General Neigh-
borhood Renewal
Plan 26,400 671.0 39.3 Not available
Philadelphia:
East Poplar
Numbers 1, 4,
5, 6 1,651 8.1 203.8 211.6 16
Source: U. S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, Urban Renewal
Administration, Urban Renewal Project Characteristics,
June 30, 1961, Characteristics Directory of Projects as of
June 30, 1961; Detroit information in part from Maurice
Frank Parkins, Neighborhood Conservation: A Pilot Study,
Detroit, Detroit City Plan Commission in Cooperation with
Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1958; New Haven infor-
mation from New Haven Redevelopment Agency; Oakland in-
formation from Redevelopment Agency of the City of Oakland,
Information Bulletin No. 3, "A General Neighborhood Renewal
Plan for West Oakland, " (no date).
Clearance projects exclude projects in areas classified as pre-
dominantly open before renewal; averages are weighted according
to area of project.
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no consistent relationship. There are important
differences, however, in the composition of the local
government share of project costs. Cities tend to
have greater expenditures on site improvements and
supporting facilities for non-clearance projects, and
to have greater cash expenditures (i. e., for land
acquisition and write-down)-in clearance projects.12
Thus the cost of gradually rebuilding old residential
areas should not be regarded as separate from local
expenditures on public works and community facilities.
Rebuilding these areas within the framework of the
federal urban renewal program will mean federal
subsidies of two-thirds (or three-fourths) of the cost
of public works benefiting project areas. The capacity
of cities to spend on the order of $30, 000 to $70, 000
per acre (typical local shares of the cost range shown
in Table VI-1) will have to be determined individually,
but considerable sums may be available out of normal
public works allocations.
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PART 2: NEW YORK, LOS ANGELES, AND HARTFORD
Renewal Policies in New York
Of our three study areas, New York has made the most use of urban
renewal programs in recent years, and offers the richest case
material for an evaluation of public policy. We shall limit our dis-
cussion here to renewal in the City of New York, where the bulk
of the decaying residential areas are concentrated, and where the
most interesting programs in the region have developed. At first,
government-sponsored renewal projects based on the Housing Act
of 1949 were concentrated in and around central Manhattan, but the
sphere of operations was soon extended to upper Manhattan (the
upper West Side, Harlem), areas of Brooklyn close to Manhattan,
and a scattering of projects in outer Queens and the Bronx. The
Housing and Redevelopment Board, which now administers urban
renewal programs in New York, has already undertaken new develop-
ments in typical older residential locations of Manhattan, the Bronx,
and Brooklyn, and has begun to plan still further incursions into
such areas.
New York is no model of enlightened public policy working toward
socially desirable objectives. We have already observed the severe
shortage of low-cost housing in New York. Despite this shortage,
redevelopment projects started between 1950 and 1960 demolished
22, 000 low-cost dwelling units. Even this volume of destruction is
only a small part of the total clearance resulting from all forms of
public action including highway construction. Total public demolition
currently displaces 15, 000 families per year, and City projections
assume no easing of this pace in the next few years.13
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Yet New York presses on with a huge renewal program that has
aroused considerable public opposition and has already brought
on two Congressional investigations. This program is currently
being modified in the direction of greater emphasis on conserva-
tion and rehabilitation projects, but much clearance is still
contemplated. One indicator of desperate citizen reactions to
City policies can be seen in a recent proposal to enact legislation
forbidding the demolition of all rent-controlled housing in sound
condition. 14
Nevertheless, New York is a valuable case study in the use of
public programs for rebuilding old residential areas. Little
governmental effort is needed to raise demand for inlying sites or
to lower acquisition costs. These factors are currently in a favor-
able relationship with one another, and the large current volume
of apartment construction provides a potential basis for re-using
cleared sites. The current office-building boom in Manhattan seems
to assure the maintenance of a strong core - an important factor
promoting central housing preferences -- without requiring direct
governmental action. Improvements in the subway system, current-
ly under way in Manhattan via the lengthening of stations and the
acquisition of new equipment, will also help maintain the central
orientation of New York's housing market. Other government
action is likely to promote the voluntary abandonment of deteriorated
housing: the City Housing Authority has announced plans to build
57, 000 new public housing units during the next few years, while City
and State anti-bias legislation continues to widen the private housing
market for minority groups now concentrated in the old neighborhoods.
With economic pre-conditions already favorable, the main current
emphasis in New York's approach to the declining areas is turned
toward the problem of improving their social and physical environ-
ment. In areas where existing buildings still have a useful life
ahead, City efforts have involved code enforcement, improvements
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in streets and street-lighting, new community facilities, and a
host of social services: English classes for adults, nursery
schools, public health programs, and casework guidance. 15 Butwhere
plans call for rebuilding with some new private construction, the
problem is one of attracting middle-income families into neighbor-
hoods surrounded by low-income people living in blighted housing.
Presumably this problem will ease once an initial middle-income
development helps diversify the character of the neighborhood,
but the current task is to trigger the initial population change. New
housing and new community facilities can accomplish physical
change in the immediate environment, but blighted surroundings
jeopardize the chances of attracting an influx of middle-income peo-
ple to occupy the new housing.
A currently emerging policy in New York seeks to overcome the
reluctance of middle-income families to move to new apartments
amid the aging areas by offering privately built housing at "bargain"
rents.16 The mechanism for this policy is a series of financial
incentives to developers of rental or cooperative housing, authorized
by the New York State Mitchell-Lama law. State or City loans are
available to developers for terms up to fifty years at 4 to 4 1/2 per-
cent interest, covering up to 90 percent of development cost. In
addition, the City grants abatements up to 50 percent in real estate
taxes. (This program may also be combined with land write-downs
in federally aided renewal areas.) The result is a substantial re-
duction in yearly financing and operating costs, and a smaller equity
share in new development, in comparison with conventional financing
and normal assessments. Rents are established by prior agreement
between the sponsor and the City or State supervising agency. Under
this program, rental units have come on the market for $25 to $30
per room; new apartments in conventionally financed private buildings
rent for $40 per room or more. Mitchell-Lama cooperatives also
offer advantageous prices to the consumer: down payments are gen-
erally $400 to $600 per room, with monthly carrying charges of $18
to $25 per room.
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The Mitchell-Lama program has been in operation since 1946, but
only recently has it become a tool used specifically to induce new
construction for a middle-income market in the old and declining
areas. The policy switch has taken the form of turning down appli-
cations of sponsors who propose new developments in areas where
unsubsidized private construction is active. The rationale on the
part of New York City officials is to avoid a situation in which new
middle-income apartments in choice locations undercut the market
for comparably priced units in the neglected areas. An additional
objective of this policy is to safeguard the tax base of the City by
preventing subsidized incursions into areas where fully tax-paying
property would otherwise develop.
Results of this policy are not yet evident. Two different phases of
the program will be interesting to watch. First is the question of
whether the low rents of Mitchell-Lama developments will succeed
in attracting an initial contingent of middle-income residents to a
few bright islands set among a sea of obsolescent housing. The
first new developments are sizable islands, however. An early
venture in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, where the first
units are expected to open in 1963, will occupy 24 acres. Another
development still in the early planning stage is expected to use
some 38 acres of land in the Brownsville area of Brooklyn.
If the scale of these initial developments is suitable for attracting
the desired rental market, the second phase of the strategy must
still be tested. Will the introduction of middle-income elements
into the population trigger later unsubsidized private development,
or will rents have to be held below normal market levels in order
to continue rebuilding these areas? The problem at this 8tage
will be to devise further changes in the environment that will allow
the old areas to command rents consistent with their locational
advantages, if the objective is to attract conventional private housing.
181.
Gradual Rebuilding in New York
The large scale of these particular Mitchell-Lama developments is
not really appropriate for the gradual rebuilding of old neighbor-
hoods in accordance with the social objectives that we recommend.
Clearing land for a site of 25 or 30 acres will inevitably mean
sweeping away a considerable amount of housing, including some
that is neither surplus nor deteriorated. A gradual approach would
require clearing smaller plots on a highly selective basis, and intro-
ducing new buildings among old ones on the same street. An urban
renewal project currently in progress on the West Side of Manhattan
is closer to our model of gradual rebuilding, and involves a number
of interesting implementation techniques.
The West Side renewal area, however, does not conform to our
general goals of replacing surplus, substandard housing in declining
areas, for the area is not a declining one and its housing is over-
utilized. From 1950 to 1956, the population climbed from 33, 000
to 39, 000, owing mainly to a large influx of Puerto Rican migrants
and a smaller exodus of white non-Puerto Rican residents. By 1956,
20 percent of all living quarters were overcrowded (more than 1.5
persons per room), and with the conversion of many furnished rooms
into family housing units, a third of all units lacked adequate bath-
room facilities. We would not recommend any clearance in such an
area while the housing is so heavily utilized, but the West Side pro-
gram is nevertheless useful to observe as an illustration of how
gradual rebuilding might be accomplished in a more suitable area.
In this renewal area, sites cleared for new buildings are small,
ranging from 7, 200 square feet to 40, 000 square feet. Over the
four stages of the program, some entire street fronts are to be re-
built, but at any one stage the new buildings are mainly non-contiguous.
In the early stages, new development thus adjoins old buildings, some
of which are in poor condition. Part of the program for attracting new
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development into this area is the eventual rehabilitation of most of
the older structures that are to be retained. For some time, how-
ever, new buildings will have old and even substandard neighbors.
Despite this potential drawback, developer interest in the project
has been high, and both rehabilitation and new construction are
already under way.
Another feature of the strategy for attracting new development is
the addition of new community facilities. These include a new
elementary school and playground, a new playground for an existing
school, and various walkways and small open spaces.
In addition to physical improvements in the neighborhood, New York
has an impressive set of tools in its varied programs for stimulating
new building. Plans for the West Side anticipate either conventional
financing or FHA Section 220 mortgages for some new buildings, and
Mitchell-Lama financing for others. Rehabilitation can be undertaken
through conventional or FHA financing. In addition, some low-income
public housing is to be built in the area. At the end of the second
stage, the ratio of new private housing units to new public units is
expected to be 2.5 to 1, with private housing rising to a higher pro-,
portion in the remaining stages.
New York has still other programs for new private housing, involving
various degrees of tax abatement and financing assistance, and de-
pendent upon a profit limitation of 6 percent. In the field of public
housing, there are City programs for low and middle-income projects,
as well as state and federal low-income programs.18 Other cities
that wish to sponsor extensive rebuilding prdgram's will have to devel-
op similarly diversified tools, to fit the highly individual character
of different sites and different neighborhoods.
Although many of these programs involve some public subsidy, the
land cost-land value relationship is basically satisfactory for new
183.
private housing in the West Side renewal area. No federally aided
land write-downs are contemplated, and a considerable amount of new
housing is expected under conventional or FHA financing, with no tax
abatement or other City subsidy. Despite land costs as high as $16
per square foot, new apartments to rent at only $45 per room are
feasible through FHA financing. One reason why actual site costs
are not excessive for new development is that the densities follow
normal levels for new construction in New York, rather than the
somewhat lower levels prevailing in large-scale urban renewal pro-
jects. We shall take up this point in more detail below. Density for
the total project area will remain about the same before and after
rebuilding.
If the timing of various stages follows the suggested schedule of two
and one-half years per stage, the rebuilding of this area will be far
from gradual. Nevertheless, with more time allotted per stage,
this plan could serve as a model for the gradual approach. Only the
first two stages are worked out in detail. At the end of the second
stage, about one-third of all the living quarters in the area will be
replaced with either new or rehabilitated housing.
Rehabilitation and clearance will both require the relocation of some
former residents, but new public housing will be included within the
area, and a number of families are expected to have incomes high
enough for rehabilitated or new units. Of 2, 600 families to be re-
located, about 1, 300 will be in the low-income category. With only
500 new public housing units in the area, at least 800 families will
have to be relocated elsewhere.
With some modifications, this type of plan would be suitable for the
gradual rebuilding of an old residential area. The most important
change would be to postpone any clearance or rehabilitation until
more vacancies are available in the area. Then, with slower staging
and perhaps with more public housing, the community could start a
steady rebuilding process,
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The Double Standard in Urban Renewal
Urban renewal in New York has also raised serious questions about
the purposes of public aid used for channeling private development
into otherwise inactive parts of the City. Is the sole purpose to
stimulate the rebuilding of stagnant areas, or is there an additional
objective of promoting higher quality housing developments than
private builders prbvide elsewhere in the City? Our economic
analyses in Chapter IV assumed that rebuilding of the declining
areas would generally involve structural types and development den-
sities similar to those currently in use elsewhere in the region.
So far as densities are concerned, urban renewal in New York has
departed considerably from normal development practice. Private
housing developments in and near central Manhattan are usually
built at densities of 300 to 500 dwelling units per net acre. Densities
in large-scale Manhattan urban renewal projects have been less than
half as high, ranging from 100 to 150 dwelling units per net acre.
In the other boroughs of New York, where typical densities of pri-
vate development are about 150 units per acre, urban renewal densi-
ties vary mainly between 50 and 100 units per net acre.19
From the point of view of public policy, a double standard is clearly
involved here. Maximum densities of private development are con-
trolled by zoning regulations. Thus the developer who builds at
densities of 500 units per acre has governmental approval to do so.
Yet when public subsidies are made available for urban-renewal
projects, maximum densities are set at levels far below usual prac-
tice. This is a costly procedure, requiring substantial subsidies to
permit a normal profit when expensive land is to be utilized according
to standards more generous than those dictated by economy alone.
The costliness of this approach results in large part from the incon-
sistency between zoning standards and renewal standards. Normal
development densities, as regulated by zoning, strongly influence
the value of land in areas where rebuilding is active or anticipated.
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Values resulting from expectations of normal development potential
will almost certainly exceed values for re-use at lower densities.
If the gap is to be bridged at all,, it will require a subsidy.
A large part of New York's expenditures on urban renewal have
gone to purchase nothing more than reduced development densities
in renewal areas. The Washington Square Southeast project is a
particularly striking example. Located on the fringe of Greenwich
Village, where private construction has accounted for a great deal
of rebuilding in recent years, the project involved a land acquisition
cost of $33 per square foot. 20 Typical land costs for privately de-
veloped housing nearby are between $30 and $40 per square foot.
While unsubsidized developments nearby are built at densities ex-
ceeding 300 units per net acre, the Washington Square project has
a density of 138 units per acre. Project rent levels are about the
same as those in new buildings nearby. Net project costs were
15. 4 million dollars for a site of 14. 5 acres, or over one million
dollars per acre. Without public site assembly, new building might
not have been possible at this location, but the site could conceivably
have been assembled and sold at cost for development at typical
densities. Instead, the area was subsidized to the extent of one
million dollars per acre to achieve a lower density,
If this lower density constitutes a public purpose of sufficient im-
portance to justify such an expenditure, why is the public purpose
not compelling enough to warrant a gradual reduction of zoning
limits to comparable densities for allnew development? New York
has recently adopted a new zoning ordinance incorporating sweep-
ing downward revisions in permitted densities, but the new law still
allows densities of 400 units per acre or more in many parts of
Manhattan. Under these circumstances, vast renewal expenditures
for lower densities seem questionable.
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To the extent that renewal subsidies serve other objectives, they
have stronger justification. Most New York City projects differ
from Washington Square Southeast in that they are not located in
areas where private development has been active. Thus they
serve the purpose of initiating rebuilding in otherwise stagnant
areas, and they may generate later unsubsidized building. Re-
duced densities in these projects may help to set processes of
population change into effect. A project currently contemplated
for the Brownsville area of Brooklyn would offer densities below
those of private development as an inducement to attract middle-
income people into what is now a low-prestige, lower class
neighborhood. This strategy is similar to that of offering low
rents through the Mitchell-Lama program as a means of trans-
forming the social environment, so that private developers can
eventually operate in these areas without special subsidy.
But the difficult question of double standards remains. If one
objective of public policy is to change the standards of private
development in the direction of lower densities, urban renewal
is a costly tool to use for this purpose. We do not know whether
it can even be a particularly effective. tool. Urban renewal pro-
jects may perhaps serve as demonstrations of superior develop''
ment standards, but unless public taste comes to demand similar
standards in all new housing, the demonstration effect will be
negligible. Zoning can be a much more powerful tool for changing
development standards. New York has made an effort to reduce
private development densities through its new zoning law, but
maximum permitted densities still exceed those used in renewal
projects. As long as this difference persists, the City is in effect
attempting to reach higher standards through renewal than it is
through zoning.
This situation of double standards is a costly one, and suggests a
need for clarifying the objectives of rebuilding and coordinating
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the various means of achieving these objectives. Reducing the
density of new construction may be a highly desirable goal. Our
calculations in Chapter IV indicated that with FHA financing, new
housing can be built in the older parts of the Bronx, Brooklyn,
and Queens at densities as low as 50 units per acre. Under pre-
sent cost conditions, land write-downs are not necessary to permit
moderate density construction in the old residential areas. But if
zoning regulations allow higher densities, special incentives will
probably be necessary to attract new development at densities be-
low the prevailing level.
If the density reductions embodied in New York's new zoning law
represent a first step toward bringing zoning and renewal policy in
line, the double standard problem will diminish in importance.
Zoning measures should be tied more closely to rebuilding objectives
in still another respect, however, We have already discussed the
prospects for diverting new apartment construction in New York
from outlying parts of the City into the declining residential areas.
We found that a rapid rebuilding rate would be possible if new de-
velopment could be drawn into the older neighborhoods. To do so on
a broad scale would surely require the use of zoning restrictions to
curb outlying multifamily building, as well as the use of environmental
improvements to make the old areas more attractive.
Zoning is but one example of public measures that should be coordinated
with rebuilding programs. Tax policies and capital investment pro-
grams are other obvious spheres of public activity that can aid or
hinder the rebuilding of declining areas. New York is far advanced in
the measures it has devised to promote the rebuilding of its older sec-
tions, but many loose ends of public policy must still be tied. together
if this rebuilding is to succeed.
Our major quarrel with New York's programs, however, is not with
techniques but with basic policies. Despite some attempt at gradual
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rebuilding on the upper West Side, and in a few other areas now
in the planning stage, the City still appears committed to a large-
scale project approach, even while the housing shortage persists.
From our point of view, this policy is bound to create serious
problems for dislocated low-income families, while it continues
taking needed low-cost housing off the market.
The Setting for Renewal in Los Angeles
Los Angeles is in a favorable position for starting a rebuilding
program. Vacancy reserves in the City of Los Angeles are at
an ample level generally, and with an estimated vacancy rate of
4. 7 percent in the declining areas, the supply of low-cost housing
is probably loose enough to permit a start on the gradual rebuilding
of these areas in the near future. We have expressed some reser-
vations about the timeliness of large-scale clearance in Los Angeles,
but the vacancy reserve exceeds the supply of deteriorated housing
by a sizable margin in both the City and the region, so that a careful
replacement of surplus housing can safely begin.
We have already discovered that economic conditions are highly
favorable for rebuilding the older areas of Los Angeles. Although
the demand for new housing exhibits little centrality, development
and operating costs in central areas are entirely consistent with
current rent levels so long as the environment is satisfactory.
Site acquisition costs are low; blighted areas in the Los Angeles
region consist primarily of single-family homes, with only a hand-
ful of row houses or tenements. Even land assembly is no problem.
Typical lot dimensions are 50 to 60 feet of frontage, and a depth of
120 or 125 feet. Apartment developers ordinarily require no more
than a single lot of this size for a new structure with eight to ten
units. Where the surrounding environment is unfavorable, however,
each developer would probably need some assurance that others
would rehabilitate or rebuild nearby property. Finally, the size of
the rental market is no obstacle, with multifamily structures
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accounting for almost half the new dwelling units built in the
region since 1957.
Under these circumstances, public action to create a favorable
economic setting for rebuilding seems hardly necessary. Never-
theless, government programs presently contemplated for other
purposes are likely to have the incidental effect of promoting
greater demand for housing in central areas. These programs
include a number of measures designed to strengthen the central
business district through more intensive internal development
and through the conversion of surrounding land to business uses,
as well as a proposed mass transit rail system. 2 1 The mass
transit system, as currently proposed, would start with a twelve-
mile route from downtown Los Angeles along Wilshire Boulevard
to the new Century City development in the west, and an eleven-
mile route to El Monte in the east. Improved accessibility to
downtown along these two corridors is likely to strengthen demand
for housing sites in inner areas adjacent to the transit routes, par-
ticularly if plans for expanding downtown activity are successful.
The first renewal projects in Los Angeles have been close to down-
town, but even the limited experience in these prime locations
illustrates the favorable economic conditions that facilitate urban
renewal in this region. Land acquisition is currently under way for
the Bunker Hill project, an area of 136 acres adjacent to the cen-
tral business district and slated to be cleared primarily for business
expansion. Advance appraisals indicate an average cost of $8.78 per
square foot for land purchases and acquisition expenses. 22 Esti-
mated returns from the resale of land average $7. 23 per square foot,
so that the land subsidy will amount to only $1, 55 per square foot,
or about $68, 000 per acre. Other project expenses -- relocation,
site improvements, overhead -- will constitute additional subsidies,
but the combined net project cost or total subsidy is expected to be
only $164, 000 per acre. This is no gray area location, but choice
commercial land. Comparable renewal projects near the commer-
cial area of Manhattan (Columbus Circle, Lincoln Square,
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Pennsylvania Station South) have required total subsidies in the
vicinity of one million dollars per acre.
Another Los Angeles project planned for the near future is the
Temple area about five minutes northwest of the central business
district, intended for clearance and residential re-use. With an
anticipated gross project cost - including land acquisition, site
improvements, and all other expenditures -- of only $4.45 per
square foot, or $189, 000 per acre, subsidies are expected to be
still smaller than in the Bunker Hill project. According to current
resale estimates, the net project cost will be $63, 000 per acre.
Again, New York clearance projects with comparable locations have
required subsidies many times as great. The West Park, New York
University-Bellevue, Cooper Square, and Washington Square South-
east projects are all residential areas quite close to the business
center of Manhattan; subsidies for these projects range from $600, 000
to one million dollars per acre.
One small renewal project in Los Angeles has already been completed
without any subsidy: the Ann project, formerly a residential area
near downtown, has been cleared and put to industrial re-use without
benefit of land write-down.
Although none of these initial projects have penetrated into the old
residential areas away from downtown, fifteen other areas that have
been officially designated for renewal study are scattered throughout
the City of Los Angeles, and several outlying communities in the re-
gion have also initiated renewal programs. The first project in Santa
Monica also presents an economic picture highly favorable for renewal,
but it is by no means in a typical declining area. The Ocean Park
project will use a choice site near the business center of Santa Monica,
with an excellent view of the Pacific Ocean. Real estate purchases
and acquisition expenses for this site are expected to average $6. 32
per square foot, and land resale value is appraised at $4.97 per square
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foot, for a mixture of new residential and commercial development. 23
Thus the land subsidy will amount to only $1. 35 per square foot,
or $59, 000 per acre.
Official renewal efforts have not yet begun to cope with rebuilding
typical old residential neighborhoods. As a result, special policies
have not yet been devised to take account of the special problems in
such areas. The limited renewal experience in this region suggests,
however, that public rebuilding programs will hardly require sub-
sidies for reducing land costs. The role of government in Los
Angeles renewal is now largely one of assembling tracts of land on
a scale suitable for rebuilding, investing in public improvements
for renewal areas, and taking charge of relocation. Our study of the
economics of renewal in Los Angeles suggests that this role need not
change when public renewal programs begin to operate in the declin-
ing residential areas.
Mixing New and Old Housing in Residential Rebuilding
Rebuilding an area in small stages requires mixing new and old
housing in a fine-grained pattern. To some observers of real
estate practice, this pattern seems impossible to achieve when the
old housing is in poor condition. Yet the upper West Side of New
York is well on the way to achieving such a mixture, even before
many of the old buildings are rehabilitated. Los Angeles also has
an area where public action has induced new development side by
side with substandard old housing. In Los Angeles, however, de-
velopers of new housing had assurances that building and occupancy
codes would be enforced to bring the neighboring old structures at
least up to code standards.
Los Angeles has had an active code enforcement program operating
largely outside the official urban renewal project areas. 24
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One of the areas recently chosen for intensive code enforcement was
the Sawtelle section of West Los Angeles located near several high
prestige areas of recent growth: : Brentwood, Beverly Hills, and
Santa Monica. Before the code enforcement program started,
housing in the Sawtelle area consisted primarily of deteriorating
single-family homes built in the late nineteenth century. Each
property owner was given a list of repairs that would be necessary
to bring his building up to code standards, with a thirty-day time
limit to start work. These notices confronted each owner with the
alternatives of making repairs, having the City make repairs and
assess their cost against the property, or selling the property. If
rehabilitation costs were expected to exceed fifty percent of the
replacement cost of the building, the City was to start demolition
proceedings in the event of non-compliance.
The Federal Housing Administration in Los Angeles agreed to insure
loans for new development in the Sawtelle ,area, and would-be developers
soon appeared on the scene with offers to buy many of the properties.
The net result of this code enforcement program was a wave of new
apartment construction, as well as the rehabilitation of many original
structures. The number of buildings demolished, however, was
almost as great as the number repaired: 386 were demolished, and 397
repaired. 2 5
This project differed from normal urban renewal approaches in a num-
ber of important respects. The City made no physical improvements
in the area, and gave no relocation assistance. Land subsidies were
not involved: total costs to the City were the administrative expenses
necessary to carry out code enforcement procedures. What was accom-
plished? Social gains were dubious, with a large number of former
residents leaving the area to make way for new construction. The phy-
sical transition of the area is impressive, however. Experience in
the Sawtelle neighborhood illustrates the favorable economic conditions
that can facilitate rebuilding in Los Angeles, as well as the possibility
193.
of mixing new and old housing even in an area that has long been
bypassed by new development.
Other blighted areas in Los Angeles may not respond quite as
easily to code enforcement treatment. In less favorable locations,
developers may be unwilling to bid for properties even when the
owners are under some duress. In minority areas, the market
for new apartments may be less certain. When the surrounding
neighborhoods are deteriorating, a larger scale of action may be
necessary in order to attract new housing, and major public in-
vestments in local facilities may be a prerequisite for private
housing investments. In short, later attempts to rebuild blighted
areas may have to incorporate approaches similar to those in New
York, but the basic economic conditions are likely to be highly
favorable in any case.
Old Housing and Minority Groups
Recent policy discussions within the federal housing agencies in
Los Angeles have touched on another aspect of the declining areas
that we have mentioned many times before: the extent to which old
housing is an asset for some groups in the population. Minorities
in the Los Angeles region -- Negroes, Mexicans, Japanese -- can-
not enter freely into the housing market, despite the fact that many
minority families have adequate incomes to purchase new houses. 26
The nonwhite population (primarily Negroes and Orientals) consti-
tutes about 9 percent of total population in the region; yet according
to estimates of the Federal Housing Administration, only 1. 9 per-
cent of all new dwelling units constructed in the region between 1950
and 1956 were occupied by nonwhites. In the San Fernando Valley,
a major boom area for new single-family home developments since
World War II, population has soared from 155, 000 in 1940 to
840, 000 in 1960; yet aside from one segregated district in Pacoima
with a Negro population of about 4, 000, approximately eighteen Negro
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families lived in the Valley in 1960.
Minority population groups are now heavily concentrated in central
areas of the region, and efforts to break down barriers of prejudice
in the housing market are unlikely to produce sudden changes. The
rate of decentralization among Negroes and, to a lesser extent,
Mexicans and Japanese is likely to be slow for some time to come.
In iView of these unfortunate social characteristics of the suburban
housing market, the Federal Housing Administration and Housing
and Home Finance Agency offices in Los Angeles have been recon-
sidering their policies toward central areas inhabited by minority
groups. 27 Financing for home repairs has generally been difficult
to obtain in these areas, and FHA assistance has only recently
become available in a few older areas. A position that has been
advanced in these policy discussions is that minority groups
potentially constitute a great force for rehabilitating the inner areas,
provided that financing is available on favorable terms comparable
to those applying to new housing. A reshaping of government poli-
cies to stimulate the flow of mortgage funds into these areas would,
according to this view, represent a highly effective means of per*
mitting minority groups to improve their housing conditions. Such
a policy is likely to create opportunities for better housing for
minorities long before the suburbs are open to them.
From this point of view, the old housing represents a highly desirable
social asset. Whether rehabilitated or in its present condition, it
provides living accommodations for groups unable (in part unwilling)
to compete freely in the market for new housing. Economic calcu-
lations alone would reveal nothing of this special value that old
housing has for minority groups. In Los Angeles, site acquisition
costs are moderate and re-use values are high, but much of the old
housing has a far greater social value than its acquisition cost would
suggest. The Los Angeles situation calls attention once again to the
danger of establishing public policy solely on economic terms.
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Declining areas are generally ambiguous in terms of their economic
value, but public policy decisions should reflect an appraisal of the
extent to which these areas are social as well as economic assets.
So far as Los Angeles is concerned, implementing policies for re-
building the older areas -- with new as well as rehabilitated housing
will call for approaches broader than those now in use in the region.
To attract private investment in rehabilitation, public action will
probably have to provide the same background conditions that we
have suggested are necessary to secure new housing. These con-
ditions include a scale of operations large enough to upgrade the
surrounding environment, and adequate public investment to provide
facilities and services as part of this upgrading. Operations to im-
prove blighted Los Angeles neighborhoods will almost certainly
have to combine elements of the three separate Los Angeles pro-
grams that we have discussed: urban renewal projects, code
enforcement, and favorable terms for financing home improvements.
The tasks of public policy in the region, therefore, are to formulate
clear objectives for the older areas, and to weave together these
separate techniques into an appropriate program for each area.
Renewal Policies in Hartford
Vacancy rates in Hartford have risen to the point where limited re-
building could probably be started without depleting the supply of
low-cost housing, but Hartford has problems of economic feasibility.
A look at the choices confronting policy-makers in Hartford will
illustrate some of the difficulties in cities that do not meet the pre-
conditions for rebuilding. Our previous analysis of Hartford indicated
a somewhat ambiguous situation with respect to the land cost-land
value balance in the old residential areas. Although the multifamily
housing market displays some centrality in terms of rents as well
as densities, land costs in the declining areas are slightly high in
relation to likely rental returns. In many cases the gap can be
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bridged by FHA financing, but slight land subsidies may be required
under some circumstances. The second pre-condition -- a sufficient
demand for housing sites in the older areas -- is more clearly lacking,
since the total market for new multifamily housing is small in Hartford.
Recent renewal activities in Hartford will probably promote the pre -
conditions by strengthening central preferences in the housing mar-
ket. Five years ago, the decision of a major insurance company
(Connecticut General) to move its headquarters from downtown
Hartford to suburban Bloomfield gave an air of instability to down-
town. Since then, an active renewal program has helped to shore up
the existing situation and to stimulate business expansion in the
central business district. Two renewal projects are currently in
execution; one will provide a site for the new Phoenix Mutual head-
quarters. building as well as other office activity, while the other is
expected to be used for a mixture of business and light industry ad-
jacent to the central business district. Four more projects are
currently in planning, all in or near downtown. One will create
space for a convention hall, another is for retail expansion, a third
for a combination of luxury apartments and offices, and the remain-
ing project is to build moderate-rental apartments overlooking the
Connecticut River near downtown.
This program is likely to enhance the pulling power of downtown
materially, both in a functional sense and in terms of improved
appearance. The four projects within the central business district
will rebuild more than 25 acres of downtown land with modern
structures; two nearby projects will convert almost 100 acres to
new uses. Central activity will increase, and the mixture of new
uses will add variety to the core.
While these developments are likely to increase the attraction of
downtown, other government action may have the effect of diverting
the housing market effects of this attraction from theinner areas to
197.
outlying vacant land. Concurrently with the downtown renewal
projects, a major highway program has been under way in the
Hartford region. Several new expressways now under construc-
tion or planned for the near future will improve access from
many outlying locations to downtown Hartford. Since abundant
vacant land is available only seven or eight miles from the core,
much of the demand for housing sites readily accessible to down-
town may be filled by new developments on open land rather than
in the declining areas. Zoning restrictions in suburban communi-
ties will play a key role here, for a shortage of land zoned for
multifamily housing may shift development to alternate sites in
the inner areas. Nevertheless, the availability of open sites with-
in short driving times from central Hartford is likely to make
single-family homes a most attractive alternative to rental housing,
even when access to downtown is a prime consideration.
In contrast to Los Angeles, urban renewal in Hartford involves
high land costs and substantial subsidies. Site acquisition costs
for thiree downtown clearance projects planned for the near future
are expected to range from $17 to $24 per square foot, with total
subsidies at levels comparable to those in New York: $780, 000 to
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$946, 000 per acre. These are not sites in typical old residential
areas, however. We have previously estimated typical site costs
in the old neighborhoods of Hartford as ranging from three to five
dollars per square foot. Two clearance projects in areas near the
core fall roughly within this range. Acquisition costs for the
Riverview Project, a mixed residential-industrial area, are ex-
pected to be about $5. 20 per square foot. Gross project costs for
the Windsor Street development, currently under way in another
mixed-use area, are estimated as $4.40 per square foot. Gross
project cost includes relocation expenses, public improvements,
demolition, and overhead; land acquisition costs alone are probably
between three and four dollars per square foot.
198.
As we have previously noted, land costs of three to five dollars
per square foot are slightly higher than site costs in locations
where private rebuilding is currently in progress. Developers
of new housing in the old-mansion territory of Asylum Hill rarely
pay more than $2.'50 per square foot for apartment sites. Resale
value of land in the Riverview project, intended for moderate
rental (i. e., non-luxury) apartment buildings, is estimated as
two dollars per square foot. Although the advantages of FHA
financing can help close the gap between acquisition costs and re-
use values in urban renewal areas, some subsidies will probably
be necessary. In New York, land subsidies are likely to be needed
in the older areas only if developers are required to build housing
at densities lower than normal. In Los Angeles, land subsidies
are likely to be unimportant. But in Hartford, present land costs
are out of line with re-use values, and some subsidy will be needed
if private rebuilding is to be feasible. The Riverview project re-
use value is not a result of lowering normal densities, but simply
reflects current market prices for apartment land elsewhere in the
City of Hartford.
At current levels, the land subsidy in Hartford need not be very
high. The gap between cost and resale price in Riverview is about
$3 per square foot, or some $130, 000 per acre. The net project
cost anticipated for Riverview is $204, 000 per acre, but 8 of the
24 acres in the project area are to be turned into a public park
rather than sold as part of the apartment development. With some
land subsidy needed in addition to expenditures for relocation and
public improvements, rebuilding the old residential areas will be
more expensive in Hartford than in Los Angeles.
Size of the Multifamily Market in Hartford
In addition to the imbalance between site costs and re-use values,
Hartford faces a serious obstacle to rebuilding in the limited size
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of the market for new apartments. We have previously estimated
the land utilization rate for new multifamily development as 5 to 7
acres per year in the City of Hartford. The Windsor Street re-
newal area in Hartford, currently being cleared, alone covers
more than 70 acres of land just outside the central business dis -
trict. This project was originally intended for multifamily residen-
tial development, but difficulties in marketing the land for this
purpose led to a change in plans in favor of new business and indus-
trial development. According to the housing market study and our
crude estimates, some ten years of accumulated new multifamily
housing would be required to take over this 70-acre central site.
What can Hartford do to rebuild its declining areas, given the
limitations of high acquisition costs and small demand for multi-
family housing? Several general strategies seem worth considering.
One is to spread the new construction rather than concentrate it in
a few large clearance areas -- a policy which we urge on its social
merits, in any case. New development can be parcelled out to
various areas, injecting some new life into each one. Even so,
the potential rebuilding rate is so slow that 37 years would be re-
quired just to absorb sites cleared of housing that is now deteriorated.
An alternate strategy would call for attempts to broaden the multi-
family housing market. One method for broadening the rental
market is to provide types of multifamily housing that are new to
the region. The housing market study that we have previously
cited suggests luxury apartments as one type of new housing that
may extend the market by competing with upper levels of the single-
family home market. This is the strategy of the proposed Bushnell
Plaza renewal project, which will offer expensive apartments on a
highly desirable site overlooking Bushnell Park close to the heart
of downtown. Other possibilities are to experiment with row houses,
town houses, or other forms of new housing that can be built at
moderately high densities. Still another approach would be to broaden
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the market by producing multifamily housing at rents below current
levels. Counterparts of the New York Mitchell-Lama program
might be devised for this purpose, if subsidies are to be provided,
or construction and financing methods might be manipulated so as
to minimize production costs.
Another strategy would work at reducing acquisition costs of land
in the declining areas, using measures that we have already men-
tioned in this chapter: speed the depopulation of the older areas,
enforce housing codes or alter tax policies to chip away at operating
profits in deteriorated housing.
Hartford may well represent a common situation among relatively
small cities with vacant land available for development nearby.
The inner parts of the city were developed at moderately high
densities in the past, but tastes in the housing market have now
changed. As the older parts wear out, private development cannot
absorb the sites at current acquisition costs. Apartment developers
can afford to pay almost as much for the land as present property
is worth, but the total demand for apartments is too small to permit
rebuilding more than a few acres a year, even if subsidies are avail-
able to close the gap between site costs and re-use values. The major
housing demand is for new single-family homes, but developers can-
not pay anything close to current land prices in the old residential
areas for single-family sites.
If the public interest requires a general rebuilding of the old residen-
tial areas in the near future, public strategy seems to call for efforts
to broaden the multifamily market, to develop a market for housing
with densities intermediate between single-family homes and apart-
ment buildings, to take measures to reduce land acquisition costs,
or to reduce other production or operating costs for the developer.
Otherwis'e, rebuilding will require large subsidies. With acquisition
prices of $3 to $5 per square foot, clearing an acre will cost between
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$130, 000 and $270, 000 for land purchases alone, in addition to re-
location and demolition expenses and environmental improvements.
If the land is used for single-family homes, resale value will prob-
ably not exceed $10, 000 per acre. Clearance for single-family .
re-use is not financially impossible: net project costs per acre for
converting a Hartford neighborhood to single -family use will be
far lower than typical net project costs per acre for the many New
York City projects located near the business area of Manhattan.
But where the demand for building sites is limited, as in Hartford,
rebuilding programs must be weighed against inevitable land sub-
sidies, as well as against other social and economic considerations.
General Policy Implications
Our review of renewal experience in New York, Los Angeles, and
Hartford raises a number of major issues that are involved in formu-
lating public policies. First is the question of when to replace
existing housing, and how much to replace. Decisions of this kind
should depend upon the extent to which old housing is a social or
economic asset in the market. Economic value is likely to enter
into rebuilding decisions via the influence of acquisition cost, but
social value is not so readily apparent. We have noted in Los
Angeles that although site acquisition costs are reasonable for new
apartment development, much of the old housing represents a
scarce resource for minoi'ty groups. Elsewhere, the vacancy rate
may be a good indicator of the need for retaining low-cost housing.
We urge that vacancy rates be determined on a local basis, and that
rebuilding operations should not begin in a neighborhood until the
utilization of the housing stock falls off sufficiently to create surplus
housing. This principle would be a desirable regulator of the timing
of rebuilding, with each new increment of rebuilding dependent upon
the prior abandonment of other housing in the area. The economics
of rebuilding do not necessarily dictate such a policy, but renewal
programs that claim to have social goals cannot afford to rest on
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economic criteria alone.
Is a policy of gradual rebuilding feasible? Cities will find them-
selves confronting very different sets of policy choices, depending
upon whether or not they meet the pre-conditions for rebuilding.
If the pre-conditions are weak or missing, public strategy can
proceed along the lines we have suggested to increase demand for
housing sites in the old areas, or to reduce their acquisition cost.
A major vehicle for increasing demand is the physical planning
program of the metropolitan region, particularly plans for the
downtown core, the transportation system, and competitive vacant
sites. Reducing acquisition costs implies devaluing the old housing
through providing alternative and superior low-cost housing, strict
enforcement of building and occupancy codes, or tax policies de-
signed to reduce the profitability of deteriorated housing. Alternately,
land costs may be reduced through subsidies, or rebuilding may be
attempted for non-residential purposes.
If the economic background is favorable for rebuilding -- as we have
found it in New York and Los Angeles -- the task of public policy
is quite different. In this case, strategies must be devised to accom-
plish the actual rebuilding of declining areas, and public action must
be shaped to attract new development into the old areas. Much ex-
perimentation will be necessary, but the techniques now in use for
the upper West Side area in New York are probably a reasonable
model. Components of this model are the improvement of the
physical setting through public works and rehabilitation, the staging
of limited clearance, and a battery of alternative housing programs
to fit different situations. Housing alternatives should encompass
different methods of financing, different degrees of public assistance,
and possibilities for public as well as private construction -- all of
which are r'epresented in New York programs.
203.
A successful rebuilding program also involves coordinating re-
building objectives with other spheres of public action, particularly
with zoning and other regulation of private building outside renewal
areas. Here, too, general coordination is necessary between re-
building activities and the general apparatus of physical planning,
including public works programming, highway construction, and
over-all regional development. Even when the pre-conditions for
rebuilding are present, regional growth must be directed so that
the older areas become logical locations for new development.
The distinction between an economic situation favorable for re-
building and an unfavorable one is not sufficiently appreciated
in recent discussions of urban renewal. Where the old areas of
a city are stagnant, observers generally assume that economic
costs and benefits are out of line for new development, or that the
demand for housing sites is very limited. Hence the frequent
view that the root of the "gray area" problem lies in acquisition
costs that are too high for the level of demand. We know that this
is not always the case. Even when costs and returns are in line,
however, the old residential areas may remain inactive. Difficul-
ties of site assembly, problems with the scale of operations, effects
of the surrounding environment, insufficient governmental commit-
ments to improve old areas, perhaps lack of entrepreneurial vigor,
may prevent the conversion of a favorable economic situation into
an actual rebuilding program.
For many cities with characteristics similar to either the New York
or the Los Angeles patterns that we have described, the problems
of rebuilding declining areas may result much more from failure
to capitalize upon an existing economic situation than from dis -
parities in the economics of new development. For such cities,
rebuilding strategies will have to focus increasingly on detailed
techniques for transforming the physical environment so that neg-
lected locations can achieve their economic potential.
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APPENDIX A
POPULATION AND HOUSING STATISTICS FOR
NEW YORK, LOS ANGELES, AND HARTFORD REGIONS
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TABLE A-1
New York Metropolitan Region
1. Population Change, 1950-1960
New York-Northeastern
New Jersey Standard
Consolidated Area
Central Cities: New
York, Newark, Jersey
City
Remainder of Standard
Consolidated Area
Population
1950
12, 911, 994
8,629,750
4,282,244
Population
1960
14, 759, 429
8,463, 305
6, 296, 124
Percent
Change
1950-1960
+14. 3
- 1.9
+47.0
2. Racial Components of Change in Central
City Areas of Population Loss, 1950-1960
Change in White Population
1950-1960
Number Percent
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Newark
Jersey City
Total
-284,777
- 26,462
-110,856
- 97,260
- 39,224
-558, 579
-18. 3
- 1.8
- 4.0
-26.8
-16.4
- 9.2
Change in Nonwhite
Population, 1950-1960
Number Percent
+ 22, 957
+ 68, 916
+168, 403
+ 63,704
+ 16,308
+340, 288
+ 5.7
+69. 2
+79. 0
+84.2
+77.8
+41.9
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II,
Characteristics of the Population, Part 32, New York
Tables 33, 41; and Part 30, New Jersey, Table 33;
U. S. Census of Population: 1960, General Population
Characteristics, New York, Final Report PC(1)-34B,
Tables 20, 27; and New Jersey, Final Report PC(1)-32B
Table 20.
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TABLE A-1
New York Metropolitan Region
3. Distribution of Negro Population, 1950 and 1960
Total Population Negro Population
Percent of
Total Region-
al Negro
Population
1960 1950 1960
New York-
Northeastern
New Jersey
Standard Con-
solidated Area
Manhattan
New York City
outside
Manhattan
Newark
Jersey City
12, 911, 994 14,759,429 1, 013, 424 1, 557, 069 100.0 100. 0
1,960,101
5,931, 856
438, 776
299, 017
1,698,281
6,083, 703
405, 220
276, 101
384, 482 397,101 37.9 25.5
363,126 690,830 35.8 44.4
74,965 138,035 7.4 8.9
20, 758 36,692 2.0 2.4
Total Central
Cities: New
York, Newark,
Jersey City 8,629, 750 8, 463, 305 843,331 1,262,658 83.2 81.1
Source: U. S. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II, Characteristics of
the Population, Part 32, New York, Tables 33, 34, 42; and
Part 30, New Jersey, Tables 33, 34, U. S. Census of
Population: 1960, General Population Characteristics, New York,
Final Report PC(I)-34B, Tables 21, 28; and New Jersey,
Final Report PC(1)-32B, Table 21.
1950 1960 1950
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TABLE A-1
New York Metropolitan Region
4. Distribution of Puerto Rican Students in Public
Schools, by Boroughs of New York City, 1956 and 1960
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Queens
Richmond
Number
1956
48, 952
30, 417
30, 078
2,846
448
of Students
1960
56, 154
43, 943
47, 457
30932
525
Source: J. Cayce Morrison, The Puerto Rican Study: 1953-1957,
New York, City of New York Board of Education, 1958,
p. 171; City of New York Board of Education, Bureau of
Educational Program Research and Statistics, "Special
Census of School Population, October 31, 1960, "
Publication No. 167, March. 1961, Table 2. Puerto Rican
students defined as born in Puerto Rico, or born on main-
land with one or both parents born in Puerto Rico.
Special schools excluded from above tabulation.
Percent
1956
43.4
27. 0
26.7
2.5
0.4
of Total
1960
36.9
28.9
31.2
2.6
0.3
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TABLE A-1
New York Metropolitan Region
5. Age Characteristics and Race, 1950 and 1960
1950
Percent of
Population
Under 18
Non-
White White
1960
Percent of
Population
Under 18
Non-
White White
1950
Percent of
Population
65 and Over
Non-
White White
1960
Percent of
Population
65 and Over
Non-
White White
New York-
Northeastern
New Jersey
Standard Con-
solidated Area
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Newark
Jersey City
25. 1 27.5 30.4 34.9 8.0 3.8 10.1 4.7
18.4 23.6 20.6 29.1 10.0 4.0 14.2 6.4
25.0 31.0 27.3 36.7 7.6 3.0 11.6 4.0
25.7 31.1 28.5 38.1 7.8 3.1 10.9
25.0 30.2 27.6 39.1
25.9 33.4 29.2 41, 7 7. 6
7.9 3.3 11.8
3.5
3.7
3.7 10.9 3.8
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. HI,
Characteristics of the Population, Part 32, New York,
Tables 33, 41; and Part 30, New Jersey, Table 33; U. S.
Census of Population: 1960, General Population
Characteristics, New York, Final Report PC(1)-34B,
Tables 20, 27; and New Jersey, Final Report PC(1)-32B,
Table 20.
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TABLE A-1
New York Metropolitan Region
6. Occupancy Characteristics and Race in Central Cities, 1960
White Population
Occupied Population
Housing Per Housing
Units Unit
Nonwhite
Occupied
Housing
Units
Population
Population
Per Housing
Unit
New York City
Newark
Jersey City
2,301,891
88, 612
78, 339
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Housing: 1960, Advance
Reports, Housing Characteristics: States, HC(A1)-33,
New York, Table 1, and HC(A1)-31, New Jersey, Table 1;
U. S. Census of Population: 1960, General Population
Characteristics, New York, Final Report PC(1)-34B,
Table 20, and New Jersey, Final Report PC( 1)-32B,
Table 20.
2.88
3.00
3.05
352, 554
39, 160
10, 213
3.24
3.56
3.65
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TABLE A-1
New York Metropolitan Region
7. Population and Dwelling Units in New York
City Areas of Population Loss, 1950-1960
Non-Institutional
Population
Total
Dwelling
Units
Non-Institutional
Population Per
Dwelling Unit
1950
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
1960 1950 1960 1950
1,945,466 1,694,644 635,944 645, 393 3.06
1,442,907 1,420,989 432,259 474,030 3.34
2,728,814 2,625,068 814,134 878,815 3.35
Source: U. S. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II, Characteristics
of the Population, Part 32, New York, Table 34. U. S.
Census of Population: 1960, General Population Character-
istics, New York, Final Report PC(1)-34B, Table 28.
U. S. Census of Housing: 1950, Vol. I, General Character-
istics, Part 4: Michigan - New York, New York, Table 1.
J. Anthony Panuch, Building a Better New York: Final
Report to Mayor Robert F. Wagner, March 1, 1960,
"Changes in the Housing Supply of New York City by
Borough," p. 36; compiled by New York City Department
of City Planning from Department of Buildings data.
1960
2.63
3.00
2.99
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TABLE A-i
New York Metropolitan Region
8. Housing Vacancies in Central Cities
and Metropolitan Area, 1960
Total Non-Seasonal
Housing Units Percent Vacant
Total of New York,
Jersey City, Newark,
Patterson-Clifton-Passaic
Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas
New York City
Newark.
Jersey City
Remainder of 4 Combined
Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas
4,671,740
2,735,272
134,727
91,802
1, 709,939
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Housing: 1960, Advance
Reports, Housing Characteristics: States, HC(A1)-31,
New Jersey, Table 1, and HC(A1)-33, New York, Table 1.
The New York - Northeastern New Jersey Standard Con-
solidated Area consists of the Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas of New York, Jersey City, Newark, and
Paterson-Clifton-Passaic, plus Middlesex County, New
Jersey and Somerset County, New Jersey. Middlesex
and Somerset Counties are omitted from this table.
3. 3
3.0
5.2
3.5
3.7
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TABLE A-1
New York Metropolitan Region
9. Central City Housing Utilization, 1950 and 1960
Percent of
(Non-Seasonal)
Units Vacant
and Available, in
Sound Condition
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Newark
Jersey City
1950
0.8
1.0
1.0
0.7
0. 5
1960
2. 5
1.5
1. 7
4.1
2.5
Number and Percent of
(Non-Seasonal) Units With
More Than 1 Occupant
Per Room
1950 1960
Number Percent Number Percent
99, 846
90,811
16.5 92,386 13.3
21.6 70, 926 15.3
138,369 17. 6 110, 053
18,216 15.1 16,600
12,418 14.8 10,077
12. 9
13.0
11.4
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Housing: 1950, Vol. I,
General Characteristics, Part 1, U. S. Summary,
Tables 27, 29, and Part 4, Michigan-New York,
New York Tables 17, 19; U. S. Census of Housing: 1960,
Advance Reports, Housing Characteristics: States,
HC(A1)-31, New Jersey, Table 1; U. S. Census of Housing:
1960, Vol. III, City Blocks, Series HC(3), Numbers 96,
249, 252, Table 1; New York Department of City Planning
Newsletter, December 1961, p. 2.
Information for Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx for
1960 covers all housing units, including seasonal. Vacant
units are those claasified as year-round, non-dilapidated,
available for rent or sale.
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TABLE A-I
New York Metropolitan Region
10. New Dwelling Units Authorized by Building Permits
In Central City Declining Areas, 1951-1960
Number of Dwelling Units
Private Housing Public Housing
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Newark
Jersey City
Total
52, 219
33,419
50, 081
14, 513
2, 091
142, 323
23, 009
16, 913
19, 8 21
7, 754
1,396
68, 893
Source: U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
"New Dwelling Units Authorized by Local Building Permits,"
Annual Summaries, 1951-1957;, U. S. Bureau of the Census,
Construction Reports: Building Permits, C40-8, "New
Dwelling Units Authorized by Local Building Permits," Annual
Summaries, 1958-1960.
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TABLE A-2
Los Angeles Metropolitan Region
1. Population Change, 1950-1960
Los Angeles-Long Beach
Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area
City of Los Angeles
Remainder of Standard
Metropolitan Statistical
Area
Population
1950
4, 367, 911
1, 970,358
2, 397, 553
Population
1960
6, 742,696
2,479, 015
4, 263, 681
Percent
Change
1950-1960
+54,4
+25.8
+77.8
2. Racial Components of Change in Central
City Population,, 1950-1960
Change in White Population
1950-1960
Number
City of Los Angeles +303, 035
Percent
+17. 2
Change in Nonwhite
Population, 1950-1960
Number Percent
+205, 622 +97. 2
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II,
Characteristics of the Population, Part 5, California, Table
33; U. S. Census of Population: 1960, General Population
Characteristics, California, Final Report PC(1)-6B, Table 20.
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TABLE A-2
Los Angeles Metropolitan Region
3. Distribution of Negro Population, 1950 and 1960
Total Population Negro Population
Percent of
Total Region-
al Negro
Population
Los Angeles -
Long Beach
Standard Metro-
politan Statistical
Area
City of Los
Angeles
1950 1960
4,367,911 6,742,696
1,970,358 2,479,015
1950 1960 1950 1960
,218,770 464,717
171,209 334,916
100.0 100.0
78. 3 72. 1
Source: U,. S. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. 11, Characteristics
of the Population, Part 5, California, Table 34; U. S. Census
of Population: 1960, General Population Characteristics,
California, Final Report PC(1)-6B, Table 21.
4. Distribution of Japanese Population, 1950 and 1960
Percent of
Total Region-
al Japanese
Total Population Japanese Population Population
Los Angeles -
Long Beach
Standard Metro-
politan Statistical
Area
City of Los
Angeles
1950 1960 1950 1960
4,367,911 6,742,696 37,947 81,204
1,970,358 2,479,015 25, 502 51, 468
1950 1960
100.0 100.0
67.2 63.4
Source: U. S. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II, Characteristics
of the Population, Part 5, California, Table 47; U. S. Census
of Population: 1960, General Population Characteristics,
California, Final Report P C( 1)-6 B, Table 21.
220.
TABLE A-2
Los Angeles Metropolitan Region
5. Age Characteristics and Race, 1950 and 1960
1950
Percent of
Population
Under 18
Non-
White White
1960
Percent of
Population
Under 18
Non-
White White
1950
Percent of
Population
65 and Over
Non-
White White
1960
Percent of
Population
65 and Over
Non-
White White
Los Angeles -
Long Beach
Standard
Metropolitan
Statistical
Area
City of Los
Angeles
26.1 27.6
23.1 26.3
33.4 37.9 9.4 4.7 9.3 4.6
29.5 35.8 10.2 4.6 11.3 4.9
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II
Characteristics of the Population, Part 5, California, Table
33; U. S. Census of Population: 1960, General Population
Characteristics, California, Final Report PC(1)-6B, Table 20.
6. Occupancy Characteristics and Race in Central City, 1960
White Population
Occupied Population
Housing Per Housing
Units Unit
Nonwhite
Occupied
Housing
Units
Population
Population
Per Housing
Unit
City of Los
Angeles 746., 065 129, 945 3.21
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Housing: 1960, Advance
Reports, Housing Characteristics: States, HC(A1)-5,
California, Table 1, U. S. Census of Population: 1960
General Population Characteristics, California, Final
Report PC(1)-6B, Table 20.
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TABLE A-2
Los Angeles Metropolitan Region
7. Population and Dwelling Units in Areas of
Population Loss, 1950-1960
Population
1950
Total
Dwelling
Units
1960 1950 1960
Population Per
Dwelling Unit
1950 1960
Central Area
East Area
North East
Area
Total
129,578 92,656 56,896 45, 760
238,653 213,341
162,654 159,044
530,885 465,041
66,641 62,944
57,285 58,070
180,822 166,774
Source: Los Angeles County Regional Planning Commission, based
on data from U. S. Censuses of 1950 and 1960. 1950 dwelling
units from U. S. Census of Housing: 1950; 1960 dwelling units
derived from 1950 data, adding new construction and conver-
sions, subtracting demolitions and mergers through April 1960.
Central statistical area includes the Downtown, University,
and Westlake sections of the City of Los Angeles. East
statistical area includes the Boyle Heights, Central and Whole-
sale Industry sections of the City of Los Angeles, and the
unincorporated areas of Belvedere, City Terrace, and East
Los Angeles in Los Angeles County. North East statistical
area includes the El Sereno, Elysian Park, Highland Park,
Lincoln Heights and Silver Lake (southern part) sections of
the City of Los Angeles.
2.28
3.58
2.84
2.93
2.02
3.39
2.74
2.79
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TABLE A-2
Los Angeles Metropolitan Region
8. Housing Vacancies in Central City
and Metropolitan Area, 1960
Total Non-Seasonal
Housing Units Percent Vacant
Los Angeles-Long Beach
Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area
City of Los Angeles
Remainder of SMSA
2, 358, 405
933, 354
1,425, 051
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Housing: 1960, Advance
Reports, Housing Characteristics: States, HC(A1)-5,
California, Table 1.
9. Central City Housing Utilization, 1950 and 1960
Percent of
Non-Seasonal
Units Vacant
and Available, in
Sound Condition
1950 1960
Number and Percent of
Non-Seasonal Units With
More Than 1 Occupant
Per Room
1950 1960
Number Percent Number Percent
City of Los
Angeles 2.7 4.9 68,822 10.0 72,007
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Housing: 1950, Vol. I,
General Characteristics, Part 1, U. S. Summary,
Tables 27, 29; U. S. Census of Housing: 1960, Advance
Reports, Housing Characteristics: States, HC(A1)-5,
California, Table 1; U. S. Census of Housing: 1960,
Vol. III, City Blocks, Series HC(3), Number 178, Table
Vacant units are those classified as year-round, non-
dilapidated, available for rent, or sale.
8.2
1.
6.1
6.1
6.1
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TABLE A-3
Hartford Metropolitan Region
1. Population Change, 1950-1960
Population
1950
Population
1960
Percent
Change
1950 -1960
Hartford Standard
Metropolitan Statistical
Area
City of Hartford
Remainder of Standard
Metropolitan
Statistical Area
406, 534
1 7 7
, 397
229, 137
2. Racial Components of Change in Central
City Population, 1950-1960
Change in White Population
1950 -1960
Number Percent
- 27,580 -16.8
Change in Nonwhite
Population, 1950-1960
Number Percent
+12, 361 +96. 6
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II,
Characteristics of the Population, Part 7, Connecticut,
Table 33; and U. S. Census of Population: 1960,, General
Population Characteristics, Connecticut, Final Report
PC(1)-8B, Table 20.
525, 207
162,178
+29. 2
- 8.6
363, 029 +58.4
City of
Hartford
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TABLE A-3
Hartford Metropolitan Region
3. Distribution of Negro Population, 1950 and 1960
Total Population
1950 1960
Hartford Standard
Metropolitan
Statistical Area 406, 534 525,207
City of Hartford 177, 397 162,178
Source: U. S. Census of Population:
Negro
1950
14, 233
Population
1960
Percent of
Total Region-
al Negro
Population
1950 1960
28, 689 100.0 100.0
12,654 24, 8 55 88.9 86.6
1950, Vol. II, Characteristics of
the Population, Part 7, Connecticut, Table 34; U. S. Census
of Population: 1960, General Population Characteristics,
Connecticut, Final Report PC(1)-8B, Tables 20, 21. Negro
population of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area unavailable
for 1950; Negro population shown is that of 1950 Standard
Metropolitan Area, which covers all significant centers of
Negro population in the region.
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TABLE A-3
Hartford Metropolitan Region
4. Age. Characteristics and Race, 1950 and 1960
1950.
Percent of
Population
Under 18
Non-
White White
1960
Percent of
Population
Under 18
Non-
White White
1950
Percent of
Population
65 and Over
Non-
White White
1960
Percent of
Population
65 and Over
Non-
White White
Hartford
Standard
Metropolitan
Statistical
Area
City of
Hartford
26.5 32.2 34.9 40.3
23.9 32.6 26.6 42.3
8.5 4.4 9.8 3.9
8.8 4.2 12.3 3.7
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II.,
Characteristics of the Population, Part 7, Connecticut, Table
33; U, S. Census of Population: 1960, General Population
Characteristics, Connecticut, Final Report PC( 1)-8B, Table
20. 1950 information is for Hartford Standard Metropolitan
Area; 1960 information for Hartford Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area, which covers 1950 Standard Metropolitan
Area plus towns of Canton, Cromwell, East Windsor, Enfield,
Suffield, Vernon, and Windsor Locks.
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TABLE A-3
Hartford Metropolitan Region
5. Occupancy Characteristics and Race in Central City, 1960
White Population
Occupied Population
Housing Per Housing
Units Unit
47 783 2.87
Nonwhite
Occupied
Housing
Units
6,852
Population
Population
Per Housing
Unit
3.67
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Housing: 1960, Advance
Reports, Housing Characteristics: States, HC(A1)-7,
Connecticut, Table 1; U. S. Census of Population: 1960,
General Population Characteristics, Connecticut, Final
Report PC(1)-8B, Table 20.
6. Housing Vacancies in Central City
and Metropolitan Area, 1960
Hartford Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Area
City of Hartford
Remainder of SMSA
Total Non-Seasonal
Housing Units
163, 454
57, 545
105, 909
Percent Vacant
3.9
5. 1
3. 3
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Housing: 1960, Advance
Reports, Housing Characteristics: States, HC(A1)-7,
Connecticut, Table 1.
City of
Hartford
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TABLE A-3
Hartford Metropolitan Region
7. Central City Housing Utilization, 1950 and 1960
Percent of
Non-Seasonal
Units Vacant
and Available in
Sound Condition
1950 1960
Number and Percent of
Non-Seasonal Units With
More Than 1 Occupant
Per Room
1950 1960
Number Percent Number Percent
City of
Hartford 1.4 4.1 6, 852 13.4 5, 053 9. 2
Source: Calculated from U. S. Census of Housing: 1950, Vol. I,
General Characteristics, Part 1, U. S. Summary,
Tables 27, 29; U. S. Census of Housing: 1960, Advance
Reports, Housing Characteristics: States, HC(A1)-7,
Connecticut, Table 1; U. S. Census of Housing: 1960,
Vol. I, City Blocks, Series HC(3), Number 96, Table 1.
Vacant units are those classified as year-round, non-dilapi-
dated, available for rent or sale.
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APPENDIX B
RATES OF LAND UTILIZATION FOR NEW MULTIFAMILY
HOUSING IN NEW YORK, LOS ANGELES,- AND HARTFORD
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NEW YORK
We assume that new moderate-priced multifamily housing currently
built in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens constitutes the potential
supply of new private construction that might be attracted into the
central declining areas. The 1951-1960 construction rates in these
boroughs are our basis for estimating land consumption rates. In
Queens, however, the 1951-1955 rate was unusually high because
considerable vacant land was still available at that time. We shall
therefore project the 1956-1960 rate for Queens to a ten-year period,
in order to use data reflecting more typical construction volumes in
built-up areas.
New dwelling units completed in private multifamily structures,
1951-1960 (source: New York Department of City Planning):
Bronx 16, 650
Brooklyn 32,534
Queens 59,340
(1956-60 rate)
Total 108, 524 units
At a typical new development density of 150 dwelling units per net acre,
the 1951-1960 private construction volume in these boroughs would
cover 723.5 acres in 10 years, or 72 acres per year., If developments
in the declining areas follow the somewhat lower densities of urban re-
newal projects, they will be built at about 100 units per acre. At this
density, the 1951-1960 construction volume would use 1, 085. 3 acres
in 10 years, or 109 acres per year.
Public housing built anywhere in the City can conceivably be channeled
into the declining areas as part of a rebuilding program. We shall take
account of public housing construction in Manhattan, the Bronx,
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Brooklyn, and Queens from 1951 to 1960, on the assumption that
a similar volume can be located in declining sections of these
boroughs in future ten-year periods. The City Housing Authority
has announced plans for an accelerated rate of construction, but
we shall assume that the surplus over the 1951-1960 rate will be
located in other parts of the City.
Public housing completions from 1951-1960 were 21, 623 units in
Manhattan, and 48, 683 units in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens
(information from Department of City Planning), Typical densities
for public housing are about 100 units per acre in Manhattan and
75 units per acre in the other boroughs. At these densities, the
10-year volume for Manhattan would utilize 216 acres, and the
volume in the other boroughs would use a total of 649 acres. In all,
public housing would thus require 865 acres, or 87 acres per year.
Private housing at typical densities, plus public housing, would thus
utilize 159 acres per year. Private housing at urban renewal den-
sities plus public housing would use 196 acres per year.
If New York were to clear all the deteriorated housing in its declining
areas, how much land would be available for rebuilding? Deteriorated
housing, as we define it, is not suitable for rehabilitation. In terms
of 1960 Census definitions, we shall count units classified as dilapi-
dated, and units classified as deteriorating but lacking in plumbing
facilities. We thus assume that deteriorating units with all plumbing
facilities can be rehabilitated. On this basis, Manhattan had 80, 358
deteriorated units in 1960, while the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens
had 66, 901.
We estimate average densities of deteriorated housing as 200 units1 A1per acre in Manhattan and 90 per acre in the other boroughs. At
these densities, deteriorated housing would occupy 402 acres in
231.
Manhattan and 743 acres in the other boroughs, for a total of 1, 145
acres.
Private housing at current densities, plus public housing, would
utilize this land at a rate of 159 acres per year. The time required
for absorbing 1, 145 acres would thus be 7. 2 years.
Private housing at urban renewal densities, plus public housing,
would consume land at a rate of 196 acres per year. In this case,
5.5 years would be required to absorb the 1, 145 acres.
We must also take into account the rate at which additional existing
housing will become deteriorated. Changes in enumeration from the
1950 Census to the 1960 Census create some complications in esti-
mating the rate of deterioration for the 1950's. In 1950, housing
condition was classified as either non-dilapidated or dilapidated.
In 1960, a three-way classification was used: sound, deteriorating,
or dilapidated. Although the definition of dilapidated condition did
not change, enumeratbrs seem to have classified many doubtful
cases as deteriorating in 1960, Consequently, the 1960 deteriorating
category includes some housing that was classified as either dilapi-
dated or non-dilapidated in 1950.
To approximate constant definitions of condition, we shall equate
dilapidated housing of 1950 with dilapidated housing of 1960 plus
that portion of 1960 deteriorating housing that is lacking in one or
more plumbing facilities. On this basis, the number of units suitable
for clearance grew by 25, 521 in Manhattan from 1950 to 1960, and by
12, 740 in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens. At densities of 200 per
acre in Manhattan and 90 per acre in the other boroughs, the amount
of land occupied by deteriorated housing grew by 269. 2 acres in ten
years, or 27 acres per year.
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If newly deteriorated. housing is replaced by private development
at current densities, plus public housing, the over-all land utili-
zation rate of 159 acres per year must be reduced by 27 acres
per year to take account of continuing deterioration. The residual
rate of 132 acres per year would absorb the 1, 145 acres of land
occupied by deteriorated housing in 1960 in 8. 5 years.
The higher rate of land utilization resulting from private housing
developed at urban renewal densities, plus public housing, would
have to be reduced from 196 acres per year to 169. At this rate,
the 1, 145 acres of clearance land in 1960 would be absorbed in
6.2 years.
An alternate objective for New York might be to replace all old-law
tenements. These structures were all built prior to 1901, and have
a number of obsolete physical features that make rehabilitation im-
practical, As of 1958, Manhattan and the other three boroughs with
which we are concerned had 387, 954 old-law tenements 2 We esti-
mate the average density of these structures as 250 units per net
acre. At this density, old-law tenements occupied 1, 552 acres in
1958.
At the low rate of rebuilding -- 159 acres per year -- the time re-
quired to absorb these 1, 552 acres would be 9.8 years. At the high
rate -- 196 acres per year - - 7. 9 years would be required.
We may thus summarize the time necessary to rebuild cleared sites
in New York, if all new private multifamily housing is diverted from
the outer boroughs into clearance areas, and if public housing con-
struction at 1951-1960 rates is also located in these areas:
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Time to rebuild all
deteriorated housing,
including future
deterioration
Time to rebuild
all old-law
tenements
Low rate of land utilization
(private plus public housing,
private at current densities)
High rate of land utilization
(private plus public housing,
private at urban renewal
densities)
8.5 years
6.2 years
9.8 years
7.9 years
LOS ANGELES
We assume that new private housing currently built in the older areas
within ten miles of downtown Los Angeles constitutes the development
that could conceivably be attracted into the declining areas, which also
lie within this ten-mile band. From 1950 to 1960, the net increase
within this zone was 98, 042 multifamily dwelling units (source: Los
Angeles County Regional Planning Commission, net increases for
35 statistical areas within the County). Total new construction was
probably greater, since some units were lost to highway construction,
but we shall accept this figure.
At the typical construction density of 50 units per acre for this part
of the City, new building would absorb 1, 961 acres in 10 years, or
196 acres per year.
According to the 1960 Housing Census, the City of Los Angeles had
24,800 housing units that were either dilapidated or deteriorating
and lacking in plumbing facilities. The rate of increase of deteriora-
tion was negligible from 1950 to 1960, in terms of the basis for com-
parison that we have already explained for New York. For the near
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future, at least, we may confine our attention to the housing that is
already deteriorated. At typical densities of eight to ten units per
acre for old housing, the 24,800 deteriorated units occupied approx-
imately 2, 755 acres in 1960.
With new private housing utilizing 196 acres per year, and with no
public housing construction program under way, the total time re-
quired for rebuilding 2, 755 acres of cleared land would be 14. 0
years.
HARTFORD
On the basis of a housing market study of Hartford 3 and our own
projections, we estimate the potential demand for multifamily
housing within the central Hartford area as 2,, 500 units in ten years.
At the typical current density of 50 units per acre in central locations,
this volume of new development would utilize 50 acres in 10 years, or
5 acres per year. If the density is reduced to 35 units per acre, the
land consumption rate will be 71.4 acres in 10 years, or 7. 1 acres
per year.
According to the 1960 Housing Census, the City of Hartford had 3, 235
housing units that were either dilapidated or deteriorating and lacking
in plumbing facilities. We estimate the average density of this old
housing as 15 to 20 units per acre. Thus the deteriorated units occupy
about 185 acres.
At the low rate of land consumption (5 acres per year), 36 years would
be required to rebuild these 185 acres; at the higher rate of 7. 1 acres
per year, 26. 1 years would be required.
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From 1950 to 1960, the amount of deteriorated housing in Hartford
increased by 1, 126 units. At a density of 15 to 20 units per acre,
this increase would represent an increment of 66 acres in 10 years,
or 6.6 acres per year.
If this rate of deterioration continues, the low land utilization rate
of 5 acres per year would not even permit rebuilding to keep pace
with the spread of deterioration. At the high rate of 7.1 acres per
year, all but one-half acre per year would have to be devoted to
coping with the increase in deterioration,
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FOOTNOTES
1. See City of New York Department of City Planning Newsletter,
January 1958, p. 4, for the range of residential densities
within the different boroughs as of 1955-56. A study of
renewal prospects for part of the West Side of Manhattan
gives information on densities for different types of
structures within the area; these structural types are also
to be found at similar densities in deteriorated areas else-
where in New York. The average density for walk-up
tenements (primarily old-law tenements built prior to 1901)
is 240 dwelling units per net acre. For all brownstone
structures, including those converted to rooming houses,
the average density is 224 dwelling units per net acre.
For brownstones that have not been converted to rooming
houses -- a housing type more representative of the outer
boroughs -- the average density is 139 dwelling units per
net acre in the West Side study area.
Source: New York City Planning Commission, Urban
Renewal: A Report on the West Side Urban Renewal Study
to Mayor Robert F. Wagner and the Board of Estimate of
the City of New York, and to the Urban Renewal Administra-
tion, New York, 1958.
2. City of New York Department of City Planning Newsletter,
October 1958, p. 1. The average density of all old-law
tenements reported in the West Side renewal study is 246
units per net acre; those used for single-room occupancy
had an average density of 619 units per acre. A study by
the Regional Plan Association lists densities of 350 to 400
units per acre as typical for old-law tenements: Regional
Plan Association, Bulletin Number 87, "People, Jobs and
Land in the New Jersey-New York-Connecticut Metropolitan
Region 1955-1975, " June 1957, p. 38.
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3. Real Estate Research Corporation, Rental Housing Market
Analysis: Downtown Hartford, prepared for Department of
Housing, City of Hartford, 1959.
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APPENDIX C
URBAN STRUCTURE AND THE LOCATION OF NEW HOUSING:
A REVIEW OF THEORETICAL WORKS
239.
Studies of urban economics and city form have advanced many
theoretical statements seeking to explain the location of urban
activities. Theoretical approaches have long recognized accessi-
bility as a factor influencing both the location of new housing and
the land rent of different sites for residential use. We shall
examine several theories based primarily on accessibility, as
well as two comprehensive models of the urban land market that
relate accessibility to other factors shaping the residential pattern,
We shall also review studies that have identified changing urban
patterns and dynamic characteristics of urban structure, with
particular emphasis on the shifting residential patterns that have
created the areas of residential decline in the centers of growing
regions. Our purpose is to identify the major structural features
underpinning the pattern of housing locations, and to observe their
role in forming the areas of decline.
Accessibility and the Location of New Housing
Urban growth in the nineteenth century was a favorable setting in
which to view the effects of accessibility on housing locations.
Successive changes in transportation systems, from the horse-car
to the electric transit line, extended the area within commuting
range of the centerby a series of finite jumps. Homer Hoyt analyzed
the significance of these transportation changes for the development
of Chicago:
The time and expense required to go from the center of
the city outward or upward, and not physical extension,
determines the effective supply of urban land,
.. . Accessible building space in Chicago in 1833
was the ground and the layer of air above the ground to
a height of about 50 feet, within walking distance over
dirt roads to the main channel of the Chicago River.
Outward extension began with plank roads and street
railway lines. Omnibuses and horse cars which traveled
at a rate of 6 miles an hour instead of a walking pace of
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3 miles an hour doubled the radius of settlement.
Cable cars in the eighties, with a speed of 12 miles
an hour, doubled the radius again along trunk lines.
Suburban steam railroads and elevated electric lines,
traveling at from 25 to 30 miles an hour, again doubled
the radius of settlement along their routes. 1
Transportation improvements had observable effects on both the con-
figuration of the city and the density of settlement at different distances
from the center. As Hoyt noted in a subsequent study of American
urban growth, most cities had a compact circular form before 1880,
when stagecoaches and horse-car lines were the chief means of internal
transportation2 Central preferences were strong during this period,
and the housing market was confined to a small area surrounding the
core. With the coming of cable-cars, elevated steam railways, and
electric surface transit, axial growth extended out from the previously
developed area in bands along the new transit lines. Before 1880, ur-
ban growth meant substantial increases in density in the central area,
with only limited growth at the periphery. Subsequently, densities
rose more slowly near the core (in part because business development
replaced residences), and at an accelerated rate farther away, while
the limits of settlement pushed out to new locations. Figure C-1 illus-
trates population densities by one-mile zones from the center of
Chicago for 1860, 1880, and 1900.
Hoyt's analyses focus on the center of the city as the destination most
influential in shaping the housing pattern. Economic activity was of
course highly centralized in the nineteenth century city, but even at
that time the core was not the sole location of jobs or of retail activity.
Hoyt assumes the dominance of downtown as an employment center:
"The practical limit to the supply of urban land is set . . by the amount
which is accessible to people working at a certain strategic spot." 3
The center has become increasingly less strategic in most American
cities. Hoyt's view of accessibility as a factor shaping the housing
market is widely accepted, but the extent to which recent trends have
Population/sq. mile
60,000,
50,000-
40,000-
1880
30,000-
20,000-
10,000-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Miles from center
FIGURE C - 1
Population density by distance from center of Chicago, 1860-1900
Source: Hoyt, One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago, p. 484.
Population increase 1860-1880: 394,092; 1880-1900: 1,195,277.
242.
diluted the significance of access to the center is largely unknown.
Recent analyses of density as a function of distance from the core
confirm that the center is still a powerful organizing force in the
housing market, but its potency varies significantly in different
4
cities Instead of assuming the dominance of the center, we have
used the extent of employment concentration in the core as a vari-
able in our research, By analyzing cities with contrasting degrees
of core employment concentration, we have been able to determine
the importance of access to the center under conditions of dispersed
as well as centrallied job locations.
Accessibility and Land Value
Theories of. land rent also recognize the significance of accessibility
to the center. Richard M. Hurd adapted the agricultural theories of
Ricardo to urban land, attributing land values to differences in
accessibility between sites at the margin of settlement and those more
favorable located:
The dependence of value in land on economic rent is
clearly seen in the origin of any city, utility in land
arising when the first buildings are erected, but not
value in land, as is evidenced by the fact that the first
settlers are commonly allowed to build their houses wher-
ever they please and enclose whatever land they need, as
occurred in New York and many other cities. As a city
grows, more remote and hence inferior locations must be
utilized and the difference in desirability between the two
grades produces economic rent in locations of thd first
grade, but not in those of the second. As land of a still
more remote and inferior grade comes into use, ground
rent is forced still higher in land of the first grade, rises
in land of the second grade, but not in the third grade,
and so on. 5
In Hurd's formulation, accessibility affects rents only in so far as dif-
ferent sites offer different degrees of access to the center, with the
most remote settled areas constituting the base for his scheme of land
values. Thus, given a site with some particular degree of accessi-
bility, we cannot determine anything about its value unless we know
how it compares in accessibility with other sites in the same urban
243.
area. Access advantages rather than access characteristics per se
are the basis of land values according to this hypothesis. While
empirical testing is difficult, some confirmation is available in Hoyt's
description of the early rise in central land values when Chicago's
peripheral growth began in the 1830's. 6
Later theories of land value incorporate Hurd's insights into the
significance of access differences for the land market, while refining
the concept of accessibility. In the work of R. M. Haig, land values
reflect savings in transportation costs:
The term accessibility ... really means ease of con-
tact' - -contact with relatively little friction. The
friction of space may be overcome by means of transpor-
tation; but transportation involves costs. Rent appears
as the charge which the owner of a relatively accessible
site can impose because of the saving in transportation
costs which the use of his site makes possible. The ac-
tivities which can "stand" high rents are those in which
large savings in transportation costs may be realized by
locating on central sites where accessibility is great.
The complementary character of these two things--site
rents and transportation costs -- is imperfectly recog-
nized....
.&. Site rents and transportation costs are vitally
connected through their relationship to the friction of
space. Transportation is the means of reducing that
friction, at the cost of time and money. Site rentals
are charges which can be made for sites where accessi-
bility may be had with comparatively low transportation
costs. While transportation overcomes friction, site
rentals plus transportation cos s represent the social
cost of what friction remains.
Here, too, relative accessibility is the key to rent levels. Site rents
reflect cost savings in comparison with alternate locations. In evalu-
ating the desirability of central locations for new housing, Haig would
take account of other possible sites and their access characteristics.
A location fifteen minutes from the core of a large metropolitan re-
gion may offer time savings of thirty minutes in comparison with
alternate sites on open land at the fringe of the developed area. In a
smaller region, sites fifteen minutes from the core may be in
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competition with open land only five or ten minutes farther away. If
Hurd and Haig are correct, the size of the region, or the distance
(or travel-time) from the core to the nearest large supply of vacant
land, will have great significance in determining the attractiveness
of inner sites for new housing. To test the applicability of this
theory, we have analyzed regions that differ in size, using distance
from the core to vacant land as one of our variables in urban struc-
ture.
Subjective Evaluation of Accessibility
In Haig's writings, the costs of overcoming friction are largely an
objective matter of the time and expense necessary to go from one
place to another. Thus improvements in the transportation system
reduce the costs of overcoming friction by shortening travel time
and reducing financial expenses for the consumer. But subjective
elements also enter into the costs of friction, as Haig points out in
his discussion of accessibility as a factor in the housing market:
If the economic activity seeking a site happens to be
housing, is not the problem worked out in this fash-
ion? In choosing a residence purely as a consumption
proposition, one buys accessibility precisely as one
buys clothes or food. He considers how much he wants
the contacts furnished by the central location, weighing
the "costs of friction" involved -- the various possible
combinations of site rent, time value, and transportation
costs: he compares this want with his other desires and
resources, and he fits it into his scale of consumption,
and buys.8
Haig's intellectual successors in the literature of urban location theory
have developed the subjective element still more explicitly. Ratcliff
points out the element of personal evaluation that determines the sig-
nificance of objective access characteristics in shaping a structure
of land values:
Space costs are inherent in our physical world. This
disutility of distance is the joint product of the ac-
tivities involved, the distance, the available means of
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overcoming the distance, and the importance of the con-
tact to the persons or activity concerned. No matter
why people want to be near something or somebody, their
preference is expressed in terms of value and becomes
an economic force. 9
Walter Firey has interpreted land use patterns in Boston by referring
the evaluation of accessibility not merely to personal preferences, but
to social systems and their cultural origin. In Firey's interpretation,
"the very impeditiveness of space itself does not reside in it as a
physical phenomenon but rather in the costfulness which it imposes
upon social systems that have to deal with it." Since social systems
reflect cultural values, Firey sees the cultural component, as central
to locational processes. In terms of this cultural component, "land
gains its impeditive character, by which particular social systems
cannot function unless they find suitable locations. " 10
The personal value of accessibility to consumers is one of the main
topics of this study. By observing housing patterns against a back-
ground of contrasting metropolitan structures, we have attempted to
learn how the value of accessibility differs in response to structural
factors. At the same time, we must recognize that the physical
characteristics of the region do not account entirely for the patterns
that emerge, and that a different population within the region might
respond differently to the same structural features. Our findings
can be applied to other regions only with considerable caution, but
the analytical technique should be applicable without major modifica-
tion, and the results can serve as guidelines covering the general
scope and direction of structural effects on locational preferences for
new housing.
Access Requirements as Part of a Movement System
In the work of Mitchell and Rapkin, 11 communication requirements
between different activities form the basis of locational patterns with-
in urban regions, but their requirements are more complex than a
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need for access to a single destination. Each activity has a "packet
of movement systems" associated with it. If the activity is a resi-
dence, it serves as the base for many trips. To understand the
choice of a residential location, we need to know the destinations
of all these trips. If they are scattered, accessibility cannot be
achieved by spatial proximity, but must result from a location offer-
ing good transportation to many dispersed places. Trips to shopping,
to entertainment, to schools., and to jobs are all part of the movement
system for a family. Housing locations thus reflect a need for access
to a variety of destinations, rather than access to the downtown core
alone.
This viewpoint provides an approach to analysis, rather than a theore-
tical model that would explain how a particular location is chosen when
the objective is to have access to many activities. One useful part of
the approach, the concept of linkage, offers some insight into the re-
solution of varying access needs. For certain types of movements,
physical proximity is required. A linkage is a relationship between
activities characterized by frequent interaction requiring proximity
in space. Mitchell and Rapkin illustrate linkages between business
establishments, but the concept would be applicable to a home-school
relationship for young children. Where such linkages exist, the
locational chbice will be near linked activities, but need not be near
other activities where access requirements can be met without proxim-
ity.
Mitchell and Rapkin go beyond a static approach to consider the role of
movement in changing the locational pattern of activities. Here again
we have only a framework for investigation, but several points are use -
ful for understanding changing residential patterns. Changes in the
internal structure of an establishment alter its movement requirements.
In the case of a family, movement requirements that 'correspond to the
ages of its members will presumably have much to do with changes in
location over time.
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Still other ways in which movement requirements bring about new
locational choices are through shifts in the location of trip destina-
tions, and changes in the street system and other movement channels.
The dispersal of employment from the core, and the development of
new highways are obvious illustrations of the ways in which these
factors have altered movement requirements and have contributed to
the outward spread of housing in recent years.
Mitchell and Rapkin treat the subject of access requirements in con-
siderable depth, and go far beyond earlier analysts in suggesting
approaches to the dynamics of locational change. Nevertheless, they
continue to focus on accessibility needs as the major consideration
influencing locational choices.
Density and Access in Locational Models
Two recent works, in contrast, view the process of locational choice
as a balancing of access requirements and the demand for space.
These works present comprehensive (though static) theoretical models
of locational forces in the urban land market, drawing elements from
earlier writings but combining them more systematically.
William Alonso has devised a model covering both business and resi-
dential locations. 12 The driving force in his residential theory is the
individual consumer's weighing of commuting costs against the ad-
vantages of cheaper land. By assumption, all employment is located
in the center of the city, where land costs are highest. When a con-
sumer considers different locations, he realizes that commuting costs
(in time and money) increase as he moves away from the center. To
prepare a series of alternatives that will each yield him equal satis-
faction, he decides by how much the price of land must be reduced as
he moves away from the center, in order to compensate him for the
extra commuting cost. In making this decision, he considers commuting
costs in subjective terms and decides on appropriate land price reduc-
tions in terms of how much satisfaction he derives from buying a larger
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site to redress the increased commuting cost.
By means of this evaluation of alternate satisfactions, the consumer
develops a schedule of prices that he will bid for land at different
distances from the center to maintain the same level of satisfaction
at all locations. An individual will have a series of these "bid rent
curves" corresponding to different levels of satisfaction. For any
given price level of land, the consumer will choose the location
that places him on his curve of highest satisfaction. Individual
points of equilibrium are found by a method adapted from the standard
solution of consumer equilibrium in economics; market equilibrium
involves the simultaneous determination of locations, densities, and
land prices by a process of iteration starting with an assumed land
price at the center.
Assumptions underlying the determination of bid rent curves are
significant. Land and accessibility are both positive goods in the
housing market; consumers are assumed to want both central loca-
tions and large lots, although individuals each make their own evalua-
tion of these two goods and may want them in different proportions.
Empirical evidence in the New York Metropolitan Region Study is
consistent with these assumptions in suggesting that accessibility
and land area per dwelling unit are substitutes, with reductions in
one balanced by gains in the other. Hoover and Vernon have analyzed
net residential density, median income, and access time to central
Manhattan for a group of communities in the rapidly growing suburban
area around New York City. For any given level of median income,
communities with better access have higher residential densities (i. e.,
less residential land per dwelling unit). For any given degree of
access, communities with higher median incomes have lower densities,
And for any given level of density, communities with higher median
incomes tend to have better access. Higher incomes thus appear to
buy more land per dwelling unit and better access, but they buy each
at a sacrifice of the other. 13
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In our analysis of housing patterns, we have considered land area
per dwelling unit as a substitute for accessibility, so that high den-
sities constitute a sacrifice that the consumer accepts for the sake
of access advantages. Consumer acceptance of higher densities in
central locations than in outlying sites is evidence of central pref--
erences in the housing market, according to this view. We have
gauged central preferences by more obvious indicators, as well:
higher rents and lower vacancy rates in central areas. Determining
the extent to which high densities, high rents, and low vacancy rates
are found simultaneously in highly accessible sites helps test the
relationships that Alonso assumes between density and accessibility.
Transportation Advantage and Position Rent
The recent work of Lowdon Wingo, Jr. 1 resembles Alonso's model
in many ways, but calls attention to several other structural features
that are assumed to influence the location of new housing. Wingo's
model involves only residential land, and relies on the journey to
work as the basic organizing force. Commuting costs depend upon
the organization and technology of transportation, as modified by the
individual's own valuation of leisure time lost while traveling to work.
These costs of transportation establish a structure of "position rents,"
which reflect savings in travel time and cost:
Position rent is simply the economic advantage in trans -
portation costs of any location with respect to the most
disadvantaged position occupied, that is, the maximum
amount that a user would be willing to pay rather than
occupy the marginal location. 15
Different levels of position rent imply different amounts of land area
per dwelling unit. Assuming that ground space has diminishing mar-
ginal utility for the individual, Wingo postulates that the greater the
position rent, the less space will be used. Each household has its
own valuation of residential land space, as in Alonso's model, al-
though in this case the demand schedule for space is independent of
location. The household chooses its optimum location as follows:
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As it moves toward the employment site, position rent
increases and transportation costs decrease until it
finds a position in which the marginal saving in trans -
portation costs is just equal to the marginal value of
the residential space given up. Through this process
of substituting transportation costs f~r space costs,
locational equilibrium is achieved.
The mechanism for finding optimal locations is similar to Alonsots,
and Wingo also assumes a substitution effect between accessibility
and land area.
Wingo's model recognizes the significance of two metropolitan char-
acteristics that we take as variables in our analysis. Following
Hurd, he uses the location of the outer margin of settlement as a
determinant of access advantages, and of rental values based on
these advantages, at more central locations. Wingo is careful to
stipulate that access advantages and rent structures are modified
by the consumer's subjective evaluation of the costs of travel.
In the simplest version of Wingo's model, all employment is located
at the center. This simplifying assumption is later relaxed, and
Wingo demonstrates a method for taking non-central employment
locations into account. - The effects of a secondary employment node
are a reduction of densities and land values near the center of the
region, a rise near the new employment node, and an outward shift
of the margin of settlement. These conclusions are consistent with
our findings in regions with different internal distributions of employ-
ment.
Scope of This Study
Both these models, and indeed almost all the literature that we have
reviewed, focus on employment location and the journey to work as
basic organizers of the housing pattern. The more advanced theories
recognize subjective and social factors as they affect consumers'
evaluations of travel costs and land area requirements. These factors
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are incorporated into the theory by means of individual preference
schedules; the models assume little about the nature of these pref-
erence schedules other than that access and land area are substi-
tutes for one another, and that both follow the principle of diminishing
marginal utility.
Although the journey to work is unquestionably an important market
factor, other significant forces also shape the housing pattern.
Wingo acknowledges the likely importance of prestige and culture
group associations, variations in the quality of local services, and
other considerations. He suggests that complex substitution effects
may take place among these factors: households may sacrifice
nearness to employment for prestige locations, or may pay higher
rent to be near a good school. Firey's work and several other
studies consider these influences, but most of the theoretical litera-
ture that we have reviewed excludes them, concentrating instead on
variables related to the journey to work and the demand for ground
space. Wingo notes that the patterns that emerge from the operations
of these few variables would be optimal only if othet features were
either generally distributed or had little influence in individual de-
cisions.
To what extent should we recognize such considerations as neighbor-
hood prestige and the quality of local service when we analyze locational
preferences for new housing? Our objective has been to study the
feasibility of developing new housing as part of a program to rebuild
older neighborhoods. Where rebuilding programs are contemplated,
many physical characteristics of a neighborhood, and its level of ser-
vices, are subject to extensive manipulation. It has appeared useful,
therefore, to treat these aspects of the local environment as elements
that a renewal program can direct satisfactorily so that social and
cultural considerations will not obstruct rebuilding. The location of
employment, the access characteristics of an area, and its relation-
ship to the outer margin of settlement cannot be controlled as directly,
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although they can be affected by public policy over a period of
time. We have chosen to regard these structural factors as
exogeneous "givens" in our problem. The question is then one
of determinirig the degree to which these structural characteris-
tics promote or hinder the rebuilding of the declining areas in
view of the tastes and preferences of the existing population of the
region, with the government assumed to have adequate power for
reshaping the local environment satisfactorily.
Our inquiry thus follows the general lines of previous theoretical
studies. Following Mitchell and Rapkin, we have extended the
concept of accessibility to cover more than the journey to work.
To do so, we have considered not only the proportion of regional
employment located in the core, but also the proportion of retail,
entertainment, and cultural facilities. For our purposes, the
regional distribution of these facilities constitutes another given
aspect of urban structure.
Changing Urban Patterns and the Problem of Declining Areas
Recent patterns of urban growth have called increasing attention to
problems of blight and decline in the older parts of cities. In the
nineteenth century, urban growth typically meant an increase in
population and density throughout the region, with old central areas
converted to more intensive uses partly through rebuilding at higher
densities. More recently, new construction has bypassed inlying
sites in favor of peripheral locations, leaving the older areas to de-
cline in population and density. A number of studies have given
special attention to the increasing abandonment of these older areas,
and to the factors that inhibit their rebuilding as modern residential
neighborhoods.
Homer Hoyt observed the shifting patterns of population and land
value that marked the decline of Chicago's blighted areas before 1930.
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Population in the zone within two miles of the center grew, but at
a decreasing rate, until 1910; from 1910 to 1930, it declined.
Population in the zone two to four miles from the center rose until
1910, held steady until 1920, and then declined. 17 These changes
were reflected in population density:
The population of Chicago was at first concentrated
near the center of the city and the density curve re-
sembled a cone with the sides sloping sharply down-
ward. As population increased and transportation
facilities improved, the base of this cone widened and
the rate of most rapid population increase passed to
successive belts of land, each one in turn farther from
the main business district. After 1870 the height of
the population pyramid rose only slowly but the base
widened rapidly. In the twentieth century the number
of people living within the areas that once contained
the entire city stopped advancing and began to decline.
, A large crater has appeared near the heart of
the city .... 18
Land values followed the density pattern; Hoyt takes note of "a valley
in the land-value curve between the Loop and the outer residential
areas. " 19 The Loop itself is not part of this picture of decline,
however. New construction added a significant amount of floor space
to the central business district in the 1920's, and land values rose
steadily, although at a lower rate than the rise in total Chicago land
values. Thus Chicago in 1933 consisted of live areas in the core and
at the fringe, with a declining intermediate area:
The heart wood of the organic Chicago is constantly
replacing old tissues with new ones, in marked con-
trast with the static condition of the belt of dead wood
around the Loop known as the "blighted area" which
has ceased to grow. 20
Studies of other regions have documented similar shifts in population
distribution. Hans Blumenfeld has described the phenomenon that
Hoyt noted -- that the zone of most rapid population increase moves
steadily outward from the core -- as "the tidal wave of metropolitan
expansion." 21 Blumenfeld's historical analysis of Philadelphia
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illustrates not only the tidal wave effect, but also the static or de-
clining condition of areas between the core and the wave of expansion.
Contrast the growth pattern of 19th century Chicago (Figure C-1)
with the pattern of 20th century Philadelphia in Figure C-2. Even
after the transit improvements of the 1880's enabled Chicago to
burst its earlier commuting-time boundaries, densities continued
to increase substantially in all central areas except the core itself
(0-1 mile zone), where business expansion helped push out resi-
dences. Except for this innermost zone, the Chicago density
gradient sloped steeply upward toward the core in 1900, much as
in 1880.
In Philadelphia, growth from 1900 to 1920 followed the earlier Chicago
pattern, with density decreasing only in the innermost zone and in-
creasing substantially in other zones near the center. From 1920 to
1940, a new pattern emerged, producing sharp cutbacks in density
through the 2-3 mile zone, a point of stability in the 3-4 mile zone,
and large increases in density spread over the suburban rings starting
4-5 miles from the center. The wartime period of 1940-1950 saw
density gains throughout the region, but their magnitude was negligible
in most inner zones and the most noticeable upward shifts were once
again in the areas more than 5 miles from the core, During this 50-
year period, the zone with the greatest percentage increase in popula-
tion shifted from the 4-5 mile zone from 1900-1910 to the 7-8 mile
zone in 1940-1950, moving outward at an average speed of one mile
per decade.
The New York Metropolitan Region Study also confirms both the tidal
wave pattern and the static or declining character of zones close to
the core of the region, Hoover and Vernon modify the growth wave
concept to take account of two different and widely separated rings of
growth, one marked by single -family construction in the suburbs and
the other by apartment development closer to the center. 22 Although
the wave of apartment construction has injected new life into older
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FIGURE C - 2
Population density by distance from center of Philadelphia, 1900-1950
Source: Hans Blumenfeld, "The Tidal Wave of Metropolitan Expansion," Table 6, p. 14.
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parts of the New York region, density trends approximate those of
modern Chicago and Philadelphia. Figure C-3 depicts population
densities in 1920, 1940, and 1955, for the suburban New York re-
gion (excluding New York City and Nassau County). This plotting
of density against travel time to the core via commuter railroad
constitutes a good base for historical comparison, since the travel
times have remained relatively constant since 1920. Nevertheless,
the pull of the center has evidently weakened, particularly since
1940. From 1940 to 1955, population dropped slightly in the nearest
time-zone, increased slightly in the next zones, and registered
greatest gains in zones far removed from the center. Thus the
density curve flattened noticeably from 1940 to 1955. If New York
City has been included in this sample, the density curve would have
flattened still more strikingly, since the City lost population after
1950.
Other analyses of population distribution within metropolitan regions
furnish additional evidence that growth now takes place mainly in
outlying locations, while central areas remain static or actually de-
cline. 23 What does this new growth pattern mean? Clearly, the
tidal wave effect does not reflect merely the filling of inner ares to
some standard capacity and the overflow of excess population into
successively more distant rings. Some of the central locations that
we have examined have relatively-low densities. The first time zone
in the New York suburban sample shown in Figure C-3 had a density
of about 1, 500 persons per square mile in 1940, and yet failed to grow
in the next fifteen years. In contrast, parts of Chicago with densities
of 20, 000 per square mile in 1880 filled to a density of more than
40, 000.per square mile in 1900. Since 1950, central areas have not
merely been bypassed by new growth: nine of the ten largest cities
in 1950 lost population from 1950 to 1960, while their metropolitan
areas expanded 24
Persons per square mile
(ratio scale)
9 0 n
1,000
8oo
600
500
400
300
200
t00
80
60
50
40
30
20
* Each
additional
2 3 4 5 6 7
Travel-time zone*
additional time zone after the first represents about 15 minutes
travel time.
FIGURE C - 3
Relation between population density and approximate travel time
to Manhattan, New York metropolitan region, 1920, 1940, 1955
(New York City and Nassau County excluded)
Source: Hoover and Vernon, Anatomy of a Metropolis, Chart 14, p. 186.
257
.195
- - --
- --
- - -
- -. -%%\ ~ 15
S 1940
- - -
-
\.....194 -
e n
258.
This evidence points consistently in one direction: central locations
are less preferred for housing now than they were fifty years ago.
The distribution of population within a region'reflects a complex
interaction of many factors; but the desire for central location, which
is one of these factors, has evidently become less important in rela-
tion to other considerations.
Reasons for the Population Shift
What are some of these other considerations? Studies of housing
patterns take several different approaches. Hoyt explains the abandon-
ment of central Chicago as a combination of objectionable social and
physical conditions in the center and the pull of new housing and new
facilities in outlying areas. The old housing of central Chicago be-
came a magnet for socially marginal occupants: racial and ethnic
minorities, criminal elements. The presence of these groups stimu-
lated old American residents nearby to look elsewhere for housing.
Improved transportation facilities made new neighborhoods practical
on the outer: edge of the city, and the new developments had pulling
power of their own:
The attractions of modern buildings and of motion-pic-
ture places, banks, and chain stores in these newly
settled communities were the centrifugal forces that
whirled people from their old abodes into the new bright-
light areas. In their wake, between the Loop and the new
sections were left the "blighted areas." 2 5
At the same time, new immigration from Europe dropped sharply, and
few newcomers appeared in the city to take up vacancies in the center.
As of 1933, Hoyt saw little demand for the blighted areas for any pur-
pose.
The literature describing recent urban change is filled with plausible
explanations for the rapid suburban growth since World War II. 26
Widespread automobile ownership and the construction of modern high-
way networks are often singled out for special emphasis. Auto
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transportation for workers and truck transport for freight freed
many industries from central locations and enabled them to build
expansive horizontal plants on outlying sites. As work places de-
centralized, suburban homes were able to offer increasingly good
access to jobs. With the general shift to the automobile, proximity
to public transportation has become less important even for resi-
dents who require access to downtown: new highways have opened
up huge areas of accessible and inexpensive land for housing develop-
ment. Retail outlets have followed residences but to the suburbs;
the large new suburban market has been able to support impressive
shopping concentrations within short driving times of residential
areas. All these developments, plus easy financing for home pur-
chases, have made suburban living feasible for large numbers of
families. The low-density suburban environment in itself has been
a great attraction to families with increasing leisure time and with
young children.
On the basis of a study of current housing patterns in Philadelphia,
Rapkin and Grigsby suggest that the attraction of low-density living
is a particularly strong factor influencing the housing choices of
families with children, and that the attraction is to single-family
houses specifically rather than merely to a suburban environment.
Surveys 'f households in outlying elevator apartment houses, located
near excellent school facilities, revealed as low a proportion of
families with children as in new apartment houses in central Phila-
delphia. 27 A different survey of 300 households living in high-rent
units in the centers of New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago corro-
borates the rejection of apartment living by families with children:
only one-fifth of the households consisted of husband and wife with
minor children, although close to half of all nonfarm households in
the United States are in this category. 28
The limited appeal of apartment living for families with children has
several implications for the declining areas. To the extent that the
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rejection of apartment units is a new development, it constitutes one
force promoting population decline in central locations. But families
with children carry particularly heavy weight in population totals.
If departing families with children are replaced by childless couples
or single adults, total population will decline even though the stock
of housing may be fully utilized. In our case studies, we have there-
fore looked into changes in household size and housing utilization in
order to determine what is happening to the demand for housing in the
declining areas.
The Alternatives: Peripheral Growth or Redevelopment
In the preceding discussion, we have adopted the viewpoint of the
housing consumer in an attempt to understand how the declining areas
have reached their present condition. Another useful perspective is
that of the housing producer and the market within which he operates.
At all stages in the growth of a metropolitan area, developers can
build new housing on vacant fringe land or in already built-up areas.
In the latter case, they may be able to build on remaining vacant lots
or, more typically, they will have to assemble building sites by de-
molishing existing structures. Peripheral growth, rather than
redevelopment, has accounted for most of the growth in the housing
supply of metropolitan areas in the last few decades. If the declining
areas are to be rebuilt for residential use, the task of the next decades
is to divert a larger proportion of new housing construction from
peripheral growth to redevelopment.
Studies of urban housing patterns contain a number of interesting views
on the prospects of redevelopment as an alternative to peripheral growth.
Hoyt's works in the 1930's view redevelopment in terms of the private
developer operating without special government assistance. Within this
framework the greatest obstacles to redevelopment arise from the small
scale at which the individual developer operates, and his difficulties in
assembling large sites. Hoyt maintains that obsolete surroundings and
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diversified ownership of land in the blighted areas together keep out-
new housing. Only high-grade apartment developments generate
rental returns sufficient to pay the cost of acquiring existing buildings,
but potential occupants who can afford the necessary rents will object
to living among obsolete surroundings. If the developer could clear
a sufficiently large area, he could provide a totally new environment,
but diversified land ownership makes the assembly of large tracts
difficult and costly. Hoyt notes that redevelopment is occasionally
feasible, if existing structures are flimsy or scattered, and if land
is cheap and easily assembled. In raire circumstances., developers
can build apartment houses in obsolete surroundings:
Such apartments can rise even in the midst of a poor
area because the tall building itself, rising from humble
surroundings like a feudal castle above the mud huts of
the villeins, is a barrier against intrusion. 29
Since the 1930's, the idea of government participation in redevelopment
has become increasingly accepted. With the exercise of eminent domain
to condemn blighted areas, large sites can be assembled in spite of
diversified ownership, and the economic effect of hold-outs can be mini-
mized. At first, several state programs authorized public acquisition
of land for rebuilding; since the Housing Act of 1949, federal subsidies
have been available to bring site acquisition costs down to feasible re-
sale prices for new building sites.
This growing appreciation of the role of government participation is
evident in Walter Firey's 1947 analysis of land use changes in central
Boston. One of Firey's main purposes is to demonstrate the signifi-
cance of non-economic factors in shaping urban development. The
history of Boston includes one successful case of renewing an old
area that had begun to decline. The revival of Beacon Hill involved
primarily the rebuilding of old structures rather than clearance and
redevelopment, but Firey considers the method of renewing Beacon
Hill applicable to areas requiring redevelopment, as well. This
method relied heavily on the intervention of governmental measures
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to block commercial and apartment construction from filtering
into the neighborhood. Protective zoning, consisting of a low
height limit and restriction to exclusively residential use, pre -
served the existing structures and enabled priEate developers to
buy them at reasonable prices for rehabilitation.
Firey's contribution to this discussion is his recognition of the
role of public measures in promoting the rebuilding of -older
areas. Unlike Hoyt, he sees good future prospects for redevelop-
ment through official promotion of redevelopment corporations,
and through aid in the form of assessment and tax adjustments as
well as zoning regulations. The most promising basis for stimu-
lating housing demand in central Boston, according to Firey, is
the symbolic value of its historic buildings and monuments. Firey
holds that, with government assistance, developers can capitalize
on the symbolic associations of sites in the older areas of Boston
by locating new housing there.
Limits of Peripheral Growth
Subsequent analyses generally accept the idea of government assist-
ance in redevelopment, but few regard historic sites as a significant
basis for renewing older areas, largely because the supply of historic
sites falls far short of the supply of deteriorated districts in American
cities. Two recent works suggest that the outward push of peripheral
growth will set up pressures for redevelopment in central areas and
thus act as an equilibrating mechanism. Hoyt points out in a 1958
article that the spread of single-family homebuilding has created a
situation in which home buyers must travel farther and farther out
each year to find a-new house. Despite the construction of new high-
ways, travel times between vacant land and the core lengthen as
vacant land becomes more remote. In Hoyt's view, travel time to the
core has once again become a significant factor promoting central
redevelopment rather than peripheral growth. Many families,
263.
particularly those without children or with pre-school children, are
willing to live in apartment houses in order to save travel time be-
tween home and work. Apartment rentals generate sufficient income
so that the builder can afford to pay from $2 to $5 a square foot for
his site, a price that enables him to clear obsolete one-family
structures. 30
The authors of Housing Choices and Housing Constraints also regard
peripheral growth as a self-correcting mechanism, but through the
effects of rising housing costs in the suburbs rather than through
an overly extended journey to work:
The city could hardly compete with the suburbs where
vast areas of open land were still available for fringe
building. The cost of putting new housing on this unde -
veloped land is increasing each year. Furthermore,
the rapid rise in taxes necessary to provide schools and
other community facilities has made the suburban
housing burden heavier than many house buyers had
anticipated. As suburban land and housing become
even more costly, and taxes even higher in the future,
attractive city dwellings within a reasonable price
range might well exert an appeal which has been lacking
in the past. Indeed, it may not be going too far to sug-
gest that the traditional housing situation of scarce and
expensive city land, compared with ample and low-cost
suburban land, may eventually -- through competition
for outlying properties -- equalize if not reverse itself. 31
Raymond Vernon also speculates on the possibility that peripheral
growth will create a shortage of land in outlying locations and thus
stimulate central redevelopment to obtain building sites:
If urban land were to prove an acutely scarce resource
at some point in the future ... pressure to recapture
the "underused" gray areas for living space might be
so strong as to generate vast expenditures to that end.
But it is one of the paradoxes of urban growth today
that the increase in the supply of urban land is prob-
able outstripping the demand. At the edges of most
urban masses, farmers are shrinking their land use,
on the whole, faster than developers are taking the
land up
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Eventually, of course, this will change. Urban land
will become scarce again as sheer population growth
fills up the empty spaces. But the land promises to
grow more plentiful before it grows scarce again.
And for several decades, we are likely to see sub-
urban developments making more and more profligate
use of the land. 32
Vernon's assertions about the rate of growth of the supply of urban
land are not directly testable. Much depends upon future transpor-
tation systems and their ability to provide acceptable conditions of
access from outlying vacant land to employment centers; the future
location of employment centers is thus an additional factor in deter-
mining the effective supply of urban land. The other equilibrium
concepts are more readily testable, and we have investigated both in
our case studies. Hoyt notes an increasing demand for inlying housing
as the distance to vacant land increases: we have tested this assump-
tion by analyzing the housing market in regions that differ sharply with
respect to the location of vacant land. Hoyt's estimates of land prices
that developers can pay for inlying sites have also been tested empiri-
cally. The statement cited from Housing Choices and Housing Con-
straints is based on an assumption that rising land and operating costs
in the suburbs are approaching cost levels in more central locations.
We have examined the present situation in our study regions to determine
how great. the cost disparities are at present, and the extent to which
they encourage or inhibit redevelopment in the declining areas.
Characteristics of the Declining Areas
Different conceptions of the problems of declining areas emerge from
the foregoing analyses of consumer preferences and market factors
influencing the location of new housing. These conceptions have con-
trasting implications for government policies seeking to promote the
rebuilding of old areas, and they delineate some of the important
issues that our research can help to resolve.
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Declining demand and depressed land values characterize Hoyt's
conception of Chicago's areas of population loss in 1933. Suc-
cessive waves of immigrants occupied these areas in the past;
with the ending of large-scale immigration after World War I,
demand for housing in the blighted areas declined, and the popu-
lation thinned out. Miles Colean also emphasizes the role of
immigration in maintaining old and blighted housing. During the
period of mass immigration, Colean explains that owners of
obsolete structures saw opportunities for profit in crowding them
with newcomers rather than replacing them. Impoverished immi-
grants created a constant demand for old housing; as a result, old
areas that might have been improved were bypassed by new develop-
ment and left to deteriorate. When the flow of immigration stopped,
these areas were far removed from new development, and they had
reached a scale where individual efforts at rebuilding could not
cope with the problem of blighted surroundings. 33
Hoyt's land value analysis of Chicago showed a relative depression
in the blighted areas corresponding to their decline in population.
Before 1900, land values resembled a pyramid with its peak at the
Loop and steeply sloping sides. From 1900 to 1928, the pyramid
shape disappeared: land values in outlying areas rose to levels
approximating those in the Loop, and values between the core and
the fringe formed valleys on either side of the Loop. In a historical
analysis of land values in the old areas (settled before 1873), Hoyt
found that their values had increased only slightly after 1890. He
suggests that the difference in land values between old and new areas
reflects not only the different numbers of occupants, but other
characteristics, as well: the thin spread of low-income people in
the blighted areas, which fails to overcome their low individual pur-
chasing power by an aggregate concentration; losses in rent collection;
and a substantial rate of property deterioration caused by neglect and
vandalism.
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If Hoyt's conception is accurate, land values in the declining areas
will be low, both because of falling housing demand and because of
characteristics of the resident population. If so, acquisition costs
of old property may not constitute a serious obstacle to redevelop-
ment. Much of our research has been designed to test whether this
image of the declining areas is close to reality in our study regions,
and whether land costs are low enough to permit rebuilding cleared
sites.
The "Gray Area" Problem: Declining Demand and High Acquisition Prices
The New York Metropolitan Region Study has dramatized the subject
of residential decline with an incisive characterization of the "gray
areas. " Hoover and Vernon see the problem in New York essentially
as a situation of declining demand for gray area locations for any
purpose:
What is least clear in the (future] prospect is the
trend of development in the "gray" areas that com-
prise most of the less central parts of the core, and
their counterparts in the older large cities elsewhere
in the region. The aging multifamily housing of those
areas suffers most of the drawbacks of congestion and
high redevelopment cost that prevail in still more
central areas, but lacks their unique access advantage.
In terms of access, its appeal is to the subway com-
muters, a group now beginning to shrink in numbers.
Employment opportunities within the gray areas them-
selves are unlikely to grow. On the other hand, the
supply of obsolescent housing is likely to grow at
record rates. The increasing fraction of the region's
population who work outside the core will generally
look farther out for their homes, while the shift of
inner-core dwellers into the gray areas may well fall
far short of maintaining demand for all of the low-grade
housing that will exist there. Renewal projects will
accommodate more and more people in the inner core
itself, perhaps even at slightly higher densities per
square mile if past Manhattan experience is a guide;
and those who leave the inner core will have a great
deal more freedom to move into the single-family
residential neighborhoods beyond the gray areas than
they had in the past. 35
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Hoover and Vernon foresee some potential for redevelopment in
the innermost parts of the gray areas, near the central business
district, where special access advantages are available. Farther
out, they estimate that redevelopment costs are as high as in
central gray area locations, but the high prices do not bring cor-
responding access advantages, We have investigated these assump-
tions: Is the demand for central locations a discontinuous one,
strong near the core and very much weaker elsewhere in the gray
areas, or does it resemble a gradient extending across the gray
areas without a precipitous decline as one leaves the central
business district? Are site acquisition costs relatively constant
within the gray areas, or do they decline with increasing distance
from the center?
The Conflict of Market Standards with Social Criteria
In a separate article, Vernon describes the problem of the gray areas
not merely as a lack of demand for building sites, but as a demand
blocked by high acquisition costs:
One can picture the development of a gray ring around
the central portions of some of our major cities -- a
ring consisting of structures abandoned by the low-in-
come groups and unwanted by others at the costs involved
in converting the area to other purposes.
The obstacle of excessive acquisition costs for re-use purposes arises
again in this view. Vernon goes on to raise the question of social costs
arising from increasing abandonment of the gray areas:
The social costs of maintaining the ring would be high.
The ring would lengthen the journeys -to-work of those
whose business lay in the central city. It could need-
lessly lengthen the mileage of mass transit facilities.
Underused though it was, it would still demand fire
and police protection, schools, water and sewers.
And the eyesore it presented would be a constant
source of revulsion to those who passed through it. 36
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We have not undertaken an investigation of these social costs, but
we have investigated whether the lengthening journey to work acts
as a significant private cost and induces consumers to pay rent
premiums for locations close to the center.
Chester Rapkin also sees the gray area problem as a conflict arising
from the clash of economic standards of the housing market against
non-economic social criteria. Vernon sees a lack of effective market
demand for gray area locations at prevailing costs; Rapkin sees' the
high acquisition costs of gray area sites as reflections of a housing
market that fails to provide sufficient low-income accommodations.
Rapkin phrases the problem of the gray areas as the question, 'What
shall we do with physical assets that retain economic value long after
they cease to serve social purposes judged by other than market
criteria?" 37 The approach that he suggests is to promote measures
that will reduce the economic value of obsolete housing. Basically,
the way to lower acquisition costs in the gray areas is to maintain a
rate of new housing construction in excess of the rate of net family
formation. He cites Philadelphia as a city where these conditions
have been achieved; the results have been increased vacancies in
lower quality housing and a reduction in site acquisition costs.
The key elements of these conceptions of the gray areas concern the
demand for gray area locations and the costs of site acquisition.
Some analyses of the problem emphasize the weakness of demand;
others emphasize the high costs of redevelopment. Our approach
has been to investigate both sides of the problem, in order to deter-
mine how wide the gap is between site costs and re-use values. The
regions we have chosen to study illustrate different types of metro-
politan structure; our analysis has been designed to search out the
structural factors that influence demand and cost levels. By
identifying these factors and how they operate, we attempt to indicate
how metropolitan planning and general public policies may promote
the rebuilding of the declining areas.
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